Preventative Polarization:

Republican Senators' Positional Adaptation in the Tea Party Era

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Republicans in Congress have, by almost any measure, become significantly more conservative over the last 25 years. We propose that the changing pressures they face when seeking reelection helps explain this trend. Rather than moderating towards the general election median voter as they had previously done, Republican senators became more conservative when seeking reelection to avoid the emergence of, or mitigate the threat from, a primary opponent after the Tea Party emerged. We also show that at the height of Tea Party era—the 111th to 113th congresses—retiring senators moderated their voting behavior, suggesting that their personal preferences were more moderate than their expressed preferences. During the Trump era, we report mixed results, suggesting that the threat posed by primary challengers was not solely ideological, though the new dynamics and behaviors that emerged in the Tea Party era have continued to shape the Republican Party in the Senate.

Keywords: Republican Party, Senate, polarization, Tea Party, primary elections

It used to be they're looking over their shoulders to see who their general opponent is. Now they're looking over to see who their primary opponent is.

Former Speaker Dennis Hastert[1]

The 2008 elections were the worst elections for the Republican Party since at least 1976. In addition to Barack Obama winning the presidency, the Democrats (eventually) enjoyed a filibuster-proof majority in the Senate, and an almost eighty-seat advantage in the House. Republicans had different reactions to this election. Some prominent Republicans advocated for the conventional wisdom that the party needed to focus more directly on the median voter (Downs, 1957). In in a *New York Times* opinion piece, David Brooks wrote that the party had to moderate "to appeal more to Hispanics, independents and younger voters" (2008). Ken Mehlman, who managed George W. Bush's 2004 reelection effort resulting in the highest number of Republicans in Congress since the 1930s shared that opinion: "The way you do that, in part, is by being a party that is less reliant on white guys and expands it support among Hispanics, among African-Americans" (Martin et al., 2007).

That opinion was not universally shared. Typifying the opposition to the moderation strategy, Senator Jim DeMint (South Carolina) declared: "I would rather have thirty Republicans in the Senate who really believe in principles of limited government, free markets, free people, than to have sixty that don't have a set of beliefs" (Carney, 2009). At a time when confrontation was less common, he directly targeted a fellow senator: "I'd rather lose with Pat Toomey than win with Arlen Specter any day" (Moore, 2010).[2] These diametrically opposed reactions underscored the tension among Republicans.

In the congresses after the 2008 election, it became clear that moderation was not part of the Republican playbook. In fact, quite the opposite. The largest conservative increases in roll-call voting among Republican senators since Reagan was elected president in 1980 occurred after the 2010 elections, when the average NOMINATE score (Poole & Rosenthal, 1985) went from 0.397 to 0.441. The second largest increase (0.029) occurred after the 2012 elections. The average change after the other eighteen elections was one-sixth that at 0.007.[3] Before these shifts, Republican senators were only seventeen percent further from the ideological midpoint than

1 Quoted in Ryan (2013).

2 Toomey and Specter, who was the incumbent, were competing in the Republican primary until Specter switched parties.

3 In the twenty elections since 1980, Democratic senators only became on average 0.003 more liberal after each election, often described as asymmetric polarization.

Democratic senators. After these two shifts, that distance doubled (to 36 percent) and increased that amount again over the next four elections (to 48 percent).

We think this disjoint between the Downsian logic of moderation and the Republican reality of more conservative voting can at least partially be explained by the changing incentives senators faced during their reelections. As primaries became more threatening and general elections became increasingly one-sided affairs (*Senate Toss Up Chart*, 2021), Republican senators shifted their voting behavior. Though data suggest that primary voters are no more "extreme" than general electorates (Hirano et al., 2010; Sides et al., 2020), primaries may incentivize politicians to take non-centrist positions consistent with donors, activists, and other groups crucial during the nomination phase of the campaign (Masket, 2009). The Tea Party encouraged primary challenges to those incumbents who were insufficiently conservative and its track record of winning open-seat primaries made their threats real (Blum, 2020; Blum & Cowburn, 2023; Gervais & Morris, 2018).

We therefore test the influence of the Tea Party and its associated groups in compelling Republican senators to vote more conservatively when seeking reelection. Though the Tea Party Caucus was only formally established in the House of Representatives, studies demonstrate important cross-chamber affects (Rohde, 1991; Theriault, 2013). We also think that focusing on the Senate helps redress a disproportionate focus in the literature on the Tea Party in the House (Bailey et al., 2012; Blum & Cowburn, 2023; Gervais & Morris, 2018). Empirically, the cohort structure of the Senate, with one-third of members facing reelection every two years also enables a research design constructed to identify behavioral differences among those seeking reelection and their colleagues who are not in any given election cycle. Given that states remain more competitive than House districts in general elections and that Senate Republicans have radicalized less than their counterparts in the House, we also contend that analyzing the Senate makes for a harder empirical test of our theory.

We test Republican senators' roll-call voting adaptation in those congresses when they sought reelection both before and after the emergence of the Tea Party using a series of fixed effects models. We find that senators behaved consistently with Downs (1957) before the emergence of the Tea Party, casting more moderate votes when seeking reelection. Once the Tea Party emerged, this pattern of moderation to appeal to general election voters ended and senators instead became more conservative in these congresses. This rightward movement was most pronounced at the height of the *Tea Party era* (2009 to 2015) but continued into the *Trump era* (2015 to 2023). In the Tea Party era, we demonstrate that further-right voting is connected to external pressure rather than simply being an expression of senators' personal preferences, with

evidence that retiring senators cast more moderate votes once they announced their retirement and were thus alleviated from electoral concerns. This relationship was not present either before or after this period. In seeking to understand the driving force behind this change, we demonstrate that the emergence of primary challengers was strongly associated with more conservative voting in this period, and that those senators who received a *viable* primary challenger moved farther rightward.

These results indicate that the presence of an organized faction on the party's right—which used (the threat of) ideological primary challenges—incentivized senators to adapt more conservative roll-call voting behavior. In line with other recent research on party factions (Bloch Rubin, 2017; Blum, 2020; Blum & Cowburn, 2023; Clarke, 2020; DiSalvo, 2012; Noel, 2016a; Rouse et al., 2022), our findings suggest that sub-party groups play an important role in orienting parties along the ideological spectrum. Our results therefore provide evidence of what we term *preventative polarization*—where incumbents adapt more extreme or consistently partisan voting positions to ward off the emergence of, or lessen the threat posed by, ideological primary challengers—at least on the right of the political spectrum. Unlike other scholarship on this subject (Cowburn, 2024; Hirano et al., 2008; Meyer, 2021), which only tests incumbent responses once a primary challenger emerges,[4] our empirical design enables us to identify senators' strategic anticipation of *potential* primary challenges on ideological grounds and adapt their behavior in advance. We argue that it is the mere threat of a primary opponent that drives this conservative shift in voting because the adaptation of some senators was likely sufficient to *prevent* challengers who might otherwise have emerged, meaning we test senators' behavioral adaptation in response to any *potential* challenger when seeking reelection. As such, we assert, that this threat affects all in-cycle Republican incumbents, while also demonstrating that these findings are particularly pronounced among those senators who elicit a viable primary challenger.

Primary Elections and Elite Positioning

Elite partisan polarization, commonly defined as the ideological distance between Democrats and Republicans in Congress, has increased consistently since the late 1970s and reached unprecedented levels in recent years (Lewis et al., 2021; McCarty et al., 2006; Theriault, 2008). Adaptation, the process through which individual members move towards an ideological pole during their career, accounts for roughly one-third of congressional polarization between the 1970s

[4] See e.g., Meyer (2021, p. 2) "This study examines the voting behavior of incumbent senators in both parties while they are *actively* being primaried" [emphasis added].

and the 2000s (Theriault, 2006). It is this process that we explicitly study here, though the pressures we identify are likely also present in the two-thirds of polarization caused by the replacement of more moderate members by more ideologically extreme members.

Whether and how primaries contribute to elite polarization in Congress remains contested in the literature (Abramowitz, 2008; Brady et al., 2007; Burden, 2001; Cowburn, 2022; Fiorina & Levendusky, 2006; Sides et al., 2020). Summarizing data from 1936 to 2006, Hirano et al. (2010, p. 169) find "little evidence that...the threat of primary competition [is] associated with partisan polarization in congressional roll call voting." We argue that these findings across this seventy-year period of relatively stable party dynamics may need to be reconsidered in light of the shifting electoral incentives Republicans faced once the Tea Party began exerting pressure from the right.

The logic of members' behavior is their desire for electoral survival (Mayhew, 1974). During the party-stable system that Hirano et al. (2010) study, electoral survival likely compelled senators to moderate their voting records during their in-cycle congresses to appeal to general election voters. We examine whether that same reelection instinct compelled them to cast more conservative votes to appeal to primary voters once the Tea Party emerged. Though this shift in their in-cycle congresses might hurt them in their general election efforts, senators first need to survive the primary before having the privilege of worrying about the general election. With party organizations dominating the general elections in this period (Lee, 2016), this anti-Downsian move to the right may even maximize their reelection probability.

Because the United States has one of the most open systems of legislative candidate selection in the world (Cowburn & Kerr, 2023; Hazan & Rahat, 2010), intra-party factions can easily field their own candidates to challenge incumbents, and primary challenges on ideological grounds have become increasingly common in the twenty-first century (Boatright, 2013; Cowburn, 2022, 2024). These challenges to incumbents occur because some part of the party coalition believes that the incumbent is not sufficiently ideological (Jewitt & Treul, 2019). One potential response by incumbents is to adapt their position towards the faction to reduce the likelihood of a primary challenger emerging and limiting their impact when they do (Brady et al., 2007).

In adapting their positions, senators may adopt a range of strategies to limit the threat from intra-party challengers including campaign messaging and advertising, seeking endorsements from these groups, introducing bills in Congress, or making press statements that align with the goals and concerns of the faction. We think these strategies extend to how they behave on the Senate floor. Because roll-call votes are easier to observe, record, and analyze, we restrict our analysis to this one activity not because the others are not important, but because we have good roll-call voting records and they are highly correlated with other measures of positioning, including

donor support (Bonica, 2014), factional allegiances (Clarke, 2020), media engagement (Cowburn & Knüpfer, 2024), campaign communication (Cowburn & Sältzer, 2024), and activist perceptions (Hopkins & Noel, 2021).

When legislating, senators must often moderate their positions to ensure that bills—which often require a supermajority (usually sixty votes) to overcome a filibuster—pass (Tausanovitch & Berger, 2019). Senators who are unwilling to compromise may struggle to build the coalitions needed to pass legislation, potentially stalling the legislative process and making them appear ineffective (Volden & Wiseman, 2024). At the same time, parties offer senators incentives to obstruct bills to demonstrate loyalty, such as when they vote against the alternative party's bill, to demonstrate ideological differences to appeal to the partisan base, or to delay or derail legislation that their party disagrees with, either to buy time to negotiate improved terms or build public support for their position (Curry & Lee, 2021). We therefore expect that the emergence of the Tea Party shifted the incentives for senators from the former to the latter when voting on bills.

The Tea Party as a Driver of Republican Radicalization

Given the recent critiques of the narrative of polarization as the central challenge facing U.S. politics (Kreiss & McGregor, 2023), the clear asymmetry in positional movement between Republicans and Democrats in Congress (Hacker & Pierson, 2006; Mann & Ornstein, 2008; Theriault, 2013),[5] and the Republican Party's adoption of authoritarian rhetoric and racialized anti-democratic sentiment (Bartels, 2020; Cowburn & Oswald, 2020), we focus exclusively on positional adaptation in the Republican Party. Our focus on Republican radicalization is therefore both normatively motivated and empirically justified.

One driver of the recent radicalization of the Republican Party was the emergence of the Tea Party movement. Tea Party elites and supporters were ideologically to the right of other Republicans (Rouse et al., 2022; Skocpol & Williamson, 2012), and the faction was highly successful in reorienting both the elite and mass party rightward (Blum & Cowburn, 2023). To do so, the Tea Party had a variety of approaches, with evidence that it initially functioned as an astroturf organization pressuring the party from the right in the manner of a pressure group before broadening its influence in such a way that helped shift public opinion rightward (Lo, 2012). In

[5] The lack of movement in roll-call voting among Democratic senators during this period would likely produce null results in our empirical analyses. Democratic senators who served after Biden's election in 2020 were only 17 percent further from the ideological midpoint than the Democrats who served after Reagan's election in 1980; the Republicans, in contrast, moved nearly four times as much (64 percent).

this first stage, connections to elite groups including Americans for Prosperity and FreedomWorks provided the most important mechanism to influence the positions of elites (Street & DiMaggio, 2011). After this initial phase, Tea Party activists targeted party elites through direct communication such as in town hall meetings (Broockman et al., 2021). Where these groups were unable to persuade Republican elites to adopt their policies, they instead tried to reshape the local party in their own image (Blum, 2020). In this attempt, the nomination process served as *the* key mechanism that the Tea Party used to incentivize incumbent members of Congress to adapt their positions away from the center using the threat of replacement (Blum, 2020; Blum & Cowburn, 2023).

This dynamic of intra-party threat is perhaps best understood in the response of "Tea Party hero" (Steinhauer, 2012) Jim DeMint to the 2008 election. DeMint proposed several rule changes in the Republican conference that struck at the seniority system and the power of the Appropriations Committee; they attracted no more than a handful of supporters. After one vote, Minority Leader Mitch McConnell commented, "Jim, you can't change the Senate" (DeMint, 2011). In an effort to prove McConnell wrong, DeMint developed a strategy of changing the Senate by changing the kind of senator that was elected. In nine Senate races in 2010, DeMint endorsed a candidate that was running against the Republican establishment's preferred candidate (see Theriault, 2013).[6] His candidates won five of those primaries, though only Marco Rubio (Florida), Rand Paul (Kentucky), and Mike Lee (Utah) won their general elections. In total, DeMint poured nearly $7,000,000 into the campaigns of his endorsed candidates. His efforts were broadly aligned with other Tea Party organizations who sought to reorient the party rightward (Blum, 2020; Skocpol & Williamson, 2012).

Incumbent senators were not passive observers as DeMint and the Tea Party engaged in their primaries. In line with theoretical expectations (Brady et al., 2007), many senators responded by becoming more conservative in their issue positions. One oft-cited example of this positional movement is the late Arizona Senator John McCain's adoption of more conservative positions on climate change (Anderson et al., 2020) and the southern border fence (Meyer, 2021) after being challenged from the right by former House member J.D. Hayworth in the 2010 Republican primary. Though primary voters are themselves unlikely to directly monitor the voting behavior of the elected officials in Congress (Masket, 2009),[7] important organizations in the movement such

[6] Only one of the nine (Arlen Spector) was an incumbent, the rest were all running in open seats or to challenge a Democratic senator.

[7] It is also unclear whether primary voters would reward more extreme roll-call voting were they cognizant of it (Abramowitz, 2008; Hill, 2015; Hirano et al., 2010; Porter, 2021).

as Tea Party Express, Tea Party Patriots, Americans for Prosperity, and FreedomWorks were keenly aware of senators' voting behavior and adherence to conservative policy goals (Skocpol & Williamson, 2012). Evidence from the House of Representatives suggests that ideological extremity in roll-call voting helps incumbents avoid primary challenges (Brady et al., 2007; Pyeatt, 2013). Though we might expect this same effect for senators, a senator's six-year term is broken up into governing seasons and electoral seasons (Fenno, 1998), meaning that not all incumbents face the pressure at the same time.

The Tea Party movement remained important beyond its demise, where the rightward ideological shift reduced the organizational capacity of establishment party forces and helped foster an increasingly Trumpian Republican Party. Most obviously, the rightward movement produced a party at both the elite and mass levels that was less openly hostile to Trump's populist and nationalist rhetoric and a policy platform that shared much in common with the Tea Party movement that preceded him (Gervais & Morris, 2018). The Republican intra-party conflict that the Tea Party fostered in Congress has further been identified as weakening the established party structures that might otherwise have coordinated to prevent Trump from winning the nomination in 2016 (Noel, 2016b). Furthermore, the Tea Party movement may have provided the grassroots supporters and megadonors approach that Trump used in 2016 (Pew Research Center, 2019; Skocpol & Williamson, 2012). We therefore expect that the incentives established in the Tea Party era continued to structure senators' behavior once Trump came to dominate the party.[8]

Expectations

Below we set out our expectations when senators seek reelection or retire in both the pre-Tea Party and post-Tea Party periods.

Reelection Hypotheses

If senators' observed roll-call voting behavior balances their personal preferences with their constituencies' preferences, we would expect the latter to be dominant during the final two years of their terms in office. During the previous four years, they are comparatively less constrained by their constituents. As discussed above, in the pre-Tea Party era, we expect that senators will follow the Downsian (1957) conventional wisdom of moderating when seeking reelection to appeal to the median voter among their general electorate (Fenno, 1978). Conversely, we expect that

[8] We test this expectation in an extension to our results section.

once the Tea Party emerges, Republican senators will instead adapt their positioning in a more conservative direction to appeal to their primary electorate and negate the threat from the intra-party faction to their right:

> **$H1_a$ Pre-Tea Party Era**: To appeal to their general electorate, Republican senators moderate in the congress they seek reelection.
>
> **$H1_b$ Post-Tea Party Era**: To appeal to their primary electorate, Republican senators become more conservative in the congress they seek reelection.

Republican senators hold more conservative policy positions than their general electorates (Bafumi & Herron, 2010). Consequently, Republican senators express more moderate positions than they would personally prefer when so as to align with their general election voters. Yet, the form of preventative polarization we hypothesize for the Tea Party era and beyond incentivizes senators to cast more conservative roll-call votes than they would otherwise choose.

Retirement Hypotheses

Downsian logic suggests that senators should be comparatively unconstrained to exercise their personal preferences after they announce that they are not seeking reelection. To test whether senators are adopting positions incongruent with their personal preferences, we test positional adaptation of those senators who announce their retirement.[9]

Most senators announce their retirement early in their final congress in an attempt to help the party retain their seat by allowing time for quality candidates to emerge as their potential successor (Karol, 2015). Consequently, scholars have found a last-term effect in how their voting behavior changes (Lott & Bronars, 1993; Tien, 2001; Vanbeek, 1991). If serving senators feel pressured to align with their general election voters through the adoption of moderate positions, we should expect retirees to be more conservative in their final congress. Conversely, if senators feel incentivized to be further to the right due to pressure from their primary electorate, then retirees should moderate once the electoral pressure is obviated. In short, we expect that retirees will adapt their positions in the opposite direction to those senators' facing reelection:

[9] This group likely remains subject to at least some external pressures such that even retirees' roll-call voting is unlikely to represent senators' 'true' personal preference, especially if they choose to run for an alternative public office. We therefore consider this group as the best available proxy of senators' personal preferences, with comparatively few electoral concerns.

$H2_a$ Pre-Tea Party Era: Relieved of the electoral pressure to align with their general electorate, retiring senators become more conservative in their final congress.

$H2_b$ Post-Tea Party Era: Relieved of the electoral pressure to align with their primary constituency, retiring senators moderate in their final congress.

Put simply, we anticipate that senators retiring before 2009 became more conservative and those retiring after 2009 moderated in their final congresses as the electoral pressure shifted from the general to the primary electorate following the emergence of the Tea Party. Relieved of these pressures, we expect that retirees adopt positions more congruent with their personal preferences in their final congress.

Data

To assess Republican senators' ideological movement over the course of their terms, we construct an original dataset from a combination of well-established sources. Our complete dataset includes all Republican senators beginning in the 97th Congress (1981–83), the commonly conceived start of the increasingly polarized period (McCarty et al., 2006; Theriault, 2006), up to and including the 117th Congress (2021–23). In total, our dataset comprises 178 senators and 1,065 senator–congress dyads that serve as our unit of observation.

Discussions of elite polarization frequently focus on the growing ideological distance between Republicans and Democrats in terms of their voting behavior in Congress. The most common method of characterizing roll-call voting behavior—our dependent variable—is NOMINATE (Poole & Rosenthal, 1985), which scales members of Congress along a single dimension from –1 (liberal) to 1 (conservative) based on the similarity of their voting records to other members.[10] Because these scores are computed across senators' entire careers, we instead use the one-congress-at-a-time version of this measure, commonly referred to as Nokken-Poole scores (Nokken & Poole, 2004).[11] Nokken-Poole scores enable us to capture the adaptative change in senators voting behavior in the congress in which they seek reelection or retire.[12]

Our key independent variables are dichotomous. For the Reelection Hypotheses, our independent variable takes the value "1" for each congress in which a senator seeks reelection and

[10] In line with the literature on the subject, we use the first dimension to identify positions.

[11] Given their centrality to our study, we include a comprehensive discussion of Nokken-Poole scores in the supplementary material.

[12] One alternative approach would be to use partisan unity scores. Yet, voting against the party is not a directional signal. For example, a Democratic senator could vote against legislation from their own party either because it is too liberal or not liberal enough. Nokken-Poole scores provide this additional information.

"0" otherwise. We consider all senators who advance as far as the primary ballot or party convention as having sought reelection. Similarly, any senator who is reselected as the party's candidate unopposed is considered as having sought reelection. We therefore include senators who are defeated by a same-party opponent in a primary or convention and those who are renominated and then not reelected for any reason.[13] For the Retirement Hypotheses, we consider all senators who actively chose not to seek reelection as having retired.[14] Our interest here is in the change in behavior once senators no longer face reelection to the Senate, meaning we do not differentiate between senators who retire from politics and public office completely and those who retire to run for an alternative office such as governor.

Given the temporal dimension of our hypotheses, we construct a "post-Tea Party" variable which takes the value "1" for observations in the 111th Congress or later, and "0" before. Our key independent variable in our post-Tea Party hypotheses is therefore the interaction of reelection or retirement with this time variable, with the non-interacted reelection or retirement component serving as the key independent variable in our pre-Tea Party period.

Republican senators may adjust their roll-call voting behavior for a variety of reasons. Given our specific interest in the dynamics of reelection and retirement, we attempt to mitigate the influence of alternative explanations by controlling for them empirically. Most obviously, senators may adjust their positions if the preferences of their voters change. If a senator's state moves meaningfully leftward or rightward during their career, we might reasonably expect that they update their voting behavior to align with their constituents. In line with this expectation, senators from very red states likely pay more attention to their primary constituency, knowing that they are highly unlikely to lose reelection to a Democratic opponent. Conversely, senators from swing or Democratic-leaning states must be comparatively attentive to the preferences of their general electorate. To account for these possibilities, we control for the state's partisanship, operationalized as Republican vote share in the most recent presidential election (FEC, 2023). The presidency is the only office in which all voters decide between the same candidates, removing any inter-state differences in candidate quality, and presidential vote share has long been used as a reliable indicator of state partisanship (Cook Political Report, 2017).

We also control for variation in several key economic and demographic indicators at the state level. Low median income has been theorized as motivating more conservative voter behavior

[13] Most commonly, losing the general election. Less common examples include dying between the primary and the general election or resigning from office during this period.

[14] We do not consider deaths (e.g., John McCain in 2018) as retirements given the impossibility of determining whether these senators expected not to live until their next reelection and adjusted their roll-call voting in relation to that belief.

through greater economic anxiety, despite decades of wealthier Americans being more supportive of Republican presidential candidates (Gelman et al., 2007). Racial patterns of partisan support are less ambiguous, where white Americans have long been more supportive of the Republican Party in the modern era than any other racial group (see e.g., Phillips, 2016). Accordingly, senators in states that are getting whiter may feel incentivized to adopt more conservative voting positions to align with the perceived preferences of their voters. Alternatively, the "racial threat hypothesis" suggests that larger Black populations cause white voters to feel threatened and so support more conservative policies (Avery & Fine, 2012; Blalock, 1967; Giles & Buckner, 1993; Huckfeldt & Kohfeld, 1989).

An associated pattern is present in partisan support across urban and rural areas, where urban populations are far more supportive of the Democratic Party and the Republican Party faring better in rural areas (Parker et al., 2018).[15] Accordingly, we include controls for median household income, the percentage of white voters in a state, and the percentage of the state's population which lives in an urban area. We take these figures from the relevant versions of the U.S. Census American Community Survey estimates.

We further note that Senate voting is strongly conditioned by majority party status (Gailmard & Jenkins, 2007; Roberts, 2007). We therefore include an indicator variable that takes the value "1" when the Republican Party has a working majority in the chamber and "0" otherwise.[16] Given that we seek to identify patterns of adaptation in relation to reelection and retirement within the broader polarizing trend (depicted visually in the supplementary material), we detrend our data by including a continuous control for congress (time).[17] Absent a control for the temporal structure of our dependent variable, the ongoing process of Republican radicalization might incorrectly result in roll-call voting adaptation being attributed to senators' reelection or retirement status.

[15] We recognize that more nuanced measures of urban-rural variation are available (Nemerever & Rogers, 2021), given our empirical results we do not expect these would meaningfully change using alternative constructions.

[16] In a fifty-fifty Senate, majority status is denoted by control of the presidency.

[17] In the supplementary material, we demonstrate the robustness of our findings to the inclusion of time (congress) fixed effects.

Results

To identify positional adaptation by senators in the congress in which they stand for reelection or choose to retire we use a series of fixed effects models.[18] In this, the congress (97th, 98th, and so on) serves as our time variable, with senators' (unchanging) identifiers as the panel variable. Our results therefore compare senators' positions in the congress in which they sought reelection or retired to those congresses they did not.[19] This approach has several advantages; most obviously, we can identify positional adaptation at the individual level when a senator seeks reelection or retires. We report the results for all models using robust standard errors clustered at the individual (senator) level.

We note that our results are likely attenuated because the timing of the congress does not align perfectly with the way senators think about their reelections. Downsian logic would suggest that members begin moderating during the second congress of their term, where the primary threat may be felt before their in-cycle congress. Furthermore, once the primary threat ceases—either because a challenger does not materialize, or the primary election is over—incumbent senators likely revert to their normal voting behavior or moderate to appeal to their general electorate.[20] These issues likely reduce the size of any relationships found (type II error) rather than produce spurious positive associations (type I error). Despite these concerns not strictly abiding by the temporal parameters of a congress, we identify substantively significant results under several conditions.

Reelection Hypotheses

Consistent with the Reelection Hypotheses during the pre-Tea Party era ($\mathbf{H1_a}$), senators moderated when facing reelection, as shown in Table 1.[21] We understand this moderation as an attempt to align with the general election median voter in their state and to ward off criticisms from their Democratic opponents that they are too conservative or extreme. Controlling for other

[18] We report the results of a series of robustness checks in the supplementary material. In all cases, our results remain substantively significant and align with the main results reported here.

[19] In the supplementary material, we conduct an alternative analysis: centered at the congress level, we test positional differences in roll-call voting between those senators seeking reelection or retiring and other senators. This enables us to include all senator-year dyads in our analysis, though presents challenges in comparability between groups. For this reason, we contend that the analysis presented here which tests individual adaptation represents the more comprehensive test of our theory.

[20] The congressional primary season runs from March until September of the election year, meaning, in the earliest case, we may have a full nine months of "unpressured" votes in a congress, or seven months of votes designed to appeal to general election voters.

[21] We present full results including all control variables in the supplementary material.

potential covariates, senators in the pre-Tea Party era have more moderate voting records (–0.035, give or take 0.004) in the congresses that they sought reelection compared to their voting record in other congresses.

Table 1: Republican Senators' Voting Behavior when Seeking Reelection

	Reelection Model
Reelection (**H1$_a$**)	-0.035***
	(0.004)
Post Tea Party (111th Congress or later)	-0.016
	(0.013)
Reelection x Post Tea Party (**H1$_b$**)	0.042***
	(0.010)
Observations	1,065
Number of Senators	178
R^2	0.076
Individual (Senator) Fixed Effects	✓

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

In the post-Tea Party Era, we expected that senators would adapt their position rightward, becoming more conservative in the congress in which they face reelection (**H1$_b$**). Our results in Table 1 show clear evidence of such adaptation, with senators positioning themselves 0.042 (give or take 0.010) to the right when facing reelection in the Tea Party era, shown by the significant interaction term. Senators can therefore be understood to be fully 0.077 further to the right compared to the equivalent congress in the pre-Tea Party era, roughly four times the average rightward movement in each congress in this period. The directionality and differences between the movement in these periods are both statistically significant and substantively meaningful. In Fenno's (1978) terms, senators, who had previously moderated to align with their general electorate, began adopting more conservative voting positions when facing reelection, likely to appeal to their primary electorate.

Retirement Hypotheses

Turning to the Retirement Hypotheses, we expect that senators make the opposite ideological shift to those seeking reelection. Our results are not consistent with our expectations, with null results for both periods presented in Table 2. Prior to the emergence of the Tea Party (**H2$_a$**), when senators who sought reelection became more moderate, retiring senators' positions were unchanged. This null finding suggests that senators were either voting in line with their personal preferences or that they felt continued pressure to maintain their previous positions following their

retirement announcement. In the post-Tea Party era (**H2$_b$**) senators may have moderated slightly (–0.033), but this relationship is not statistically significant ($p = 0.120$). Accordingly, we report null results for both periods.

Table 2: Republican Senators' Voting Behavior when Retiring

	Retirement Model
Retirement (**H2$_a$**)	0.003
	(0.011)
Post Tea Party (111th Congress or later)	0.002
	(0.013)
Retirement x Post Tea Party (**H2$_b$**)	-0.033
	(0.021)
Observations	1,065
Number of Senators	178
R^2	0.029
Individual (Senator) Fixed Effects	✓

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

These null results may be because senators do not behave in the way that we theorized due to continued pressures being exerted on retiring members, because our statistical approach is underpowered, or due to the temporal concerns around retirement discussed above. For example, a senator who ends up retiring may not plan to do so at the start of the congress and therefore continue to vote in line with their previous record. Or incumbent senators may have shifted their voting behavior immediately after their previous election because they intended to retire. In either case, we do not detect an in-cycle difference.

Tea Party & Trump Era Differences

Many commentators (see e.g., Kabaservice, 2020) have noted important differences in the Republican Party between what might be considered the Tea Party era (2009 to 2015) and the period defined by the emergence and dominance of the singular personality of Donald Trump (2016 onwards). To better understand these differences, we split our post-Tea Party period into what we call the *Tea Party era* consisting of the 111th, 112th, and 113th congresses, and the *Trump era*; the 114th, 115th, 116th and 117th congresses.[22]

[22] In the supplementary material, we move this boundary so that the 114th Congress is in the Tea Party era.

In Figure 1, we report the coefficients for the relevant interaction terms for both hypotheses.[23] Consistent with our main results for the reelection hypotheses, senators facing reelection in either the Tea Party or the Trump eras adapted their voting records rightward. We note that the rightward movement in the Tea Party era was more than twice the size of that in the Trump era.

Figure 1: Tea Party & Trump Era Differences



The distinct behavioral responses between retiring senators in the Tea Party and Trump eras is far starker. Retiring senators in the Tea Party era adopted much more moderate voting positions than they had done in other congresses, potentially indicating that senators felt compelled to adopt positions further to the right than they personally preferred at the time when ideological pressure from the right of the party was at its greatest. In the Trump era, this pattern of moderation in the congress in which senators retired did not continue and we report null results. Senators who retired between the 114th and 117th congresses did not adapt their roll-call voting behavior in either direction.

We proffer two explanations for the differences between the Tea Party and Trump eras. First, by the 114th Congress, senators may have moved so far to the right that comparatively less space existed for them to move even further in signaling their conservative *bona fides*. We think that this is partly a result of the replacement effect, where, during the Tea Party era, many of

[23] We present the full results of this model in Table A.4 of the supplementary material.

the more moderate senators either lost elections or chose to retire. The lack of moderation among retiring senators in the Trump era suggests that this cohort had more conservative personal preferences. This explanation aligns with evidence that Republican candidates, unlike their Democratic opponents, did not attempt to communicate more radical positions during the primary phase of the 2020 electoral cycle (Cowburn & Sältzer, 2024). Because no Republican senator failed to advance from their primary in the four election cycles of the Trump era, incumbents may have perceived less of an ideological threat once Trump led the party.

Second, it could be that when Donald Trump took the oath of office the Republican Party's fealty to a person replaced its adherence to an ideology. Trump's lack of a consistent conservative ideology (Lawless & Theriault, 2021) gave him the space to prioritize personal loyalty. This preference ordering was seen most obviously in the shifting power dynamics in the House of Representatives in 2021, when the conservative Representative Liz Cheney[24] was stripped of her leadership position as Chair of the House Republican Conference and then targeted and defeated in a primary. The comparatively moderate Elise Stefanik[25] was promoted into leadership and supported by former president Trump. Whereas Cheney supported Trump's impeachment and served as the vice chair of the January 6th committee, Stefanik identified as "ultra-MAGA and...proud of it" (Stefanik, 2022), with Trump praising her as "one of my killers" (Karni, 2022) during his first impeachment trial. In the Trump era, senators might therefore be more likely to adopt Trumpian rhetoric (see also Cowburn & Knüpfer, 2024) or signal personal allegiance to the former president to prevent or neutralize a primary challenger (see Blum et al., 2023).

The Role of Primary Challenges

To test our argument that primary elections are the underlying mechanism driving the changes we observe in voting behavior when senators seek reelection, we produce two further models that consider positional adaptation when senators receive a primary challenger. Whereas the previous models assessed all senators' adaptation when seeking reelection, these models test whether senators adapt their voting behavior only where a primary challenger emerges.[26] In our first set of models, we therefore consider adaptation in response to *any* primary challenge. Yet, not all primary challengers are equal, and so we include a second model for what we consider to be a

[24] DW-NOMINATE score of 0.405.
[25] DW-NOMINATE score of 0.263.
[26] Of course, only members seeking reelection can receive a primary challenger, but many senators do not receive a primary.

viable primary challenge; where a challenger emerges and receives at least fifteen percent of the vote share (following Boatright, 2013).[27]

Table 3: Any Challenger Model

	(1) Challenger Model	(2) Tea Party Era Challenger Model	(3) Trump Era Challenger Model
Any Primary Challenger	-0.023***	-0.015**	-0.011
	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.007)
Post Tea Party Era (111th Congress or later)	-0.008		
	(0.013)		
Tea Party Era (111th-113th Congress)		0.003	
		(0.010)	
Trump Era (114th-117th Congress)			-0.021*
			(0.012)
Challenger x Era	0.034***	0.041**	0.015
	(0.012)	(0.018)	(0.013)
Observations	1,066	1,066	1,066
R-squared	0.034	0.034	0.030
Number of Senators	179	179	179

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

In Table 3 we present the result of our any challenger model. Here, we see that in the period prior to the emergence of the Tea Party, senators who received a primary challenge were more moderate than at other points in their career, shown by the significant negative coefficient on the "Any Primary Challenger" variable in model 1. This moderation was likely due to their continued prioritization of their general electorate rather than their primary voters even as a same-party challenger emerged. In both the post-Tea Party and the Tea Pary eras, we see that senators adopted more conservative voting positions than they had done previously, as shown by the significant positive interaction terms in models 1 and 2. In the Trump era, we do not see this positional response to the emergence of a primary challenger (shown by the non-significant interaction term in model 3), indicating that the positive coefficient in model 1 is primarily the result of behavioral adaptation by senators in the Tea Party era.

[27] We recognize that this approach involves a *post-hoc* justification of viability given that incumbents may respond more strongly to a candidate they perceive to be viable, thereby reducing their vote share below 15%.

Table 4: Viable Challenger Model

	(1) Challenger Model	(2) Tea Party Era Challenger Model	(3) Trump Era Challenger Model
Viable Primary Challenger	-0.034***	-0.013	-0.012
	(0.011)	(0.009)	(0.012)
Post Tea Party Era (111th Congress or later)	-0.009		
	(0.012)		
Tea Party Era (111th-113th Congress)		0.003	
		(0.010)	
Trump Era (114th-117th Congress)			-0.024*
			(0.012)
Challenger x Era	0.064***	0.060**	0.037**
	(0.016)	(0.025)	(0.016)
Observations	1,066	1,066	1,066
R-squared	0.043	0.035	0.033
Number of Senators	179	179	179

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

In Table 4 we present the results of our viable challenger models. As with our any challenger model, we see a clear difference in senators' responses to a viable primary challenger before and after the emergence of the Tea Party. Prior to the Tea Party, senators were, on average –0.034 more moderate in their voting behavior in the congress which they faced a viable primary challenger (give or take 0.011). Once the Tea Party emerged, senators were, on average, 0.064 more conservative in their voting behavior than they had been before the 111th congress (give or take 0.016). In our second and third models, we again show that this rightward shift happened primarily in the Tea Party era, though we also identify a significant interaction effect in the Trump era.[28]

These findings suggests that rightward positional adaptation from 2009 onwards is largely being driven by those senators who have the most to fear from being primaried.[29] In the pre-Tea Party era, even those senators who received a viable primary challenger adopted more moderate positions than in other congresses, potentially because these challenges were being made on non-ideological grounds (also see Boatright, 2013; Cowburn, 2024) or because general election moderation more than countered any primary adaptation. That our moderation finding for the pre-Tea Party era holds even among those senators facing a viable primary challenger

[28] The coefficient sizes are smaller than the first model in these extensions because the alternative Tea Party/Trump eras are added to the control group, reducing the substantive size of the coefficient on the interaction term.

[29] Were we to integrate a "reason for contest" variable into our analyses as Boatright (2013) and Cowburn (2024) do, we might expect to find even stronger behavioral responses to ideological primary challenges.

demonstrates how strong the conventional wisdom—of needing to moderate when facing the voters—was at this time.

Conversely, the null results in our Trump era any challenger model further suggest the non-ideological intra-party dynamics discussed in the previous section. Though facing reelection was sufficient to move senators rightward in this period, the null findings in this model indicate that this rightward movement may have served as an effective strategy for preventing some challengers from ever emerging. Yet, those senators who received a *viable* primary challenge in the Trump era also moved significantly rightward in this period, likely because they perceived that a more conservative voting record would help them garner support from policy demanders in the party coalition and potentially be noticed by primary voters.

Long-Serving Senators

To provide some semantic validity to our empirical results, we demonstrate the voting behavior of the six Republican senators who served more than thirty years. Their voting patterns largely align with our empirical results, as shown in Figure 3. In the pre-Tea Party era, John McCain's voting record was 0.047 more moderate when he sought reelection compared to the congresses in which he did not face the voters. During the Tea Party era, the shift was even bigger (0.066) in the opposite direction—that is, he became substantially more conservative. These shifts were typical of these long-serving senators. In the pre-Tea Party era, these senators were, on average, 0.035 more moderate when seeking reelection. As with McCain, these senators became more conservative during the Tea Party era (0.046). Only half the sample had a congress of both types during the Trump era. While McCain's shifts were noticeable, they were not as big as Senator Hatch of Utah, who went from being 0.027 more moderate when facing the voters to being 0.196 more conservative. Interestingly, the senator whose voting record was least subject to his reelection status was Mitch McConnell (Kentucky) who moved in the opposite direction than expected in all three periods, possibly connected to his position in the party leadership. Senator Grassley (Iowa) adopted more moderate positions when seeking reelection in all three periods.

Figure 2: Behavioral Shifts of Long-Serving Senators Seeking Reelection



Discussion

Because elected officials prioritize their position in public office and the associated retention of power (Mayhew, 1974), we expect them to respond to electoral incentives. As those incentives change, we should expect their behavior to likewise change. Consistent with classic accounts of spatial voting behavior (Downs, 1957), Republican senators who sought reelection during the pre-Tea Party era moderated their roll-call votes to align more closely with the preferences of their states' general electorate to neutralize ideological attacks from Democratic opponents in November elections.

The emergence of the Tea Party changed those dynamics. Whether ideological primary challengers materialized or not, their potential to do so incentivized reelection-seeking senators to adopt more conservative roll-call voting behavior to neutralize the emergence of same-party opponents and undercut the credibility of these claims among those who did materialize. This *preventative polarization* was most acute in the Tea Party era; the period when Republican Party moved rightward at the fastest rate.

It is important to note these findings are not evidence that Republican primary voters preferred extreme candidates during this period. Rather, these findings indicate that Republican senators *perceived* benefits from more conservative roll-call voting at this time. Senators might

expect a range of advantages of more ideological voting, including non-ideological benefits such as a decreased likelihood of a high-quality challenger from adopting further-right positions. Policy demanders in the party network play a key role in this process. Unlike primary voters (Bawn et al., 2019), these groups are highly attentive to politicians' policy positions and liable to mobilize against those that do not align with their views (Masket, 2009). These and other findings (Anderson et al., 2020; Cowburn, 2022; DeCrescenzo, 2020) suggest that elite behavior is central to this story.

Senators' beliefs about the preferences of their primary voters are also likely important. Despite evidence that primary voters do not hold meaningfully distinct policy preferences from a party's general election voters (Boatright, 2014; Hirano et al., 2010; Sides et al., 2020), media coverage of primary voters commonly depicts primary voters as ideologically extreme and unrepresentative (Elving, 2022; Rubin, 2021), with evidence of adherence to this narrative among (at least some) senators during this period (Schumer, 2014). If Republican senators perceive that their primary constituency is to their right, then they may adapt their positions to be more congruent with these perceived preferences. Primaries may therefore have exacerbated Republican radicalization during this period, not due to the preferences of primary electorates but as a result of the perceptions of political elites (see also Anderson et al., 2020; DeCrescenzo, 2020), likely connected to media narratives about these voters.

Conclusion

Once the Tea Party began exerting pressure from the right of the ideological spectrum, Republican senators shifted their voting behavior from looking over their left shoulders at their general election opponent to looking over their right shoulders to guard against a potential primary opponent. We demonstrate a shift in voting behavior from moderation to conservativism in the congress that senators sought reelection once the Tea Party emerged, which we call *preventative polarization*. While the conventional wisdom concerning policy congruence for senators facing reelection may have been conventional before, our results suggest that it no longer is. Elections once exerted a moderating force on senators when they faced the voters; our findings indicate that this public accountability no longer elicits such a response. We demonstrate that rightward movement aligns closely with (the threat of) primary challenges which appear to serve as the underlying mechanism for this behavioral change. We also show that senators adopted more conservative voting positions than they might personally have preferred at the height of the Tea Party period (111^{th} to 113^{th} congresses), revealed by the moderation of retiring senators.

This shift in Republican senators' voting behavior is critical for understanding the radicalization of the Republican conference during this key period when they moved rightward at a much greater rate than at any time before or after. Given that voting behavior when facing reelection continued to move rightward in the Trump era, we think this finding is important for understanding how Republicans behave in the Senate today. While the findings from the pre-Tea Party and Tea Party eras were consistent with our expectations, our more mixed findings in the Trump era provide a critical second step for our understanding. Rather than looking over their left shoulder as they did in the pre-Tea Party era or looking over their right shoulder during the Tea Party era, it could be that Republican senators during the Trump era instead looked online to be sure that they were not being targeted by Trump as they pondered another term in the Senate. And, those that were targeted by Trump, more often than not just headed for the door.

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Supplementary Material

In the following we present the descriptive statistics of our data as well as a series of robustness tests that demonstrate that our main findings are not a consequence of our model specification.

Descriptive Statistics

Table A.1: Descriptive Statistics

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Nokken-Poole	1065	.393	.184	-.076	.985
Reelection	1065	.277	.448	0	1
Retire	1065	.064	.245	0	1
Median Income	1065	4.162	1.443	1.504	9.234
White %	1065	.727	.134	.381	.965
Urban %	1065	.683	.129	.338	.947
Majority	1065	.561	.497	0	1
Congress	1065	107.008	6.095	97	117

Figure A.1: Temporal Change in Roll-Call Voting Positions



Full Models with Controls

In this section we present the full models that we use in the main manuscript including all coefficients on our control variables.

Table A.2: Republican Senators' Voting Behavior when Seeking Reelection

	Reelection Model
Reelection	-0.035***
	(0.004)
Post Tea Party Era (111th Congress or later)	-0.016
	(0.013)
Reelection x Post Tea Party	0.042***
	(0.010)
Republican Pres Vote Share	0.031
	(0.038)
Median Household Income	-0.010
	(0.006)
White %	0.131
	(0.203)
Urban %	0.038
	(0.177)
Majority	0.004
	(0.004)
Congress (Time)	0.005***
	(0.002)
Constant	-0.265
	(0.331)
Observations	1,065
Number of Senators	178
R^2	0.076
Individual (Senator) Fixed Effects	✓

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table A.3: Republican Senators' Voting Behavior when Retiring

	Retirement Model
Retirement	0.003
	(0.011)
Post Tea Party Era (111th Congress or later)	0.002
	(0.013)
Retirement x Post Tea Party	-0.033
	(0.021)
Republican Pres Vote Share	0.030
	(0.040)
Median Household Income	-0.011*
	(0.006)
White %	0.061
	(0.203)
Urban %	-0.006
	(0.182)
Majority	0.005
	(0.005)
Congress (Time)	0.005***
	(0.002)
Constant	-0.206
	(0.332)
Observations	1,065
Number of Senators	178
R^2	0.029
Individual (Senator) Fixed Effects	✓

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table A.4: Tea Party & Trump Eras Differences

	Tea Party Era Reelection Model	Trump Era Reelection Model	Tea Party Era Retirement Model	Trump Era Retirement Model
Reelection	-0.028***	-0.026***		
	(0.004)	(0.004)		
Retirement			0.001	-0.013
			(0.011)	(0.011)
Tea Party Era (111th-113th Congress)	-0.004		0.016	
	(0.010)		(0.010)	
Trump Era (114th-117th Congress)		-0.024*		-0.018
		(0.013)		(0.011)
Reelection # Tea Party Era	0.054***			
	(0.016)			
Reelection # Trump Era		0.025**		
		(0.011)		
Retirement # Tea Party Era			-0.064***	
			(0.023)	
Retirement # Trump Era				0.009
				(0.027)
Republican Pres Vote Share	0.040	0.040	0.034	0.033
	(0.038)	(0.038)	(0.040)	(0.040)
Median Income ($10,000s)	-0.010	-0.009	-0.009	-0.009
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)
White %	-0.011	0.095	0.020	0.110
	(0.202)	(0.200)	(0.202)	(0.205)
Urban %	-0.040	0.009	-0.030	0.016
	(0.178)	(0.173)	(0.180)	(0.179)
Majority	0.007	0.008*	0.007	0.007
	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Congress (Time)	0.005***	0.006***	0.005***	0.006***
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Constant	-0.041	-0.261	-0.102	-0.319
	(0.321)	(0.318)	(0.314)	(0.322)
Observations	1,065	1,065	1,065	1,065
R-squared	0.072	0.062	0.036	0.029
Number of Senators	178	178	178	178
Individual (Senator) Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table A.5: Primary Challenger Model – Any Challenger

	(1) Challenger Model	(2) Tea Party Era Challenger Model	(3) Trump Era Challenger Model
Any Primary Challenger	-0.023***	-0.015**	-0.011
	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.007)
Post Tea Party Era (111th Congress or later)	-0.008		
	(0.013)		
Tea Party Era (111th-113th Congress)		0.003	
		(0.010)	
Trump Era (114th-117th Congress)			-0.021*
			(0.012)
Challenger x Era	0.034***	0.041**	0.015
	(0.012)	(0.018)	(0.013)
Republican Pres Vote Share	0.027	0.033	0.035
	(0.040)	(0.040)	(0.039)
Median Income ($10,000s)	-0.010*	-0.009	-0.009
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)
White %	0.112	0.010	0.108
	(0.202)	(0.202)	(0.200)
Urban %	0.032	-0.033	0.019
	(0.180)	(0.179)	(0.175)
Majority	0.004	0.007	0.008*
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Congress (Time)	0.005***	0.005***	0.006***
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Constant	-0.259	-0.079	-0.304
	(0.324)	(0.318)	(0.315)
Observations	1,065	1,065	1,065
R-squared	0.034	0.034	0.030
Number of Senators	178	178	178
Individual (Senator) Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table A.6: Primary Challenger Model – Viable Challenger

	(1) Challenger Model	(2) Tea Party Era Challenger Model	(3) Trump Era Challenger Model
Viable Primary Challenger (15%+)	-0.034***	-0.013	-0.012
	(0.011)	(0.009)	(0.012)
Post Tea Party Era (111th Congress or later)	-0.009		
	(0.012)		
Tea Party Era (111th-113th Congress)		0.003	
		(0.010)	
Trump Era (114th-117th Congress)			-0.024*
			(0.012)
Challenger x Era	0.064***	0.060**	0.037**
	(0.016)	(0.025)	(0.016)
Republican Pres Vote Share	0.026	0.033	0.035
	(0.040)	(0.040)	(0.039)
Median Income ($10,000s)	-0.010*	-0.009	-0.009
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)
White %	0.099	0.004	0.118
	(0.200)	(0.201)	(0.201)
Urban %	0.022	-0.035	0.021
	(0.176)	(0.177)	(0.175)
Majority	0.004	0.007	0.008*
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Congress (Time)	0.005***	0.005***	0.006***
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Constant	-0.230	-0.055	-0.320
	(0.321)	(0.316)	(0.315)
Observations	1,065	1,065	1,065
R-squared	0.043	0.035	0.033
Number of Senators	178	178	178
Individual (Senator) Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Robustness Checks

Below we present a series of robustness checks to our main results with some brief commentary where appropriate.

In Table A.7 we present the results of analyses without any of the control variables. For both hypotheses, our results are substantively aligned and in the case of the retirement hypothesis become more statistically significant in the post-Tea Party era. These models give confidence that our main findings are not being driven by the inclusion of spurious control variables.

In Table A.8, we include congress fixed effects rather than a linear control for time. Given the linear trend towards more conservative voting behavior shown in Figure A.1, we think that trending our data with a continuous control for time is the more appropriate way to detrend our data, but we recognize the need to demonstrate that our findings are robust to the alternative inclusion of congress fixed effects. Our findings are unchanged.

Table A.7: Results without Controls

	(1) Reelection Model	(2) Retirement Model
Reelection	-0.035***	
	(0.004)	
Retirement		0.010
		(0.011)
Post Tea Party Era (111th Congress or later)	0.003	0.020*
	(0.012)	(0.012)
Reelection x Post Tea Party	0.043***	
	(0.010)	
Retirement x Post Tea Party		-0.037*
		(0.021)
Observations	1,065	1,065
R-squared	0.059	0.012
Number of Senators	178	178
Individual (Senator) Fixed Effects	✓	✓

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table A.8: Results with Time (Congress) Fixed Effects

	(1) Reelection Model	(2) Retirement Model
Reelection	-0.035***	
	(0.004)	
Retirement		0.003
		(0.011)
Post Tea Party Era (111th Congress or later)	0.058	0.080**
	(0.039)	(0.040)
Reelection x Post Tea Party	0.043***	
	(0.010)	
Retirement x Post Tea Party		-0.029
		(0.021)
Observations	1,065	1,065
R-squared	0.089	0.040
Number of Senators	178	178
Individual (Senator) Fixed Effects	✓	✓
Congress Fixed Effects	✓	✓

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

In Table A.9 we include a lagged version of our dependent variable, Nokken-Poole scores, to our model. This approach further ensures that we are capturing the dynamic effects and further guards against potentially issues of serial autocorrelation. These issues are largely addressed by our fixed effects specification in the main paper, and we see that our results are basically unchanged by the inclusion of lagged Nokken-Poole scores. These findings give further confidence that the specification in the main paper is robust to alternative modelling choices.

Table A.9: Lagged Nokken-Poole as Additional Control

	(1) Reelection Model	(2) Retirement Model
Reelection	-0.039***	
	(0.005)	
Retirement		0.003
		(0.011)
Post Tea Party Era (111th Congress or later)	-0.019	-0.001
	(0.011)	(0.011)
Reelection x Post Tea Party	0.048***	
	(0.011)	
Retirement x Post Tea Party		-0.030
		(0.019)
Lagged Nokken-Poole Score	0.204***	0.181***
	(0.050)	(0.050)
Observations	883	883
R-squared	0.133	0.065
Number of Senators	162	162
Individual (Senator) Fixed Effects	✓	✓

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

In Table A.10, we prevent an alternative OLS model with standard errors clustered at the individual (senator) level and the inclusion of career-aggregated position (NOMINATE) as a control variable. We recognize this model is potentially flawed due to issues of multicollinearity and that the fixed effects models in the main manuscript provide a harder test of our theory. The results of this "easier test" do however align with the model presented in the main manuscript.

Table A.10: Inclusion of NOMINATE as Additional Control (OLS)

	(1) Reelection Model	(2) Retirement Model
Reelection	-0.035***	
	(0.004)	
Retirement		0.018*
		(0.009)
Post Tea Party Era (111th Congress or later)	-0.017	-0.001
	(0.010)	(0.010)
Reelection x Post Tea Party	0.043***	
	(0.010)	
Retirement x Post Tea Party		-0.044**
		(0.017)
NOMINATE	0.996***	0.998***
	(0.018)	(0.018)
Observations	1,065	1,065
R-squared	0.897	0.892

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

In Table A.11, we present the coefficients of our models run only on those senators whose NOMINATE score is to the left of the party median for that congress. These are likely the senators who feel the most pressure to adapt their positions ideologically when in Congress, especially once the Tea Party emerges. Our results for the reelection hypothesis (1) are entirely in line with our main findings, with even these more moderate senators adapting their roll-call voting record leftwards in the pre-Tea Party era and then rightward after the Tea Party emerge. For the retirement hypothesis (2) we show that in the pre-Tea Party era these comparative liberal senators also moved significantly to the left in the congress in which they retired, suggesting that they felt pressured into voting more conservatively than their personal preference in other congresses, likely due to the more liberal inclination of these Republican senators in this period. Once the Tea Party emerges, this moderation upon retirement was no longer present in line with our main results, with senators to the left of the party median still likely quite conservative.

Table A.11: Liberal NOMINATE Only

	(1) Reelection Model	(2) Retirement Model
Reelection	-0.025***	
	(0.005)	
Retirement		-0.030**
		(0.013)
Post Tea Party Era (111th Congress or later)	-0.017	-0.007
	(0.012)	(0.011)
Reelection x Post Tea Party	0.030***	
	(0.010)	
Retirement x Post Tea Party		0.002
		(0.018)
Observations	503	503
R-squared	0.128	0.093
Number of Senators	108	108
Individual (Senator) Fixed Effects	✓	✓

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Given that Donald Trump only formally emerged as a candidate in June 2015 and did not exert significant influence over the Republican Party until later in the 114th Congress, it is debatable whether this congress should be considered as part of the Tea Party era or the Trump era. We therefore repeat our Tea Party/Trump era results adjusting the boundary between the eras by one congress so that the Trump era begins at the start of the 115th Congress as Trump assumed the presidency. We present the results for the models in Table A.12 below. When we move this boundary in this way, our findings about reelection (1) and retirement (3) in the Tea Party era are unchanged. In the Trump era, the finding that senators move rightward when facing reelection (2) loses significance (p=0.101) in line with the comparatively modest movement presented in Figure 1 of the main text and discussed in the manuscript.

Table A.12: Adjusted TP–Trump Era Boundary

	(1) Reelection: Adjusted Tea Party Era	(2) Reelection: Adjusted Trump Era	(3) Retirement: Adjusted Tea Party Era	(4) Retirement: Adjusted Trump Era
Reelection	-0.030***	-0.025***		
	(0.004)	(0.004)		
Retirement			-0.000	-0.012
			(0.011)	(0.011)
Adjusted Tea Party Era	-0.002		0.014	
(111^{th}-114^{th} Congress)	(0.009)		(0.009)	
Adjusted Trump Era		-0.025**		-0.019**
(115^{th}-117^{th} Congress)		(0.010)		(0.009)
Reelection x Era	0.045***	0.020		
	(0.012)	(0.012)		
Retirement x Era			-0.050**	0.006
			(0.023)	(0.030)
Observations	1,065	1,065	1,065	1,065
R-squared	0.073	0.062	0.034	0.030
Number of Senators	178	178	178	178
Individual (Senator) Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

An alternative mechanism to explain positional movement when a senator faces reelection is that they received a primary challenger six years previously. We therefore repeat our challenger models from the main manuscript with the key independent variable being that they received a primary challenger last they faced reelection in Table A.13. In the pre-Tea Party era, these models show clear moderation both among senators who received a challenger (1) and those who received a viable challenger (2). Interestingly, the substantive moderation among those senators who previously received a viable primary challenger in this period was larger. These results strongly suggest that, even having previously survived a primary challenger, senators continued to prioritize their general election constituencies. As shown elsewhere, the emergence of the Tea Party completely upends this pattern, with moderation being replaced by increasingly conservative roll-call voting, indicated by the significant positive interaction term in both models.

Table A.13: Lagged Challenger Model

	(1) Any Challenger	(2) Viable Challenger
Lagged Any Challenger	-0.017*	
	(0.009)	
Lagged Viable Challenger		-0.024*
		(0.014)
Post Tea Party Era (111th Congress or later)	0.002	0.005
	(0.016)	(0.015)
Lagged Any Challenger x Post Tea Party Era	0.033**	
	(0.015)	
Lagged Viable Challenger x Post Tea Party Era		0.034*
		(0.020)
Observations	571	571
R-squared	0.058	0.055
Number of Senators	117	117
Individual (Senator) Fixed Effects	✓	✓

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

We believe that our data are not well-suited to a causal identification strategy. For example, we believe it would be very difficult to construct comparable similar groups for the treatment and control groups, which would likely contain underlying differences that would bias our estimates. Similarly, demonstrating the parallel trends assumption would be near-impossible with these data. To undertake a complete DiD approach here we would need to use a staggered diff-in-diff with treatment turning off and on, with very few "never treated" observations in our reelection model, and those who are never treated likely to be meaningfully different on several dimensions to those senators who never sought reelection or retired. We recognize that a casual identification strategy would be interesting but these concerns about the structure of our data mean that we are careful not to make causal claims about the relationships that we identify in our main manuscript. Despite these concerns, we do now include estimates using the Callaway and Sant'Anna (2020) doubly-robust DiD estimator in our supplementary materials. The DiD estimates for the post-Tea Party era are now shown in Table A.14 and align with our main results, though we urge caution about any causal interpretations of our findings.

Table A.14: Doubly-Robust Difference-in-differences Estimator

	Reelection	Retirement
Reelection ATT	0.075***	
	(0.021)	
Retirement ATT		-0.029
		(0.040)
Observations	1,066	1,066

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

We recognize that roll-call voting is but one measure that senators can use to signal their preferences and that this measure is not exogenous from other influences (see discussion of Nokken-Poole scores below). We therefore also test our theory on an alternative measure of ideological position that varies by congress. The measure we use is a metric of ideology from govtrack.us based on bill cosponsorship rather than roll-call voting. The score assigns a left–right score to each Member of Congress based on their pattern of cosponsorship. The left–right score reflects the dominant ideological difference or differences among Members of Congress, which changes over time. Members of Congress who cosponsor similar sets of bills will get scores close together, while Members of Congress who sponsor different sets of bills will have scores far apart. Members of Congress with similar political views will tend to cosponsor the same set of bills, or bills by the same set of authors, and inversely Members of Congress with different political views will tend to cosponsor different bills (GovTrack.us Analysis Methodology n.d.). This measure therefore applies a similar method to NOMINATE to bill cosponsorship and provides an independent measure by wish to test our theory. Unfortunately, GovTrack's measure only dates to the 113th congress, meaning we can only apply this to the post-Tea Party period. We present the results of our model using this metric as the dependent variable in Table A.15, including the same controls as in our main model. Our results substantively align with those reported in our main model for the post-Tea Party era, giving confidence that our findings are not an artefact of senators missing roll-call votes when seeking reelection or retiring.

Table A.15: Cosponsorship Ideology Measure

	(1) Reelection Model	(2) Retirement Model
Re-Election	0.025***	
	(0.005)	
Retire		-0.060***
		(0.016)
Observations	250	250
R-squared	0.430	0.437
Number of Senators	71	71

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

In the below, we run an alternative OLS model for each election cycle, presenting the coefficients on the reelection and retirement variables of our models. For clarification, this alternative specification compares the voting record of those Republicans seeking reelection or retirement with their colleagues not in these conditions in that election cycle. This enables us to consider temporal differences between different election cycles. Whereas our main models identify within-career adaptation of senators, these alternative models test whether these senators are positionally distinct from their (not seeking reelection/retiring) party colleagues in the same congress. In our main models in the paper, we consider individual-level change and include a continuous time trend as a control variable. In Figure A.3 and A.4, the coefficients with diamond symbols are in the post-Tea Party era and coefficients represented by horizontal lines are in the pre-Tea Party era. As discussed in the main paper, we believe that the fixed effects specification allowing us to compare positional movement of individual senators across the course of their career is a preferrable empirical test of our theory. These figures do however help us better understand temporal differences between those senators' seeking reelection or retiring and their Republican colleagues not under those conditions in the same congress.

Figure A.3: Reelection OLS Election Cycle Coefficients



Figure A.4: Retirement OLS Election Cycle Coefficients



Full List of Retiring Senators

In Table A.16 we present the full list of senators and the year in which they would have faced reelection had they not retired.

Table A.16: Full List of Retiring Senators

State	Senator	Retirement Year
AL	SESSIONS, Jefferson Beauregard III	2018
AL	SHELBY, Richard C.	2022
AZ	GOLDWATER, Barry Morris	1986
AZ	KYL, Jon Llewellyn	2012
AZ	FLAKE, Jeff	2018
CA	HAYAKAWA, Samuel Ichiye	1982
CO	ARMSTRONG, William Lester	1990
CO	BROWN, George Hanks (Hank)	1996
CO	CAMPBELL, Ben Nighthorse	2004
CO	ALLARD, A. Wayne	2008
FL	MACK, Connie, III	2000
FL	MARTINEZ, Melquiades R. (Mel)	2010
GA	CHAMBLISS, Saxby	2014
GA	ISAKSON, Johnny	2020
ID	CRAIG, Larry Edwin	2008
IL	FITZGERALD, Peter G.	2004
IN	COATS, Daniel Ray	1998
IN	COATS, Daniel Ray	2016
KS	KASSEBAUM, Nancy Landon	1996
KS	BROWNBACK, Sam Dale	2010
KS	ROBERTS, Charles Patrick (Pat)	2020
KY	BUNNING, James Paul David	2010
LA	VITTER, David	2016
MD	MATHIAS, Charles McCurdy, Jr.	1986
ME	COHEN, William Sebastian	1996
ME	SNOWE, Olympia Jean	2012
MN	DURENBERGER, David Ferdinand	1994
MO	DANFORTH, John Claggett	1994
MO	BOND, Christopher Samuel (Kit)	2010
MO	BLUNT, Roy	2022
MS	LOTT, Chester Trent	2008
MS	COCHRAN, William Thad	2018
NC	EAST, John Porter	1986
NC	HELMS, Jesse	2002
NC	BURR, Richard M.	2022
NE	HAGEL, Charles Timothy (Chuck)	2008
NE	JOHANNS, Mike	2014
NH	RUDMAN, Warren Bruce	1992
NH	GREGG, Judd Alan	2010
NJ	BRADY, Nicholas Frederick	1982
NM	DOMENICI, Pete Vichi	2008
NV	LAXALT, Paul Dominque	1986
OH	VOINOVICH, George Victor	2010
OH	PORTMAN, Robert Jones (Rob)	2022
OK	NICKLES, Donald Lee	2004
OK	COBURN, Thomas Allen	2014
OK	INHOFE, James Mountain	2022
OR	HATFIELD, Mark Odom	1996
OR	PACKWOOD, Robert William	1996
PA	TOOMEY, Patrick Joseph	2022
SC	THURMOND, James Strom	2002
TN	BAKER, Howard Henry, Jr.	1984
TN	THOMPSON, Fred Dalton	2002

TN	FRIST, William H.	2006
TN	CORKER, Robert (Bob)	2018
TN	ALEXANDER, Lamar	2020
TX	TOWER, John Goodwin	1984
TX	GRAMM, William Philip (Phil)	2002
TX	HUTCHISON, Kathryn Ann Bailey	2012
UT	GARN, Edwin Jacob (Jake)	1992
VA	WARNER, John William	2008
VT	STAFFORD, Robert Theodore	1988
WA	EVANS, Daniel Jackson	1988
WY	WALLOP, Malcolm	1994
WY	THOMAS, Craig Lyle	2008
WY	ENZI, Michael B.	2020

Further Discussion of Nokken-Poole Scores

Given their centrality as the key dependent variable in our study, we provide some further information about Nokken-Poole scores here, including how they are constructed, exactly what they measure, and advantages and disadvantages. We believe that this measure is particularly appropriate for our research question.

Nokken-Poole NOMINATE scores are a statistical method used to analyze and quantify the ideological positions of U.S. Senators based on their roll-call voting behavior. These scores position lawmakers on a liberal-conservative spectrum, allowing researchers to track shifts in their political stance over time. Using multi-dimensional scaling, NOMINATE provides a nuanced view of political ideology beyond a simple left-right dichotomy, capturing the complexity of legislative behavior and facilitating comparisons across different time periods and legislative bodies.

One of the main advantages of the Nokken-Poole scores is their ability to provide a consistent and quantifiable measure of ideological positions for each Congress and their primacy in the research on ideological positioning and elite polarization. The measure enables us to conduct longitudinal studies on political polarization and legislative behavior with a high degree of precision. In doing so, the scores reveal positional changes, offering insights into how individual senators adapt their positions over time evolve over time. This is particularly useful for revealing evidence of political change and the impact of external events, such as the emergence of the Tea Party, on legislative behavior. For our study, Nokken-Poole scores are especially useful as they enable the identification of the directionality of a vote (rather than just for or against) in a way that, for example, party

unity scores do not enable. By aggregating at the congress level, we obtain a degree of temporal granularity that NOMINATE scores are not able to provide.

Yet, Nokken-Poole scores also have some notable disadvantages. One limitation is that they are based solely on roll-call votes, which may not fully capture a legislator's policy position or the strategic considerations behind their votes. Roll-call votes are influenced by party discipline, electoral concerns, and procedural strategies, which might obscure personal preferences. For example, a senator might choose to strategically miss a controversial vote if they are personally misaligned with their constituents or party, or only show up for important partisan votes, thereby biasing their scores in a certain direction. One further concern about these scores is about what exactly these ideal point estimates are capturing, as in isolation these points to not reveal which factors structure party competition in Congress. Moreover, the dimensional reduction inherent in the NOMINATE method, while simplifying analysis, may overlook important aspects of ideology that do not align with the dimensions. Finally, the aggregation at the congress level means we include some votes that are likely expressive towards a general rather than a primary constituency. As we discuss in the manuscript, this final drawback likely only dampens our findings. The other limitations of these measures are primarily targeting the problem of understanding why ideological preferences are structured in this way.

NOMINATE scores and other ideal points are therefore good measures to use for understanding when change occurs but are limited in their ability to explain how or why these changes happened. Given that our paper focuses on identifying temporal change in positions, Nokken-Poole NOMINATE scores appear particularly appropriate for our study. We also think that our use of individual fixed effects models, where we measure change in Nokken-Poole scores when seeking reelection or retiring further insulates us from some of the measurement concerns listed here given that they likely affect senators both when and when they are not seeking reelection or retiring.

Full List of Senators Included

Below we present the full list of senators and congresses in our dataset.

Table A.17: Full List of Senators

Congress	ICPSR	State	Name	NokkenPoole	Reelection	Retire
97	3658	AZ	GOLDWATER, Barry Morris	.716	0	0
98	3658	AZ	GOLDWATER, Barry Morris	.722	0	0
99	3658	AZ	GOLDWATER, Barry Morris	.597	0	1
97	9369	SC	THURMOND, James Strom	.422	0	0
98	9369	SC	THURMOND, James Strom	.424	1	0
99	9369	SC	THURMOND, James Strom	.397	0	0
100	9369	SC	THURMOND, James Strom	.353	0	0
101	9369	SC	THURMOND, James Strom	.385	1	0
102	9369	SC	THURMOND, James Strom	.341	0	0
103	9369	SC	THURMOND, James Strom	.347	0	0
104	9369	SC	THURMOND, James Strom	.405	1	0
105	9369	SC	THURMOND, James Strom	.407	0	0
106	9369	SC	THURMOND, James Strom	.394	0	0
107	9369	SC	THURMOND, James Strom	.522	0	1
97	10513	KS	DOLE, Robert Joseph	.405	0	0
98	10513	KS	DOLE, Robert Joseph	.41	0	0
99	10513	KS	DOLE, Robert Joseph	.363	1	0
100	10513	KS	DOLE, Robert Joseph	.31	0	0
101	10513	KS	DOLE, Robert Joseph	.368	0	0
102	10513	KS	DOLE, Robert Joseph	.383	1	0
103	10513	KS	DOLE, Robert Joseph	.385	0	0
104	10513	KS	DOLE, Robert Joseph	.381	0	0
97	10535	MD	MATHIAS, Charles McCurdy, Jr.	-.032	0	0
98	10535	MD	MATHIAS, Charles McCurdy, Jr.	-.004	0	0
99	10535	MD	MATHIAS, Charles McCurdy, Jr.	-.076	0	1
97	10562	VT	STAFFORD, Robert Theodore	.121	1	0
98	10562	VT	STAFFORD, Robert Theodore	.067	0	0
99	10562	VT	STAFFORD, Robert Theodore	.137	0	0
100	10562	VT	STAFFORD, Robert Theodore	.021	0	1
97	10569	ND	ANDREWS, Mark	.121	0	0
98	10569	ND	ANDREWS, Mark	-.008	0	0
99	10569	ND	ANDREWS, Mark	0	1	0
99	10574	NC	BROYHILL, James Thomas	.391	1	0
97	10823	TX	TOWER, John Goodwin	.498	0	0
98	10823	TX	TOWER, John Goodwin	.47	0	1
97	11029	ID	McCLURE, James Albertus	.596	0	0
98	11029	ID	McCLURE, James Albertus	.521	1	0
99	11029	ID	McCLURE, James Albertus	.574	0	0
100	11029	ID	McCLURE, James Albertus	.509	0	0
101	11029	ID	McCLURE, James Albertus	.529	0	0
97	11044	DE	ROTH, William Victor, Jr.	.146	1	0
98	11044	DE	ROTH, William Victor, Jr.	.313	0	0
99	11044	DE	ROTH, William Victor, Jr.	.363	0	0
100	11044	DE	ROTH, William Victor, Jr.	.206	1	0
101	11044	DE	ROTH, William Victor, Jr.	.337	0	0
102	11044	DE	ROTH, William Victor, Jr.	.403	0	0
103	11044	DE	ROTH, William Victor, Jr.	.306	1	0
104	11044	DE	ROTH, William Victor, Jr.	.268	0	0
105	11044	DE	ROTH, William Victor, Jr.	.233	1	0
106	11044	DE	ROTH, William Victor, Jr.	.208	1	0
97	11200	TN	BAKER, Howard Henry, Jr.	.392	0	0
98	11200	TN	BAKER, Howard Henry, Jr.	.34	0	1
97	11203	OR	HATFIELD, Mark Odom	.185	0	0
98	11203	OR	HATFIELD, Mark Odom	.049	1	0
99	11203	OR	HATFIELD, Mark Odom	.083	0	0
100	11203	OR	HATFIELD, Mark Odom	.083	0	0
101	11203	OR	HATFIELD, Mark Odom	-.02	1	0
102	11203	OR	HATFIELD, Mark Odom	.032	0	0
103	11203	OR	HATFIELD, Mark Odom	.037	0	0
104	11203	OR	HATFIELD, Mark Odom	.104	0	1
97	11205	IL	PERCY, Charles Harting	.216	0	0

98	11205	IL	PERCY, Charles Harting	.155	1	0
97	12032	CT	WEICKER, Lowell Palmer, Jr.	-.024	1	0
98	12032	CT	WEICKER, Lowell Palmer, Jr.	-.006	0	0
99	12032	CT	WEICKER, Lowell Palmer, Jr.	0	0	0
100	12032	CT	WEICKER, Lowell Palmer, Jr.	-.026	1	0
97	12107	OR	PACKWOOD, Robert William	.197	0	0
98	12107	OR	PACKWOOD, Robert William	.1	0	0
99	12107	OR	PACKWOOD, Robert William	.113	1	0
100	12107	OR	PACKWOOD, Robert William	.115	0	0
101	12107	OR	PACKWOOD, Robert William	.071	0	0
102	12107	OR	PACKWOOD, Robert William	.064	1	0
103	12107	OR	PACKWOOD, Robert William	.15	0	0
104	12107	OR	PACKWOOD, Robert William	.189	0	1
97	12109	AK	STEVENS, Theodore Fulton (Ted)	.333	0	0
98	12109	AK	STEVENS, Theodore Fulton (Ted)	.329	1	0
99	12109	AK	STEVENS, Theodore Fulton (Ted)	.277	0	0
100	12109	AK	STEVENS, Theodore Fulton (Ted)	.248	0	0
101	12109	AK	STEVENS, Theodore Fulton (Ted)	.169	1	0
102	12109	AK	STEVENS, Theodore Fulton (Ted)	.244	0	0
103	12109	AK	STEVENS, Theodore Fulton (Ted)	.193	0	0
104	12109	AK	STEVENS, Theodore Fulton (Ted)	.234	1	0
105	12109	AK	STEVENS, Theodore Fulton (Ted)	.226	0	0
106	12109	AK	STEVENS, Theodore Fulton (Ted)	.253	0	0
107	12109	AK	STEVENS, Theodore Fulton (Ted)	.276	1	0
108	12109	AK	STEVENS, Theodore Fulton (Ted)	.282	0	0
109	12109	AK	STEVENS, Theodore Fulton (Ted)	.298	0	0
110	12109	AK	STEVENS, Theodore Fulton (Ted)	.221	1	0
97	13050	PA	HEINZ, Henry John, III	.046	1	0
98	13050	PA	HEINZ, Henry John, III	.107	0	0
99	13050	PA	HEINZ, Henry John, III	.069	0	0
100	13050	PA	HEINZ, Henry John, III	.081	1	0
101	13050	PA	HEINZ, Henry John, III	.081	0	0
102	13050	PA	HEINZ, Henry John, III	.086	0	0
97	14000	SD	ABDNOR, James	.246	0	0
98	14000	SD	ABDNOR, James	.348	0	0
99	14000	SD	ABDNOR, James	.199	1	0
97	14002	CO	ARMSTRONG, William Lester	.416	0	0
98	14002	CO	ARMSTRONG, William Lester	.483	1	0
99	14002	CO	ARMSTRONG, William Lester	.538	0	0
100	14002	CO	ARMSTRONG, William Lester	.547	0	0
101	14002	CO	ARMSTRONG, William Lester	.631	0	1
97	14009	MS	COCHRAN, William Thad	.298	0	0
98	14009	MS	COCHRAN, William Thad	.22	1	0
99	14009	MS	COCHRAN, William Thad	.305	0	0
100	14009	MS	COCHRAN, William Thad	.265	0	0
101	14009	MS	COCHRAN, William Thad	.304	1	0
102	14009	MS	COCHRAN, William Thad	.295	0	0
103	14009	MS	COCHRAN, William Thad	.271	0	0
104	14009	MS	COCHRAN, William Thad	.325	1	0
105	14009	MS	COCHRAN, William Thad	.261	0	0
106	14009	MS	COCHRAN, William Thad	.359	0	0
107	14009	MS	COCHRAN, William Thad	.264	1	0
108	14009	MS	COCHRAN, William Thad	.367	0	0
109	14009	MS	COCHRAN, William Thad	.355	0	0
110	14009	MS	COCHRAN, William Thad	.335	1	0
111	14009	MS	COCHRAN, William Thad	.281	0	0
112	14009	MS	COCHRAN, William Thad	.291	0	0
113	14009	MS	COCHRAN, William Thad	.33	1	0
114	14009	MS	COCHRAN, William Thad	.329	0	0
115	14009	MS	COCHRAN, William Thad	.368	0	1
97	14010	ME	COHEN, William Sebastian	.133	0	0
98	14010	ME	COHEN, William Sebastian	.023	1	0
99	14010	ME	COHEN, William Sebastian	.11	0	0
100	14010	ME	COHEN, William Sebastian	.109	0	0
101	14010	ME	COHEN, William Sebastian	.059	1	0
102	14010	ME	COHEN, William Sebastian	.124	0	0
103	14010	ME	COHEN, William Sebastian	.135	0	0
104	14010	ME	COHEN, William Sebastian	.04	0	1
101	14031	MS	LOTT, Chester Trent	.408	0	0

102	14031	MS	LOTT, Chester Trent	.416	0	0
103	14031	MS	LOTT, Chester Trent	.455	1	0
104	14031	MS	LOTT, Chester Trent	.471	0	0
105	14031	MS	LOTT, Chester Trent	.408	0	0
106	14031	MS	LOTT, Chester Trent	.424	1	0
107	14031	MS	LOTT, Chester Trent	.501	0	0
108	14031	MS	LOTT, Chester Trent	.453	0	0
109	14031	MS	LOTT, Chester Trent	.422	1	0
110	14031	MS	LOTT, Chester Trent	.437	0	1
97	14056	ID	SYMMS, Steven Douglas	.611	0	0
98	14056	ID	SYMMS, Steven Douglas	.675	0	0
99	14056	ID	SYMMS, Steven Douglas	.634	1	0
100	14056	ID	SYMMS, Steven Douglas	.708	0	0
101	14056	ID	SYMMS, Steven Douglas	.668	0	0
102	14056	ID	SYMMS, Steven Douglas	.641	1	0
97	14077	NV	LAXALT, Paul Dominque	.468	0	0
98	14077	NV	LAXALT, Paul Dominque	.438	0	0
99	14077	NV	LAXALT, Paul Dominque	.493	0	1
97	14103	NM	DOMENICI, Pete Vichi	.317	0	0
98	14103	NM	DOMENICI, Pete Vichi	.25	1	0
99	14103	NM	DOMENICI, Pete Vichi	.34	0	0
100	14103	NM	DOMENICI, Pete Vichi	.245	0	0
101	14103	NM	DOMENICI, Pete Vichi	.209	0	0
102	14103	NM	DOMENICI, Pete Vichi	.279	0	0
103	14103	NM	DOMENICI, Pete Vichi	.215	0	0
104	14103	NM	DOMENICI, Pete Vichi	.266	1	0
105	14103	NM	DOMENICI, Pete Vichi	.247	0	0
106	14103	NM	DOMENICI, Pete Vichi	.292	0	0
107	14103	NM	DOMENICI, Pete Vichi	.292	1	0
108	14103	NM	DOMENICI, Pete Vichi	.346	0	0
109	14103	NM	DOMENICI, Pete Vichi	.293	0	0
110	14103	NM	DOMENICI, Pete Vichi	.264	0	1
97	14105	NC	HELMS, Jesse	.54	0	0
98	14105	NC	HELMS, Jesse	.575	1	0
99	14105	NC	HELMS, Jesse	.698	0	0
100	14105	NC	HELMS, Jesse	.696	0	0
101	14105	NC	HELMS, Jesse	.701	1	0
102	14105	NC	HELMS, Jesse	.747	0	0
103	14105	NC	HELMS, Jesse	.787	0	0
104	14105	NC	HELMS, Jesse	.658	0	0
105	14105	NC	HELMS, Jesse	.69	0	0
106	14105	NC	HELMS, Jesse	.701	0	0
107	14105	NC	HELMS, Jesse	.744	0	1
97	14226	IA	GRASSLEY, Charles Ernest	.267	0	0
98	14226	IA	GRASSLEY, Charles Ernest	.235	0	0
99	14226	IA	GRASSLEY, Charles Ernest	.111	1	0
100	14226	IA	GRASSLEY, Charles Ernest	.28	0	0
101	14226	IA	GRASSLEY, Charles Ernest	.371	0	0
102	14226	IA	GRASSLEY, Charles Ernest	.269	1	0
103	14226	IA	GRASSLEY, Charles Ernest	.347	0	0
104	14226	IA	GRASSLEY, Charles Ernest	.336	0	0
105	14226	IA	GRASSLEY, Charles Ernest	.349	1	0
106	14226	IA	GRASSLEY, Charles Ernest	.335	0	0
107	14226	IA	GRASSLEY, Charles Ernest	.367	0	0
108	14226	IA	GRASSLEY, Charles Ernest	.332	1	0
109	14226	IA	GRASSLEY, Charles Ernest	.392	0	0
110	14226	IA	GRASSLEY, Charles Ernest	.332	0	0
111	14226	IA	GRASSLEY, Charles Ernest	.387	1	0
112	14226	IA	GRASSLEY, Charles Ernest	.418	0	0
113	14226	IA	GRASSLEY, Charles Ernest	.501	0	0
114	14226	IA	GRASSLEY, Charles Ernest	.461	1	0
115	14226	IA	GRASSLEY, Charles Ernest	.459	0	0
116	14226	IA	GRASSLEY, Charles Ernest	.491	0	0
117	14226	IA	GRASSLEY, Charles Ernest	.415	1	0
101	14240	VT	JEFFORDS, James Merrill	-.02	0	0
102	14240	VT	JEFFORDS, James Merrill	-.023	0	0
103	14240	VT	JEFFORDS, James Merrill	-.045	1	0
104	14240	VT	JEFFORDS, James Merrill	-.005	0	0
105	14240	VT	JEFFORDS, James Merrill	.009	0	0

106	14240	VT	JEFFORDS, James Merrill	.057	1	0
107	14240	VT	JEFFORDS, James Merrill	.003	0	0
97	14242	WI	KASTEN, Robert Walter, Jr.	.251	0	0
98	14242	WI	KASTEN, Robert Walter, Jr.	.28	0	0
99	14242	WI	KASTEN, Robert Walter, Jr.	.128	1	0
100	14242	WI	KASTEN, Robert Walter, Jr.	.33	0	0
101	14242	WI	KASTEN, Robert Walter, Jr.	.274	0	0
102	14242	WI	KASTEN, Robert Walter, Jr.	.23	1	0
97	14268	SD	PRESSLER, Larry Lee	.084	0	0
98	14268	SD	PRESSLER, Larry Lee	.077	1	0
99	14268	SD	PRESSLER, Larry Lee	.206	0	0
100	14268	SD	PRESSLER, Larry Lee	.291	0	0
101	14268	SD	PRESSLER, Larry Lee	.263	1	0
102	14268	SD	PRESSLER, Larry Lee	.374	0	0
103	14268	SD	PRESSLER, Larry Lee	.391	0	0
104	14268	SD	PRESSLER, Larry Lee	.327	1	0
97	14303	UT	GARN, Edwin Jacob (Jake)	.506	0	0
98	14303	UT	GARN, Edwin Jacob (Jake)	.52	0	0
99	14303	UT	GARN, Edwin Jacob (Jake)	.501	1	0
100	14303	UT	GARN, Edwin Jacob (Jake)	.507	0	0
101	14303	UT	GARN, Edwin Jacob (Jake)	.486	0	0
102	14303	UT	GARN, Edwin Jacob (Jake)	.488	0	1
97	14447	IN	QUAYLE, James Danforth (Dan)	.542	0	0
98	14447	IN	QUAYLE, James Danforth (Dan)	.506	0	0
99	14447	IN	QUAYLE, James Danforth (Dan)	.482	1	0
100	14447	IN	QUAYLE, James Danforth (Dan)	.469	0	0
98	14456	VA	TRIBLE, Paul Seward, Jr.	.291	0	0
99	14456	VA	TRIBLE, Paul Seward, Jr.	.275	0	0
100	14456	VA	TRIBLE, Paul Seward, Jr.	.303	1	0
97	14500	RI	CHAFEE, John Hubbard	.075	1	0
98	14500	RI	CHAFEE, John Hubbard	.125	0	0
99	14500	RI	CHAFEE, John Hubbard	.126	0	0
100	14500	RI	CHAFEE, John Hubbard	.043	1	0
101	14500	RI	CHAFEE, John Hubbard	.146	0	0
102	14500	RI	CHAFEE, John Hubbard	.095	0	0
103	14500	RI	CHAFEE, John Hubbard	.066	1	0
104	14500	RI	CHAFEE, John Hubbard	.091	0	0
105	14500	RI	CHAFEE, John Hubbard	.08	0	0
106	14500	RI	CHAFEE, John Hubbard	.075	0	0
97	14501	MO	DANFORTH, John Claggett	.199	1	0
98	14501	MO	DANFORTH, John Claggett	.226	0	0
99	14501	MO	DANFORTH, John Claggett	.217	0	0
100	14501	MO	DANFORTH, John Claggett	.176	1	0
101	14501	MO	DANFORTH, John Claggett	.223	0	0
102	14501	MO	DANFORTH, John Claggett	.212	0	0
103	14501	MO	DANFORTH, John Claggett	.208	0	1
97	14503	UT	HATCH, Orrin Grant	.387	1	0
98	14503	UT	HATCH, Orrin Grant	.484	0	0
99	14503	UT	HATCH, Orrin Grant	.477	0	0
100	14503	UT	HATCH, Orrin Grant	.393	1	0
101	14503	UT	HATCH, Orrin Grant	.335	0	0
102	14503	UT	HATCH, Orrin Grant	.378	0	0
103	14503	UT	HATCH, Orrin Grant	.364	1	0
104	14503	UT	HATCH, Orrin Grant	.346	0	0
105	14503	UT	HATCH, Orrin Grant	.285	0	0
106	14503	UT	HATCH, Orrin Grant	.295	1	0
107	14503	UT	HATCH, Orrin Grant	.395	0	0
108	14503	UT	HATCH, Orrin Grant	.389	0	0
109	14503	UT	HATCH, Orrin Grant	.357	1	0
110	14503	UT	HATCH, Orrin Grant	.333	0	0
111	14503	UT	HATCH, Orrin Grant	.353	0	0
112	14503	UT	HATCH, Orrin Grant	.513	1	0
113	14503	UT	HATCH, Orrin Grant	.346	0	0
114	14503	UT	HATCH, Orrin Grant	.381	0	0
115	14503	UT	HATCH, Orrin Grant	.356	0	0
97	14504	CA	HAYAKAWA, Samuel Ichiye	.539	0	1
97	14506	IN	LUGAR, Richard Green	.355	1	0
98	14506	IN	LUGAR, Richard Green	.417	0	0
99	14506	IN	LUGAR, Richard Green	.348	0	0

100	14506	IN	LUGAR, Richard Green	.291	1	0
101	14506	IN	LUGAR, Richard Green	.343	0	0
102	14506	IN	LUGAR, Richard Green	.336	0	0
103	14506	IN	LUGAR, Richard Green	.27	1	0
104	14506	IN	LUGAR, Richard Green	.287	0	0
105	14506	IN	LUGAR, Richard Green	.277	1	0
106	14506	IN	LUGAR, Richard Green	.242	1	0
107	14506	IN	LUGAR, Richard Green	.348	0	0
108	14506	IN	LUGAR, Richard Green	.301	0	0
109	14506	IN	LUGAR, Richard Green	.259	1	0
110	14506	IN	LUGAR, Richard Green	.256	0	0
111	14506	IN	LUGAR, Richard Green	.26	0	0
112	14506	IN	LUGAR, Richard Green	.286	1	0
97	14510	NM	SCHMITT, Harrison Hagan	.275	1	0
97	14511	WY	WALLOP, Malcolm	.424	1	0
98	14511	WY	WALLOP, Malcolm	.57	0	0
99	14511	WY	WALLOP, Malcolm	.682	0	0
100	14511	WY	WALLOP, Malcolm	.645	1	0
101	14511	WY	WALLOP, Malcolm	.692	0	0
102	14511	WY	WALLOP, Malcolm	.643	0	0
103	14511	WY	WALLOP, Malcolm	.708	0	1
99	14628	TX	GRAMM, William Philip (Phil)	.541	0	0
100	14628	TX	GRAMM, William Philip (Phil)	.585	0	0
101	14628	TX	GRAMM, William Philip (Phil)	.463	1	0
102	14628	TX	GRAMM, William Philip (Phil)	.493	0	0
103	14628	TX	GRAMM, William Philip (Phil)	.475	0	0
104	14628	TX	GRAMM, William Philip (Phil)	.581	1	0
105	14628	TX	GRAMM, William Philip (Phil)	.597	0	0
106	14628	TX	GRAMM, William Philip (Phil)	.614	0	0
107	14628	TX	GRAMM, William Philip (Phil)	.62	0	1
104	14661	ME	SNOWE, Olympia Jean	.069	0	0
105	14661	ME	SNOWE, Olympia Jean	.096	1	0
106	14661	ME	SNOWE, Olympia Jean	.099	1	0
107	14661	ME	SNOWE, Olympia Jean	.075	0	0
108	14661	ME	SNOWE, Olympia Jean	.067	0	0
109	14661	ME	SNOWE, Olympia Jean	.063	1	0
110	14661	ME	SNOWE, Olympia Jean	.053	0	0
111	14661	ME	SNOWE, Olympia Jean	.095	0	0
112	14661	ME	SNOWE, Olympia Jean	.107	0	1
97	14701	MN	BOSCHWITZ, Rudolph Eli (Rudy)	.236	0	0
98	14701	MN	BOSCHWITZ, Rudolph Eli (Rudy)	.151	1	0
99	14701	MN	BOSCHWITZ, Rudolph Eli (Rudy)	.318	0	0
100	14701	MN	BOSCHWITZ, Rudolph Eli (Rudy)	.27	0	0
101	14701	MN	BOSCHWITZ, Rudolph Eli (Rudy)	.32	1	0
97	14703	MN	DURENBERGER, David Ferdinand	.09	1	0
98	14703	MN	DURENBERGER, David Ferdinand	.179	0	0
99	14703	MN	DURENBERGER, David Ferdinand	.13	0	0
100	14703	MN	DURENBERGER, David Ferdinand	.097	1	0
101	14703	MN	DURENBERGER, David Ferdinand	.115	0	0
102	14703	MN	DURENBERGER, David Ferdinand	.142	0	0
103	14703	MN	DURENBERGER, David Ferdinand	.074	0	1
97	14706	NH	HUMPHREY, Gordon John	.599	0	0
98	14706	NH	HUMPHREY, Gordon John	.488	1	0
99	14706	NH	HUMPHREY, Gordon John	.651	0	0
100	14706	NH	HUMPHREY, Gordon John	.584	0	0
101	14706	NH	HUMPHREY, Gordon John	.559	1	0
97	14707	IA	JEPSEN, Roger William	.309	0	0
98	14707	IA	JEPSEN, Roger William	.275	1	0
97	14708	KS	KASSEBAUM, Nancy Landon	.168	0	0
98	14708	KS	KASSEBAUM, Nancy Landon	.205	1	0
99	14708	KS	KASSEBAUM, Nancy Landon	.224	0	0
100	14708	KS	KASSEBAUM, Nancy Landon	.198	0	0
101	14708	KS	KASSEBAUM, Nancy Landon	.233	1	0
102	14708	KS	KASSEBAUM, Nancy Landon	.217	0	0
103	14708	KS	KASSEBAUM, Nancy Landon	.17	0	0
104	14708	KS	KASSEBAUM, Nancy Landon	.177	0	1
97	14710	WY	SIMPSON, Alan Kooi	.342	0	0
98	14710	WY	SIMPSON, Alan Kooi	.344	1	0
99	14710	WY	SIMPSON, Alan Kooi	.401	0	0

100	14710	WY	SIMPSON, Alan Kooi	.318	0	0
101	14710	WY	SIMPSON, Alan Kooi	.329	1	0
102	14710	WY	SIMPSON, Alan Kooi	.327	0	0
103	14710	WY	SIMPSON, Alan Kooi	.298	0	0
104	14710	WY	SIMPSON, Alan Kooi	.215	1	0
97	14712	VA	WARNER, John William	.358	0	0
98	14712	VA	WARNER, John William	.26	1	0
99	14712	VA	WARNER, John William	.268	0	0
100	14712	VA	WARNER, John William	.251	0	0
101	14712	VA	WARNER, John William	.211	1	0
102	14712	VA	WARNER, John William	.264	0	0
103	14712	VA	WARNER, John William	.221	0	0
104	14712	VA	WARNER, John William	.299	1	0
105	14712	VA	WARNER, John William	.299	0	0
106	14712	VA	WARNER, John William	.247	0	0
107	14712	VA	WARNER, John William	.255	1	0
108	14712	VA	WARNER, John William	.258	0	0
109	14712	VA	WARNER, John William	.246	0	0
110	14712	VA	WARNER, John William	.252	0	1
102	14803	CO	BROWN, George Hanks (Hank)	.497	0	0
103	14803	CO	BROWN, George Hanks (Hank)	.534	0	0
104	14803	CO	BROWN, George Hanks (Hank)	.557	0	1
101	14806	IN	COATS, Daniel Ray	.388	1	0
102	14806	IN	COATS, Daniel Ray	.383	1	0
103	14806	IN	COATS, Daniel Ray	.346	0	0
104	14806	IN	COATS, Daniel Ray	.457	0	0
105	14806	IN	COATS, Daniel Ray	.433	1	0
112	14806	IN	COATS, Daniel Ray	.403	0	0
113	14806	IN	COATS, Daniel Ray	.407	0	0
114	14806	IN	COATS, Daniel Ray	.537	0	1
102	14809	ID	CRAIG, Larry Edwin	.609	0	0
103	14809	ID	CRAIG, Larry Edwin	.497	0	0
104	14809	ID	CRAIG, Larry Edwin	.477	1	0
105	14809	ID	CRAIG, Larry Edwin	.452	0	0
106	14809	ID	CRAIG, Larry Edwin	.497	0	0
107	14809	ID	CRAIG, Larry Edwin	.483	1	0
108	14809	ID	CRAIG, Larry Edwin	.521	0	0
109	14809	ID	CRAIG, Larry Edwin	.411	0	0
110	14809	ID	CRAIG, Larry Edwin	.429	0	1
103	14826	NH	GREGG, Judd Alan	.445	0	0
104	14826	NH	GREGG, Judd Alan	.395	0	0
105	14826	NH	GREGG, Judd Alan	.412	1	0
106	14826	NH	GREGG, Judd Alan	.422	0	0
107	14826	NH	GREGG, Judd Alan	.417	0	0
108	14826	NH	GREGG, Judd Alan	.385	1	0
109	14826	NH	GREGG, Judd Alan	.462	0	0
110	14826	NH	GREGG, Judd Alan	.452	0	0
111	14826	NH	GREGG, Judd Alan	.344	1	0
105	14852	KS	ROBERTS, Charles Patrick (Pat)	.364	0	0
106	14852	KS	ROBERTS, Charles Patrick (Pat)	.376	0	0
107	14852	KS	ROBERTS, Charles Patrick (Pat)	.424	1	0
108	14852	KS	ROBERTS, Charles Patrick (Pat)	.341	0	0
109	14852	KS	ROBERTS, Charles Patrick (Pat)	.379	0	0
110	14852	KS	ROBERTS, Charles Patrick (Pat)	.326	1	0
111	14852	KS	ROBERTS, Charles Patrick (Pat)	.432	0	0
112	14852	KS	ROBERTS, Charles Patrick (Pat)	.414	0	0
113	14852	KS	ROBERTS, Charles Patrick (Pat)	.626	1	0
114	14852	KS	ROBERTS, Charles Patrick (Pat)	.434	0	0
115	14852	KS	ROBERTS, Charles Patrick (Pat)	.342	0	0
116	14852	KS	ROBERTS, Charles Patrick (Pat)	.339	0	1
97	14900	NY	D'AMATO, Alfonse Marcello	.215	0	0
98	14900	NY	D'AMATO, Alfonse Marcello	.139	0	0
99	14900	NY	D'AMATO, Alfonse Marcello	.107	1	0
100	14900	NY	D'AMATO, Alfonse Marcello	.211	0	0
101	14900	NY	D'AMATO, Alfonse Marcello	.153	0	0
102	14900	NY	D'AMATO, Alfonse Marcello	.159	1	0
103	14900	NY	D'AMATO, Alfonse Marcello	.258	0	0
104	14900	NY	D'AMATO, Alfonse Marcello	.229	0	0
105	14900	NY	D'AMATO, Alfonse Marcello	.116	1	0

97	14901	AL	DENTON, Jeremiah Andrew, Jr.	.479	0	0
98	14901	AL	DENTON, Jeremiah Andrew, Jr.	.517	0	0
99	14901	AL	DENTON, Jeremiah Andrew, Jr.	.426	1	0
97	14903	NC	EAST, John Porter	.599	0	0
98	14903	NC	EAST, John Porter	.61	0	0
99	14903	NC	EAST, John Porter	.611	0	1
97	14904	WA	GORTON, Thomas Slade, III (Slade)	.278	0	0
98	14904	WA	GORTON, Thomas Slade, III (Slade)	.265	0	0
99	14904	WA	GORTON, Thomas Slade, III (Slade)	.244	1	0
101	14904	WA	GORTON, Thomas Slade, III (Slade)	.297	0	0
102	14904	WA	GORTON, Thomas Slade, III (Slade)	.259	0	0
103	14904	WA	GORTON, Thomas Slade, III (Slade)	.252	1	0
104	14904	WA	GORTON, Thomas Slade, III (Slade)	.268	0	0
105	14904	WA	GORTON, Thomas Slade, III (Slade)	.273	0	0
106	14904	WA	GORTON, Thomas Slade, III (Slade)	.293	1	0
97	14905	FL	HAWKINS, Paula	.15	0	0
98	14905	FL	HAWKINS, Paula	.204	0	0
99	14905	FL	HAWKINS, Paula	.219	1	0
97	14906	GA	MATTINGLY, Mack Francis	.363	0	0
98	14906	GA	MATTINGLY, Mack Francis	.365	0	0
99	14906	GA	MATTINGLY, Mack Francis	.279	1	0
97	14907	AK	MURKOWSKI, Frank Hughes	.351	0	0
98	14907	AK	MURKOWSKI, Frank Hughes	.375	0	0
99	14907	AK	MURKOWSKI, Frank Hughes	.275	1	0
100	14907	AK	MURKOWSKI, Frank Hughes	.357	0	0
101	14907	AK	MURKOWSKI, Frank Hughes	.326	0	0
102	14907	AK	MURKOWSKI, Frank Hughes	.319	1	0
103	14907	AK	MURKOWSKI, Frank Hughes	.361	0	0
104	14907	AK	MURKOWSKI, Frank Hughes	.373	0	0
105	14907	AK	MURKOWSKI, Frank Hughes	.338	1	0
106	14907	AK	MURKOWSKI, Frank Hughes	.416	0	0
107	14907	AK	MURKOWSKI, Frank Hughes	.383	0	0
97	14908	OK	NICKLES, Donald Lee	.51	0	0
98	14908	OK	NICKLES, Donald Lee	.435	0	0
99	14908	OK	NICKLES, Donald Lee	.303	1	0
100	14908	OK	NICKLES, Donald Lee	.508	0	0
101	14908	OK	NICKLES, Donald Lee	.483	0	0
102	14908	OK	NICKLES, Donald Lee	.428	1	0
103	14908	OK	NICKLES, Donald Lee	.508	0	0
104	14908	OK	NICKLES, Donald Lee	.544	0	0
105	14908	OK	NICKLES, Donald Lee	.569	1	0
106	14908	OK	NICKLES, Donald Lee	.552	0	0
107	14908	OK	NICKLES, Donald Lee	.595	0	0
108	14908	OK	NICKLES, Donald Lee	.66	0	1
97	14909	NH	RUDMAN, Warren Bruce	.292	0	0
98	14909	NH	RUDMAN, Warren Bruce	.38	0	0
99	14909	NH	RUDMAN, Warren Bruce	.373	1	0
100	14909	NH	RUDMAN, Warren Bruce	.286	0	0
101	14909	NH	RUDMAN, Warren Bruce	.271	0	0
102	14909	NH	RUDMAN, Warren Bruce	.259	0	1
97	14910	PA	SPECTER, Arlen	.043	0	0
98	14910	PA	SPECTER, Arlen	.014	0	0
99	14910	PA	SPECTER, Arlen	-.058	1	0
100	14910	PA	SPECTER, Arlen	.112	0	0
101	14910	PA	SPECTER, Arlen	.089	0	0
102	14910	PA	SPECTER, Arlen	.056	1	0
103	14910	PA	SPECTER, Arlen	.1	0	0
104	14910	PA	SPECTER, Arlen	.03	0	0
105	14910	PA	SPECTER, Arlen	-.001	1	0
106	14910	PA	SPECTER, Arlen	.061	0	0
107	14910	PA	SPECTER, Arlen	.057	0	0
108	14910	PA	SPECTER, Arlen	.112	1	0
109	14910	PA	SPECTER, Arlen	.102	0	0
110	14910	PA	SPECTER, Arlen	.122	0	0
111	14910	PA	SPECTER, Arlen	.111	0	0
97	14911	NJ	BRADY, Nicholas Frederick	.386	0	1
98	14913	NV	HECHT, Jacob Chic	.442	0	0
99	14913	NV	HECHT, Jacob Chic	.559	0	0
100	14913	NV	HECHT, Jacob Chic	.486	1	0

98	14915	CA	WILSON, Pete	.414	0	0
99	14915	CA	WILSON, Pete	.363	0	0
100	14915	CA	WILSON, Pete	.344	1	0
101	14915	CA	WILSON, Pete	.281	0	0
98	14916	WA	EVANS, Daniel Jackson	.252	0	0
99	14916	WA	EVANS, Daniel Jackson	.255	0	0
100	14916	WA	EVANS, Daniel Jackson	.25	0	1
99	14921	KY	McCONNELL, Addison Mitchell (Mitch)	.299	0	0
100	14921	KY	McCONNELL, Addison Mitchell (Mitch)	.333	0	0
101	14921	KY	McCONNELL, Addison Mitchell (Mitch)	.36	1	0
102	14921	KY	McCONNELL, Addison Mitchell (Mitch)	.335	0	0
103	14921	KY	McCONNELL, Addison Mitchell (Mitch)	.379	0	0
104	14921	KY	McCONNELL, Addison Mitchell (Mitch)	.38	1	0
105	14921	KY	McCONNELL, Addison Mitchell (Mitch)	.448	0	0
106	14921	KY	McCONNELL, Addison Mitchell (Mitch)	.399	0	0
107	14921	KY	McCONNELL, Addison Mitchell (Mitch)	.429	1	0
108	14921	KY	McCONNELL, Addison Mitchell (Mitch)	.422	0	0
109	14921	KY	McCONNELL, Addison Mitchell (Mitch)	.457	0	0
110	14921	KY	McCONNELL, Addison Mitchell (Mitch)	.43	1	0
111	14921	KY	McCONNELL, Addison Mitchell (Mitch)	.458	0	0
112	14921	KY	McCONNELL, Addison Mitchell (Mitch)	.467	0	0
113	14921	KY	McCONNELL, Addison Mitchell (Mitch)	.488	1	0
114	14921	KY	McCONNELL, Addison Mitchell (Mitch)	.355	0	0
115	14921	KY	McCONNELL, Addison Mitchell (Mitch)	.386	0	0
116	14921	KY	McCONNELL, Addison Mitchell (Mitch)	.297	1	0
117	14921	KY	McCONNELL, Addison Mitchell (Mitch)	.425	0	0
104	15020	OH	DeWINE, Michael	.241	0	0
105	15020	OH	DeWINE, Michael	.278	0	0
106	15020	OH	DeWINE, Michael	.237	1	0
107	15020	OH	DeWINE, Michael	.261	0	0
108	15020	OH	DeWINE, Michael	.193	0	0
109	15020	OH	DeWINE, Michael	.132	1	0
101	15037	FL	MACK, Connie, III	.476	0	0
102	15037	FL	MACK, Connie, III	.421	0	0
103	15037	FL	MACK, Connie, III	.373	1	0
104	15037	FL	MACK, Connie, III	.418	0	0
105	15037	FL	MACK, Connie, III	.371	0	0
106	15037	FL	MACK, Connie, III	.41	0	1
100	15039	AZ	McCAIN, John Sidney, III	.37	0	0
101	15039	AZ	McCAIN, John Sidney, III	.314	0	0
102	15039	AZ	McCAIN, John Sidney, III	.32	1	0
103	15039	AZ	McCAIN, John Sidney, III	.426	0	0
104	15039	AZ	McCAIN, John Sidney, III	.503	0	0
105	15039	AZ	McCAIN, John Sidney, III	.376	1	0
106	15039	AZ	McCAIN, John Sidney, III	.347	0	0
107	15039	AZ	McCAIN, John Sidney, III	.214	0	0
108	15039	AZ	McCAIN, John Sidney, III	.245	1	0
109	15039	AZ	McCAIN, John Sidney, III	.354	0	0
110	15039	AZ	McCAIN, John Sidney, III	.442	0	0
111	15039	AZ	McCAIN, John Sidney, III	.499	1	0
112	15039	AZ	McCAIN, John Sidney, III	.444	0	0
113	15039	AZ	McCAIN, John Sidney, III	.412	0	0
114	15039	AZ	McCAIN, John Sidney, III	.464	1	0
115	15039	AZ	McCAIN, John Sidney, III	.394	0	1
102	15116	NH	SMITH, Robert C.	.761	0	0
103	15116	NH	SMITH, Robert C.	.687	0	0
104	15116	NH	SMITH, Robert C.	.631	1	0
105	15116	NH	SMITH, Robert C.	.715	0	0
106	15116	NH	SMITH, Robert C.	.87	0	0
107	15116	NH	SMITH, Robert C.	.565	1	0
106	15406	KY	BUNNING, James Paul David	.609	0	0
107	15406	KY	BUNNING, James Paul David	.521	0	0
108	15406	KY	BUNNING, James Paul David	.48	1	0
109	15406	KY	BUNNING, James Paul David	.555	0	0
110	15406	KY	BUNNING, James Paul David	.546	0	0
111	15406	KY	BUNNING, James Paul David	.632	1	0
103	15424	OK	INHOFE, James Mountain	.452	0	0
104	15424	OK	INHOFE, James Mountain	.585	1	0
105	15424	OK	INHOFE, James Mountain	.675	0	0

106	15424	OK	INHOFE, James Mountain	.685	0	0
107	15424	OK	INHOFE, James Mountain	.516	1	0
108	15424	OK	INHOFE, James Mountain	.52	0	0
109	15424	OK	INHOFE, James Mountain	.757	0	0
110	15424	OK	INHOFE, James Mountain	.7	1	0
111	15424	OK	INHOFE, James Mountain	.595	0	0
112	15424	OK	INHOFE, James Mountain	.565	0	0
113	15424	OK	INHOFE, James Mountain	.594	1	0
114	15424	OK	INHOFE, James Mountain	.521	0	0
115	15424	OK	INHOFE, James Mountain	.561	0	0
116	15424	OK	INHOFE, James Mountain	.617	1	0
117	15424	OK	INHOFE, James Mountain	.539	0	1
104	15429	AZ	KYL, Jon Llewellyn	.628	0	0
105	15429	AZ	KYL, Jon Llewellyn	.579	1	0
106	15429	AZ	KYL, Jon Llewellyn	.507	1	0
107	15429	AZ	KYL, Jon Llewellyn	.651	0	0
108	15429	AZ	KYL, Jon Llewellyn	.608	0	0
109	15429	AZ	KYL, Jon Llewellyn	.544	1	0
110	15429	AZ	KYL, Jon Llewellyn	.583	0	0
111	15429	AZ	KYL, Jon Llewellyn	.532	0	0
112	15429	AZ	KYL, Jon Llewellyn	.445	0	1
115	15429	AZ	KYL, Jon Llewellyn	.586	0	0
100	15501	MO	BOND, Christopher Samuel (Kit)	.343	0	0
101	15501	MO	BOND, Christopher Samuel (Kit)	.353	0	0
102	15501	MO	BOND, Christopher Samuel (Kit)	.295	1	0
103	15501	MO	BOND, Christopher Samuel (Kit)	.24	0	0
104	15501	MO	BOND, Christopher Samuel (Kit)	.291	0	0
105	15501	MO	BOND, Christopher Samuel (Kit)	.281	1	0
106	15501	MO	BOND, Christopher Samuel (Kit)	.346	0	0
107	15501	MO	BOND, Christopher Samuel (Kit)	.393	0	0
108	15501	MO	BOND, Christopher Samuel (Kit)	.304	1	0
109	15501	MO	BOND, Christopher Samuel (Kit)	.386	0	0
110	15501	MO	BOND, Christopher Samuel (Kit)	.344	0	0
111	15501	MO	BOND, Christopher Samuel (Kit)	.248	0	1
100	15505	NE	KARNES, David Kemp	.344	1	0
104	15633	WY	THOMAS, Craig Lyle	.424	0	0
105	15633	WY	THOMAS, Craig Lyle	.452	0	0
106	15633	WY	THOMAS, Craig Lyle	.483	1	0
107	15633	WY	THOMAS, Craig Lyle	.554	0	0
108	15633	WY	THOMAS, Craig Lyle	.597	0	0
109	15633	WY	THOMAS, Craig Lyle	.534	1	0
110	15633	WY	THOMAS, Craig Lyle	.541	0	1
101	15701	MT	BURNS, Conrad	.371	0	0
102	15701	MT	BURNS, Conrad	.367	0	0
103	15701	MT	BURNS, Conrad	.297	1	0
104	15701	MT	BURNS, Conrad	.351	0	0
105	15701	MT	BURNS, Conrad	.385	0	0
106	15701	MT	BURNS, Conrad	.371	1	0
107	15701	MT	BURNS, Conrad	.42	0	0
108	15701	MT	BURNS, Conrad	.428	0	0
109	15701	MT	BURNS, Conrad	.347	1	0
113	20100	AZ	FLAKE, Jeff	.476	0	0
114	20100	AZ	FLAKE, Jeff	.686	0	0
115	20100	AZ	FLAKE, Jeff	.853	0	1
113	20101	AR	BOOZMAN, John	.429	0	0
112	20101	AR	BOOZMAN, John	.408	0	0
114	20101	AR	BOOZMAN, John	.469	1	0
115	20101	AR	BOOZMAN, John	.383	0	0
117	20101	AR	BOOZMAN, John	.562	1	0
116	20101	AR	BOOZMAN, John	.354	0	0
111	20115	IL	KIRK, Mark Steven	.33	0	0
113	20115	IL	KIRK, Mark Steven	.345	0	0
112	20115	IL	KIRK, Mark Steven	.267	0	0
114	20115	IL	KIRK, Mark Steven	.268	1	0
114	20146	WV	CAPITO, Shelley Moore	.308	0	0
117	20146	WV	CAPITO, Shelley Moore	.326	0	0
115	20146	WV	CAPITO, Shelley Moore	.362	0	0
116	20146	WV	CAPITO, Shelley Moore	.326	1	0
117	20351	TN	BLACKBURN, Marsha	.663	0	0

116	20351	TN	BLACKBURN, Marsha	.695	0	0
113	20730	NV	HELLER, Dean	.458	0	0
112	20730	NV	HELLER, Dean	.328	1	0
114	20730	NV	HELLER, Dean	.546	0	0
115	20730	NV	HELLER, Dean	.481	1	0
114	20919	LA	CASSIDY, Bill	.434	0	0
117	20919	LA	CASSIDY, Bill	.469	0	0
115	20919	LA	CASSIDY, Bill	.437	0	0
116	20919	LA	CASSIDY, Bill	.504	1	0
117	20953	WY	LUMMIS, Cynthia M.	.72	0	0
115	21112	CO	GARDNER, Cory	.44	0	0
116	21112	CO	GARDNER, Cory	.355	1	0
116	21133	IN	YOUNG, Todd	.46	0	0
117	21133	IN	YOUNG, Todd	.422	1	0
115	21133	IN	YOUNG, Todd	.367	0	0
114	21166	OK	LANKFORD, James	.624	1	0
117	21166	OK	LANKFORD, James	.678	1	0
115	21166	OK	LANKFORD, James	.683	0	0
116	21166	OK	LANKFORD, James	.687	0	0
113	21173	SC	SCOTT, Tim	.681	1	0
114	21173	SC	SCOTT, Tim	.634	1	0
115	21173	SC	SCOTT, Tim	.533	0	0
117	21173	SC	SCOTT, Tim	.605	1	0
116	21173	SC	SCOTT, Tim	.557	0	0
114	21301	AR	COTTON, Tom	.611	0	0
116	21301	AR	COTTON, Tom	.471	1	0
115	21301	AR	COTTON, Tom	.581	0	0
117	21301	AR	COTTON, Tom	.659	0	0
114	21338	MT	DAINES, Steve	.567	0	0
117	21338	MT	DAINES, Steve	.585	0	0
115	21338	MT	DAINES, Steve	.606	0	0
116	21338	MT	DAINES, Steve	.58	1	0
117	21350	ND	CRAMER, Kevin	.384	0	0
116	21350	ND	CRAMER, Kevin	.373	0	0
116	21501	AZ	McSALLY, Martha	.338	1	0
117	21734	KS	MARSHALL, Roger Wayne	.64	0	0
105	29108	CO	ALLARD, A. Wayne	.556	0	0
106	29108	CO	ALLARD, A. Wayne	.594	0	0
109	29108	CO	ALLARD, A. Wayne	.556	0	0
108	29108	CO	ALLARD, A. Wayne	.573	0	0
107	29108	CO	ALLARD, A. Wayne	.526	1	0
110	29108	CO	ALLARD, A. Wayne	.563	0	1
105	29141	PA	SANTORUM, Richard John (Rick)	.355	0	0
104	29141	PA	SANTORUM, Richard John (Rick)	.342	0	0
106	29141	PA	SANTORUM, Richard John (Rick)	.319	1	0
107	29141	PA	SANTORUM, Richard John (Rick)	.457	0	0
108	29141	PA	SANTORUM, Richard John (Rick)	.462	0	0
109	29141	PA	SANTORUM, Richard John (Rick)	.348	1	0
107	29148	VA	ALLEN, George	.357	0	0
108	29148	VA	ALLEN, George	.378	0	0
109	29148	VA	ALLEN, George	.412	1	0
105	29306	AR	HUTCHINSON, Timothy	.509	0	0
106	29306	AR	HUTCHINSON, Timothy	.458	0	0
107	29306	AR	HUTCHINSON, Timothy	.329	1	0
106	29345	ID	CRAPO, Michael Dean	.458	0	0
109	29345	ID	CRAPO, Michael Dean	.45	0	0
108	29345	ID	CRAPO, Michael Dean	.493	1	0
107	29345	ID	CRAPO, Michael Dean	.379	0	0
110	29345	ID	CRAPO, Michael Dean	.459	0	0
113	29345	ID	CRAPO, Michael Dean	.661	0	0
112	29345	ID	CRAPO, Michael Dean	.591	0	0
111	29345	ID	CRAPO, Michael Dean	.508	1	0
114	29345	ID	CRAPO, Michael Dean	.57	1	0
115	29345	ID	CRAPO, Michael Dean	.583	0	0
116	29345	ID	CRAPO, Michael Dean	.492	0	0
117	29345	ID	CRAPO, Michael Dean	.44	1	0
105	29367	MN	GRAMS, Rod	.499	0	0
104	29367	MN	GRAMS, Rod	.522	0	0
106	29367	MN	GRAMS, Rod	.466	1	0

109	29369	MO	TALENT, James Matthes	.261	1	0
108	29369	MO	TALENT, James Matthes	.31	0	0
112	29386	OH	PORTMAN, Robert Jones (Rob)	.375	0	0
113	29386	OH	PORTMAN, Robert Jones (Rob)	.369	0	0
114	29386	OH	PORTMAN, Robert Jones (Rob)	.325	1	0
117	29386	OH	PORTMAN, Robert Jones (Rob)	.338	0	1
116	29386	OH	PORTMAN, Robert Jones (Rob)	.314	0	0
115	29386	OH	PORTMAN, Robert Jones (Rob)	.324	0	0
109	29512	GA	CHAMBLISS, Saxby	.473	0	0
108	29512	GA	CHAMBLISS, Saxby	.399	0	0
110	29512	GA	CHAMBLISS, Saxby	.457	1	0
111	29512	GA	CHAMBLISS, Saxby	.476	0	0
113	29512	GA	CHAMBLISS, Saxby	.343	0	1
112	29512	GA	CHAMBLISS, Saxby	.449	0	0
105	29523	KS	BROWNBACK, Sam Dale	.505	1	0
106	29523	KS	BROWNBACK, Sam Dale	.449	0	0
108	29523	KS	BROWNBACK, Sam Dale	.37	1	0
107	29523	KS	BROWNBACK, Sam Dale	.425	0	0
109	29523	KS	BROWNBACK, Sam Dale	.407	0	0
110	29523	KS	BROWNBACK, Sam Dale	.425	0	0
111	29523	KS	BROWNBACK, Sam Dale	.419	1	0
110	29534	MS	WICKER, Roger F.	.397	1	0
113	29534	MS	WICKER, Roger F.	.349	0	0
111	29534	MS	WICKER, Roger F.	.399	0	0
112	29534	MS	WICKER, Roger F.	.397	1	0
114	29534	MS	WICKER, Roger F.	.406	1	0
117	29534	MS	WICKER, Roger F.	.384	0	0
115	29534	MS	WICKER, Roger F.	.413	1	0
116	29534	MS	WICKER, Roger F.	.364	0	0
109	29537	NV	ENSIGN, John Eric	.528	1	0
108	29537	NV	ENSIGN, John Eric	.453	0	0
107	29537	NV	ENSIGN, John Eric	.367	0	0
110	29537	NV	ENSIGN, John Eric	.554	0	0
111	29537	NV	ENSIGN, John Eric	.516	0	0
112	29537	NV	ENSIGN, John Eric	.8	0	0
109	29548	NC	BURR, Richard M.	.5	0	0
110	29548	NC	BURR, Richard M.	.517	0	0
112	29548	NC	BURR, Richard M.	.486	0	0
111	29548	NC	BURR, Richard M.	.491	1	0
113	29548	NC	BURR, Richard M.	.434	0	0
114	29548	NC	BURR, Richard M.	.381	1	0
117	29548	NC	BURR, Richard M.	.363	1	0
115	29548	NC	BURR, Richard M.	.442	0	0
116	29548	NC	BURR, Richard M.	.342	0	0
109	29555	OK	COBURN, Thomas Allen	.985	0	0
110	29555	OK	COBURN, Thomas Allen	.808	0	0
111	29555	OK	COBURN, Thomas Allen	.843	1	0
113	29555	OK	COBURN, Thomas Allen	.786	0	1
112	29555	OK	COBURN, Thomas Allen	.673	0	0
108	29566	SC	GRAHAM, Lindsey O.	.372	0	0
109	29566	SC	GRAHAM, Lindsey O.	.398	0	0
110	29566	SC	GRAHAM, Lindsey O.	.47	1	0
112	29566	SC	GRAHAM, Lindsey O.	.37	0	0
113	29566	SC	GRAHAM, Lindsey O.	.348	1	0
111	29566	SC	GRAHAM, Lindsey O.	.421	0	0
114	29566	SC	GRAHAM, Lindsey O.	.321	0	0
117	29566	SC	GRAHAM, Lindsey O.	.318	0	0
116	29566	SC	GRAHAM, Lindsey O.	.325	1	0
115	29566	SC	GRAHAM, Lindsey O.	.359	0	0
113	29722	KS	MORAN, Jerry	.484	0	0
112	29722	KS	MORAN, Jerry	.406	0	0
114	29722	KS	MORAN, Jerry	.452	1	0
117	29722	KS	MORAN, Jerry	.418	1	0
116	29722	KS	MORAN, Jerry	.452	0	0
115	29722	KS	MORAN, Jerry	.475	0	0
113	29735	MO	BLUNT, Roy	.383	0	0
112	29735	MO	BLUNT, Roy	.361	0	0
114	29735	MO	BLUNT, Roy	.364	0	0
116	29735	MO	BLUNT, Roy	.341	0	0

117	29735	MO	BLUNT, Roy	.314	1	0
115	29735	MO	BLUNT, Roy	.367	0	0
108	29740	NH	SUNUNU, John E.	.477	0	0
109	29740	NH	SUNUNU, John E.	.501	0	0
110	29740	NH	SUNUNU, John E.	.376	1	0
109	29754	SD	THUNE, John	.357	0	0
110	29754	SD	THUNE, John	.431	0	0
113	29754	SD	THUNE, John	.467	0	0
112	29754	SD	THUNE, John	.431	0	0
111	29754	SD	THUNE, John	.501	1	0
114	29754	SD	THUNE, John	.429	1	0
116	29754	SD	THUNE, John	.394	0	0
115	29754	SD	THUNE, John	.459	0	0
117	29754	SD	THUNE, John	.473	1	0
109	29909	GA	ISAKSON, Johnny	.486	0	0
110	29909	GA	ISAKSON, Johnny	.436	0	0
112	29909	GA	ISAKSON, Johnny	.415	0	0
113	29909	GA	ISAKSON, Johnny	.321	0	0
111	29909	GA	ISAKSON, Johnny	.433	1	0
114	29909	GA	ISAKSON, Johnny	.416	1	0
116	29909	GA	ISAKSON, Johnny	.336	0	1
115	29909	GA	ISAKSON, Johnny	.359	0	0
109	29918	LA	VITTER, David	.544	0	0
110	29918	LA	VITTER, David	.565	0	0
111	29918	LA	VITTER, David	.478	1	0
112	29918	LA	VITTER, David	.586	0	0
113	29918	LA	VITTER, David	.467	0	0
114	29918	LA	VITTER, David	.479	0	1
112	29935	PA	TOOMEY, Patrick Joseph	.573	0	0
113	29935	PA	TOOMEY, Patrick Joseph	.525	0	0
114	29935	PA	TOOMEY, Patrick Joseph	.596	1	0
116	29935	PA	TOOMEY, Patrick Joseph	.707	0	0
115	29935	PA	TOOMEY, Patrick Joseph	.776	0	0
117	29935	PA	TOOMEY, Patrick Joseph	.614	0	1
109	29936	SC	DeMINT, James W.	.659	0	0
110	29936	SC	DeMINT, James W.	.82	0	0
112	29936	SC	DeMINT, James W.	.908	0	0
111	29936	SC	DeMINT, James W.	.801	1	0
108	40300	AK	MURKOWSKI, Lisa	.228	1	0
109	40300	AK	MURKOWSKI, Lisa	.279	0	0
111	40300	AK	MURKOWSKI, Lisa	.218	1	0
113	40300	AK	MURKOWSKI, Lisa	.124	0	0
114	40300	AK	MURKOWSKI, Lisa	.299	1	0
110	40300	AK	MURKOWSKI, Lisa	.23	0	0
112	40300	AK	MURKOWSKI, Lisa	.183	0	0
116	40300	AK	MURKOWSKI, Lisa	.283	0	0
115	40300	AK	MURKOWSKI, Lisa	.229	0	0
117	40300	AK	MURKOWSKI, Lisa	.212	1	0
108	40302	MN	COLEMAN, Norm	.228	0	0
109	40302	MN	COLEMAN, Norm	.171	0	0
110	40302	MN	COLEMAN, Norm	.174	1	0
108	40303	NC	DOLE, Elizabeth Hanford	.365	0	0
109	40303	NC	DOLE, Elizabeth Hanford	.394	0	0
110	40303	NC	DOLE, Elizabeth Hanford	.352	1	0
108	40304	TN	ALEXANDER, Lamar	.352	0	0
109	40304	TN	ALEXANDER, Lamar	.376	0	0
110	40304	TN	ALEXANDER, Lamar	.339	1	0
114	40304	TN	ALEXANDER, Lamar	.307	0	0
113	40304	TN	ALEXANDER, Lamar	.312	1	0
112	40304	TN	ALEXANDER, Lamar	.311	0	0
111	40304	TN	ALEXANDER, Lamar	.283	0	0
115	40304	TN	ALEXANDER, Lamar	.326	0	0
116	40304	TN	ALEXANDER, Lamar	.322	0	1
109	40305	TX	CORNYN, John	.521	0	0
108	40305	TX	CORNYN, John	.472	0	0
110	40305	TX	CORNYN, John	.487	1	0
111	40305	TX	CORNYN, John	.549	0	0
112	40305	TX	CORNYN, John	.508	0	0
114	40305	TX	CORNYN, John	.463	0	0

113	40305	TX	CORNYN, John	.539	1	0
117	40305	TX	CORNYN, John	.445	0	0
115	40305	TX	CORNYN, John	.415	0	0
116	40305	TX	CORNYN, John	.44	1	0
109	40501	FL	MARTINEZ, Melquiades R. (Mel)	.343	0	0
110	40501	FL	MARTINEZ, Melquiades R. (Mel)	.344	0	0
111	40501	FL	MARTINEZ, Melquiades R. (Mel)	.288	0	1
113	40705	TN	CORKER, Robert (Bob)	.372	0	0
112	40705	TN	CORKER, Robert (Bob)	.417	1	0
114	40705	TN	CORKER, Robert (Bob)	.513	0	0
110	40705	TN	CORKER, Robert (Bob)	.372	0	0
111	40705	TN	CORKER, Robert (Bob)	.371	0	0
115	40705	TN	CORKER, Robert (Bob)	.5	0	1
110	40707	WY	BARRASSO, John A.	.58	1	0
111	40707	WY	BARRASSO, John A.	.538	0	0
113	40707	WY	BARRASSO, John A.	.562	0	0
112	40707	WY	BARRASSO, John A.	.49	1	0
114	40707	WY	BARRASSO, John A.	.477	0	0
117	40707	WY	BARRASSO, John A.	.542	0	0
115	40707	WY	BARRASSO, John A.	.6	1	0
116	40707	WY	BARRASSO, John A.	.602	0	0
113	40902	ID	RISCH, James	.772	1	0
111	40902	ID	RISCH, James	.533	0	0
112	40902	ID	RISCH, James	.65	0	0
114	40902	ID	RISCH, James	.589	0	0
117	40902	ID	RISCH, James	.456	0	0
116	40902	ID	RISCH, James	.573	0	0
115	40902	ID	RISCH, James	.711	0	0
112	40905	NE	JOHANNS, Mike	.361	0	0
111	40905	NE	JOHANNS, Mike	.402	0	0
113	40905	NE	JOHANNS, Mike	.391	1	0
111	40911	FL	LEMIEUX, George S.	.339	0	0
112	40913	MA	BROWN, Scott P.	.083	1	0
111	40913	MA	BROWN, Scott P.	.177	0	0
113	41102	FL	RUBIO, Marco	.663	0	0
114	41102	FL	RUBIO, Marco	.617	1	0
112	41102	FL	RUBIO, Marco	.549	0	0
117	41102	FL	RUBIO, Marco	.648	1	0
115	41102	FL	RUBIO, Marco	.538	0	0
116	41102	FL	RUBIO, Marco	.517	0	0
113	41104	KY	PAUL, Rand	.914	0	0
114	41104	KY	PAUL, Rand	.83	1	0
112	41104	KY	PAUL, Rand	.933	0	0
116	41104	KY	PAUL, Rand	.879	0	0
117	41104	KY	PAUL, Rand	.906	1	0
115	41104	KY	PAUL, Rand	.879	0	0
114	41106	NH	AYOTTE, Kelly	.276	1	0
112	41106	NH	AYOTTE, Kelly	.425	0	0
113	41106	NH	AYOTTE, Kelly	.341	0	0
114	41107	ND	HOEVEN, John	.375	1	0
113	41107	ND	HOEVEN, John	.367	0	0
112	41107	ND	HOEVEN, John	.294	0	0
116	41107	ND	HOEVEN, John	.371	0	0
115	41107	ND	HOEVEN, John	.38	0	0
117	41107	ND	HOEVEN, John	.438	1	0
114	41110	UT	LEE, Mike	.919	1	0
113	41110	UT	LEE, Mike	.949	0	0
112	41110	UT	LEE, Mike	.935	0	0
117	41110	UT	LEE, Mike	.866	1	0
115	41110	UT	LEE, Mike	.902	0	0
116	41110	UT	LEE, Mike	.91	0	0
112	41111	WI	JOHNSON, Ron	.645	0	0
114	41111	WI	JOHNSON, Ron	.487	1	0
113	41111	WI	JOHNSON, Ron	.685	0	0
116	41111	WI	JOHNSON, Ron	.61	0	0
117	41111	WI	JOHNSON, Ron	.605	1	0
115	41111	WI	JOHNSON, Ron	.637	0	0
114	41302	NE	FISCHER, Debra (Deb)	.489	0	0
113	41302	NE	FISCHER, Debra (Deb)	.461	0	0

116	41302	NE	FISCHER, Debra (Deb)	.48	0	0
115	41302	NE	FISCHER, Debra (Deb)	.448	1	0
117	41302	NE	FISCHER, Debra (Deb)	.452	0	0
114	41304	TX	CRUZ, Rafael Edward (Ted)	.876	0	0
113	41304	TX	CRUZ, Rafael Edward (Ted)	.887	0	0
115	41304	TX	CRUZ, Rafael Edward (Ted)	.679	1	0
117	41304	TX	CRUZ, Rafael Edward (Ted)	.785	0	0
116	41304	TX	CRUZ, Rafael Edward (Ted)	.908	0	0
113	41307	NJ	CHIESA, Jeffrey Scott	.256	0	0
114	41500	AK	SULLIVAN, Daniel Scott	.46	0	0
116	41500	AK	SULLIVAN, Daniel Scott	.51	1	0
115	41500	AK	SULLIVAN, Daniel Scott	.47	0	0
117	41500	AK	SULLIVAN, Daniel Scott	.481	0	0
114	41501	GA	PERDUE, David Alfred, Jr.	.68	0	0
115	41501	GA	PERDUE, David Alfred, Jr.	.517	0	0
116	41501	GA	PERDUE, David Alfred, Jr.	.474	1	0
114	41502	IA	ERNST, Joni	.505	0	0
116	41502	IA	ERNST, Joni	.544	1	0
117	41502	IA	ERNST, Joni	.578	0	0
115	41502	IA	ERNST, Joni	.525	0	0
114	41503	NE	SASSE, Benjamin Eric	.827	0	0
116	41503	NE	SASSE, Benjamin Eric	.717	1	0
117	41503	NE	SASSE, Benjamin Eric	.573	0	0
115	41503	NE	SASSE, Benjamin Eric	.824	0	0
114	41504	NC	TILLIS, Thomas Roland (Thom)	.443	0	0
115	41504	NC	TILLIS, Thomas Roland (Thom)	.396	0	0
116	41504	NC	TILLIS, Thomas Roland (Thom)	.426	1	0
117	41504	NC	TILLIS, Thomas Roland (Thom)	.398	0	0
114	41505	SD	ROUNDS, Marion Michael (Mike)	.386	0	0
116	41505	SD	ROUNDS, Marion Michael (Mike)	.437	1	0
117	41505	SD	ROUNDS, Marion Michael (Mike)	.358	0	0
115	41505	SD	ROUNDS, Marion Michael (Mike)	.413	0	0
115	41703	LA	KENNEDY, John Neely	.482	0	0
117	41703	LA	KENNEDY, John Neely	.569	1	0
116	41703	LA	KENNEDY, John Neely	.681	0	0
115	41704	AL	STRANGE, Luther Johnson, III	.57	1	0
116	41707	MS	HYDE-SMITH, Cindy	.363	1	0
115	41707	MS	HYDE-SMITH, Cindy	.41	1	0
117	41707	MS	HYDE-SMITH, Cindy	.455	0	0
116	41900	IN	BRAUN, Michael	.837	0	0
117	41900	IN	BRAUN, Michael	.735	0	0
116	41901	MO	HAWLEY, Joshua David	.618	0	0
117	41901	MO	HAWLEY, Joshua David	.814	0	0
117	41902	UT	ROMNEY, Willard Mitt (Mitt)	.286	0	0
116	41902	UT	ROMNEY, Willard Mitt (Mitt)	.39	0	0
117	41903	FL	SCOTT, Richard Lynn (Rick)	.722	0	0
116	41903	FL	SCOTT, Richard Lynn (Rick)	.547	0	0
116	41904	GA	LOEFFLER, Kelly	.556	1	0
117	42100	TN	HAGERTY, William Francis (Bill)	.713	0	0
117	42102	AL	TUBERVILLE, Thomas Hawley	.867	0	0
102	49100	CA	SEYMOUR, John	.298	1	0
106	49301	GA	COVERDELL, Paul	.441	0	0
105	49301	GA	COVERDELL, Paul	.401	1	0
103	49301	GA	COVERDELL, Paul	.377	0	0
104	49301	GA	COVERDELL, Paul	.428	0	0
103	49302	ID	KEMPTHORNE, Dirk	.489	0	0
104	49302	ID	KEMPTHORNE, Dirk	.468	0	0
105	49302	ID	KEMPTHORNE, Dirk	.42	1	0
103	49304	NC	FAIRCLOTH, Duncan McLauchlin	.714	0	0
105	49304	NC	FAIRCLOTH, Duncan McLauchlin	.672	1	0
104	49304	NC	FAIRCLOTH, Duncan McLauchlin	.714	0	0
106	49306	TX	HUTCHISON, Kathryn Ann Bailey (Kay)	.338	1	0
105	49306	TX	HUTCHISON, Kathryn Ann Bailey (Kay)	.388	0	0
104	49306	TX	HUTCHISON, Kathryn Ann Bailey (Kay)	.413	0	0
103	49306	TX	HUTCHISON, Kathryn Ann Bailey (Kay)	.34	1	0
108	49306	TX	HUTCHISON, Kathryn Ann Bailey (Kay)	.273	0	0
107	49306	TX	HUTCHISON, Kathryn Ann Bailey (Kay)	.359	0	0
109	49306	TX	HUTCHISON, Kathryn Ann Bailey (Kay)	.321	1	0
110	49306	TX	HUTCHISON, Kathryn Ann Bailey (Kay)	.36	0	0

112	49306	TX	HUTCHISON, Kathryn Ann Bailey (Kay)	.353	0	1
111	49306	TX	HUTCHISON, Kathryn Ann Bailey (Kay)	.372	0	0
106	49307	UT	BENNETT, Robert	.299	0	0
103	49307	UT	BENNETT, Robert	.344	0	0
104	49307	UT	BENNETT, Robert	.325	0	0
105	49307	UT	BENNETT, Robert	.271	1	0
108	49307	UT	BENNETT, Robert	.353	1	0
107	49307	UT	BENNETT, Robert	.413	0	0
109	49307	UT	BENNETT, Robert	.335	0	0
110	49307	UT	BENNETT, Robert	.351	0	0
111	49307	UT	BENNETT, Robert	.312	1	0
105	49500	MI	ABRAHAM, Spencer	.37	0	0
104	49500	MI	ABRAHAM, Spencer	.33	0	0
106	49500	MI	ABRAHAM, Spencer	.23	1	0
104	49501	MO	ASHCROFT, John David	.538	0	0
106	49501	MO	ASHCROFT, John David	.411	1	0
105	49501	MO	ASHCROFT, John David	.692	0	0
106	49502	TN	FRIST, William H.	.35	1	0
105	49502	TN	FRIST, William H.	.335	0	0
104	49502	TN	FRIST, William H.	.338	0	0
109	49502	TN	FRIST, William H.	.405	0	1
107	49502	TN	FRIST, William H.	.439	0	0
108	49502	TN	FRIST, William H.	.349	0	0
105	49503	TN	THOMPSON, Fred Dalton	.423	0	0
104	49503	TN	THOMPSON, Fred Dalton	.392	1	0
106	49503	TN	THOMPSON, Fred Dalton	.412	0	0
107	49503	TN	THOMPSON, Fred Dalton	.384	1	0
104	49504	KS	FRAHM, Sheila	.49	1	0
105	49700	AL	SESSIONS, Jefferson (Jeff)	.582	0	0
106	49700	AL	SESSIONS, Jefferson (Jeff)	.497	0	0
107	49700	AL	SESSIONS, Jefferson (Jeff)	.476	1	0
109	49700	AL	SESSIONS, Jefferson (Jeff)	.656	0	0
108	49700	AL	SESSIONS, Jefferson (Jeff)	.552	0	0
114	49700	AL	SESSIONS, Jefferson (Jeff)	.635	0	0
110	49700	AL	SESSIONS, Jefferson (Jeff)	.501	1	0
111	49700	AL	SESSIONS, Jefferson (Jeff)	.53	0	0
113	49700	AL	SESSIONS, Jefferson (Jeff)	.619	1	0
115	49700	AL	SESSIONS, Jefferson (Jeff)	.357	0	1
106	49703	ME	COLLINS, Susan Margaret	.135	0	0
105	49703	ME	COLLINS, Susan Margaret	.132	0	0
107	49703	ME	COLLINS, Susan Margaret	.093	1	0
108	49703	ME	COLLINS, Susan Margaret	.092	0	0
109	49703	ME	COLLINS, Susan Margaret	.1	0	0
111	49703	ME	COLLINS, Susan Margaret	.087	0	0
110	49703	ME	COLLINS, Susan Margaret	.097	1	0
113	49703	ME	COLLINS, Susan Margaret	.101	1	0
112	49703	ME	COLLINS, Susan Margaret	.073	0	0
114	49703	ME	COLLINS, Susan Margaret	.157	0	0
117	49703	ME	COLLINS, Susan Margaret	.138	0	0
116	49703	ME	COLLINS, Susan Margaret	.139	1	0
115	49703	ME	COLLINS, Susan Margaret	.166	0	0
105	49704	NE	HAGEL, Charles Timothy (Chuck)	.359	0	0
106	49704	NE	HAGEL, Charles Timothy (Chuck)	.366	0	0
109	49704	NE	HAGEL, Charles Timothy (Chuck)	.378	0	0
108	49704	NE	HAGEL, Charles Timothy (Chuck)	.311	0	0
107	49704	NE	HAGEL, Charles Timothy (Chuck)	.37	1	0
110	49704	NE	HAGEL, Charles Timothy (Chuck)	.308	0	1
105	49705	OR	SMITH, Gordon Harold	.242	0	0
106	49705	OR	SMITH, Gordon Harold	.224	0	0
107	49705	OR	SMITH, Gordon Harold	.178	1	0
109	49705	OR	SMITH, Gordon Harold	.213	0	0
108	49705	OR	SMITH, Gordon Harold	.208	0	0
110	49705	OR	SMITH, Gordon Harold	.134	1	0
105	49706	WY	ENZI, Michael B.	.491	0	0
106	49706	WY	ENZI, Michael B.	.558	0	0
108	49706	WY	ENZI, Michael B.	.586	0	0
109	49706	WY	ENZI, Michael B.	.541	0	0
107	49706	WY	ENZI, Michael B.	.525	1	0
112	49706	WY	ENZI, Michael B.	.502	0	0

111	49706	WY	ENZI, Michael B.	.53	0	0
110	49706	WY	ENZI, Michael B.	.567	1	0
114	49706	WY	ENZI, Michael B.	.5	0	0
113	49706	WY	ENZI, Michael B.	.573	1	0
115	49706	WY	ENZI, Michael B.	.593	0	0
116	49706	WY	ENZI, Michael B.	.587	0	1
106	49900	IL	FITZGERALD, Peter G.	.285	0	0
108	49900	IL	FITZGERALD, Peter G.	.329	0	1
107	49900	IL	FITZGERALD, Peter G.	.244	0	0
106	49903	OH	VOINOVICH, George Victor	.294	0	0
107	49903	OH	VOINOVICH, George Victor	.358	0	0
109	49903	OH	VOINOVICH, George Victor	.25	0	0
108	49903	OH	VOINOVICH, George Victor	.251	1	0
111	49903	OH	VOINOVICH, George Victor	.163	0	1
110	49903	OH	VOINOVICH, George Victor	.24	0	0
106	49905	RI	CHAFEE, Lincoln Davenport	-.048	1	0
107	49905	RI	CHAFEE, Lincoln Davenport	-.003	0	0
108	49905	RI	CHAFEE, Lincoln Davenport	.032	1	0
109	49905	RI	CHAFEE, Lincoln Davenport	-.006	1	0
107	94659	AL	SHELBY, Richard C.	.362	0	0
104	94659	AL	SHELBY, Richard C.	.358	0	0
108	94659	AL	SHELBY, Richard C.	.386	1	0
106	94659	AL	SHELBY, Richard C.	.415	0	0
105	94659	AL	SHELBY, Richard C.	.416	1	0
111	94659	AL	SHELBY, Richard C.	.386	0	0
113	94659	AL	SHELBY, Richard C.	.515	0	0
115	94659	AL	SHELBY, Richard C.	.394	0	0
112	94659	AL	SHELBY, Richard C.	.468	0	0
114	94659	AL	SHELBY, Richard C.	.587	1	0
109	94659	AL	SHELBY, Richard C.	.408	0	0
110	94659	AL	SHELBY, Richard C.	.427	0	0
117	94659	AL	SHELBY, Richard C.	.536	0	1
116	94659	AL	SHELBY, Richard C.	.437	0	0
107	95407	CO	CAMPBELL, Ben Nighthorse	.304	0	0
105	95407	CO	CAMPBELL, Ben Nighthorse	.249	1	0
104	95407	CO	CAMPBELL, Ben Nighthorse	.152	0	0
106	95407	CO	CAMPBELL, Ben Nighthorse	.327	0	0
108	95407	CO	CAMPBELL, Ben Nighthorse	.229	0	1