

Hispanic Support for Donald Trump: In-Group Favoritism or Out-Group Animus?

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Gabriel Gómez

Freie Universität Berlin

gabrielg98@zedat.fu-berlin.de

Amanda Sahar D'Urso

Georgetown University

amanda.durso@georgetown.edu

Mike Cowburn

European University Viadrina

cowburn@europa-uni.de

Donald Trump increased his support from Hispanic Americans in the 2020 election. Using data from the 2018, 2020, and 2022 Cooperative Congressional Electoral Study, we test whether Hispanic support for Trump was driven by in-group favoritism or out-group animus. We find prioritizing a White identity among Hispanic Americans was not significantly associated with the likelihood of voting for Trump. Instead, out-group animus, measured through racial resentment, denial of racism, xenophobia, and sexism, emerged as a significant predictor, with xenophobia having the strongest link to Trump voting. These results contribute to a more nuanced understanding of Hispanic voter behavior by highlighting the role of out-group attitudes. Given Hispanics constitute the fastest-growing demographic in the U.S. electorate, these insights have important implications for future electoral dynamics.

Keywords: Hispanic voting; race; White identity; racial resentment; Donald Trump

In the 2020 presidential election, Donald Trump received a higher proportion of Hispanic¹ votes than any Republican candidate since George W. Bush in 2004 (Drucker 2020), increasing his vote share with Hispanic from 28 percent in 2016 to 38 percent (Pew Research Center 2018, 2021). Following the election, several narratives emerged to explain this improved performance, including that Hispanics had been “taken for granted” by the Biden campaign (Medina and Lerer 2021) due to the group’s historic support of the Democratic Party (Saavedra Cisneros 2017). Yet, many Hispanic voters hold views aligned closer to the Republican party (Contreras 2022; Foggatt 2023). For instance, Hispanic Americans reported being disappointed in the Democratic Party’s perceived connections to socialism (Gamboa 2021), and supported Republican policy choices regarding lockdowns and COVID-19 (Gutierrez et al. 2019; Lauter 2021; Ocampo, Garcia-Rios, and Gutierrez 2021).

After the 2016 election, research extensively tested drivers of support for Trump, identifying several important factors including in-group measures such as White identity² and measures of out-group prejudice such as racism, sexism, and xenophobia (Buyuker et al. 2021; Jardina 2021; Knuckey and Hassan 2022; Long 2023; Major, Blodorn, and Major Blascovich 2018; Sides, Tesler, and Vavreck 2017; Stewart and Willer 2022). This research almost exclusively focuses on Anglo-White voters, finding that both in-group favoritism and out-group animus were associated with support for Trump, with out-group measures

¹ The term “Hispanic” has its roots in colonialism as the Spanish language is not native to Latin America, meaning the term may be taken as erasing indigenous Latin Americans and Latin Americans with African heritage who do not speak Spanish (Cruz-Janzen 2007). We use “Hispanic Americans” to include both Spaniards and Latin Americans (including those with Spanish ancestry) living in the U.S. who are racialized in similar ways (Soto-Márquez 2019), while recognizing White Spaniards likely experience racism in distinct ways from brown-skinned South Americans. Though this category was not designed to include Brazilians, many Brazilians in the U.S. identify as Hispanic and are therefore included (Passel and Krogstad 2023). Members of this group continue to both use the term Hispanic by a wide margin (Lopez, Krogstad, and Passel 2023).

² Identification with a race or ethnicity involves how individuals understand themselves; this is similar to, but not the same as self-categorization. Self-categorization refers to how someone indicates their identity on forms which often have rigid categories. Although we discuss identity, absent specific measures of White identity, we measure White identity among Hispanics via self-categorization. We discuss this further below.

such as xenophobia being among the strongest predictors of support for Trump (Buyuker et al. 2021; Jardina 2021). We therefore test whether this phenomenon is specific to Anglo-Whites.

Heterogeneity in Hispanic Americans’ voting behavior has been identified both before and during the Trump era based on demographic and economic characteristics—such as age, gender, country of origin, and income (Alvarez and Bedolla 2003; Garcia 2021; Gouin 2021; Hill and Moreno 1996; Medina 2020; Segura 2012). An association between prejudicial beliefs such as denial of racism (Alamillo 2019; Haywood 2017), sexism (Hickel and Deckman 2022), and xenophobia (Sommer and Franco 2024) and support for Trump has also been identified among Hispanics. Current studies do not systematically test these features simultaneously (i.e., controlling for one another). Other research finds an association between Whiteness and political conservatism among Hispanics (Cuevas-Molina 2023; Filindra and Kolbe 2022; Ostfeld and Yadon 2022) but does not specifically test between White self-categorization and support for Trump. Given the existing findings related to in-group and out-group beliefs, and support for Trump among Anglo-Whites, it appears necessary to consider these beliefs concurrently. We therefore test whether in-group favoritism or out-group animus drove Hispanic support for Donald Trump.

To do so, we use data from the 2018, 2020, and 2022 Cooperative Electoral Study (CES) (Ansolabehere, Schaffner, and Luks 2021).³ We operationalize Hispanics’ in-group favoritism as the degree to which they prioritize a White rather than a Hispanic identity via self-categorizing as White. We operationalize out-group animus along four potentially salient dimensions: racial resentment, denial of racism, xenophobia, and sexism. In-group favoritism in the form of prioritizing a White identity was not significantly associated with the likelihood of voting for Trump, but all four measures of out-group animus were strongly associated with an increased likelihood of voting for Trump. As established for

³ We extend our analysis to 2016 in the supplementary material but this CES is missing two of our key variables—racial resentment and symbolic sexism—meaning we omit it from the main analysis.

Anglo-Whites (Buyuker et al. 2021), xenophobia had the strongest link to Trump vote share.

These empirical results are important for our understanding of Hispanic voter behavior as a heterogeneous phenomenon and the role of in-group favoritism and out-group animus in structuring the political preferences of demographic groups other than Anglo-Whites. Hispanics are the fastest-growing group in the U.S. electorate, meaning our findings also have implications for future electoral outcomes.

Theoretical Framework

Since his election as president, scholars have examined which attitudes were most associated with Americans' support for Trump. Animus toward out-groups—including toward Black and African Americans, non-co-partisans, Muslims, and immigrants—drove much of the support for Trump among non-Hispanic White Americans, referred to hereafter as Anglo-Whites (Stewart and Willer 2022; Mason, Wronski, and Kane 2021; Major, Blodorn, and Major Blascovich 2018; Lajevardi and Abrajano 2019; Knuckey and Hassan 2022; Choma and Hanoch 2017; Buyuker et al. 2021; Margolis 2020).⁴ In-group favoritism—namely, identification with a White racial identity—also contributed to support for Trump among Anglo-White Americans (Jardina 2021; Long 2023; Sides, Tesler, and Vavreck 2017). Given Trump's rhetoric, particularly his slogan "Make America Great Again", many Anglo-White Americans felt a sense of amity toward the candidate who openly embraced White identity. The focus on in-group favoritism and support for Trump has almost exclusively focused on the Anglo-Whites who constitute the majority of his support. Yet, Hispanic identity is an *ethnic* category that allows individuals to *also* identify with a race; including as White. We take this division of race and ethnicity seriously to analyze White-Hispanic in-group identity. Theoretically, we

⁴ Middle Eastern and North African individuals are legally classified as "White" in the United States, but we do not include these individuals as Anglo-White.

expect these same in-group and out-group mechanisms are present among Hispanic voters through the process of distancing from Hispanic identity.

To understand these dynamics, we ground our framework around social identity theory (SIT) (Tajfel 1974; Tajfel and Turner 1979, 1986). SIT explains how individuals understand themselves and interact with others through membership within a group (Tajfel 1981, 255). Social identities can therefore influence how distinct or close one feels from another group, referred to as *social distance* (Bogardus 1933; Magee and Smith 2013). Individuals create distance between their group and other groups either by prioritizing membership in their (in-)group or by disparaging other (out-)groups. Consequently, group attachments and preferential treatment are given to one’s in-group often at the expense of an unfavored out-group. Yet, in-group favoritism and out-group animus are not systematically correlated (Brewer 1999).

In-group identity prioritization can be understood as a social mobility strategy used by Hispanics to distance themselves from other Hispanics and ‘pass’ as a member of a higher-status group: White.⁵ Consequently, prioritizing a U.S. American identity—often conflated with White (Devos and Banaji 2005)—over a Hispanic identity has become a strong predictor of support for conservative immigration policies and Republican candidates (Hickel et al. 2020). Meanwhile, other Hispanics have tried to distance themselves from unfavored out-groups such as Hispanic immigrants by blaming them for the negative social standing of their group (Bedolla 2003). High-identifying members have long tended to engage in political efforts to assert the group’s positive value (Garcia-Rios, Pedraza, and Wilcox-Archuleta 2019). Conversely, low identifiers are shown to disassociate, including through strategies such as rating other Hispanics less favorably (Pérez 2015) and supporting restrictionist immigration policies and candidates (Sommer

⁵ Anglos are generally seen by Hispanics as having “significantly higher status” than other Hispanics (Huddy and Virtanen 1995).

and Franco 2024). We therefore examine these two modes of social distancing—in-group favoritism and out-group animus—for Hispanics’ support for Trump.

Whiteness and Hispanic Identity

Discussing ethnoracial identity in the U.S.—particularly related to Hispanic identity—reveals a distinction between race and ethnicity. Race is often conceived as consisting of “hard” boundaries that are usually phenotypic, including skin color and hair texture. Ethnicity, often envisaged in reference to “softer” boundaries such as culture, language, and traditions. Government-issued forms ask respondents to indicate *both* their racial *and* ethnic identities. Individuals are asked to select among six racial groups: American Indian or Alaska Native; Asian American; Black or African American; Native Hawaiian or Other Pacific Islander; and White. The subsequent question focuses on ethnicity, asking whether the individual is of Hispanic, Latino, or Spanish origin. Hispanic Americans, therefore, self-categorize into *both* a racial and an ethnic group: Hispanicity. To understand why it is important to consider *both* the racial *and* ethnic identity of U.S. Hispanics—especially when considering the role of White identity on support for Trump—we offer a brief historical context for the rationale behind separating race and ethnicity.

One catalyst for separating ethnic and racial identity in the U.S. Census was the Texas school system. The 1910 revolt against the Mexican dictator, Porfirio Díaz produced a wave of Mexican emmigration. Following this rapid increase in Mexican immigrants into the U.S., the 1930 Census included Mexican as a *racial* category for the first and only time. Shortly thereafter, organizations such as the League of United Latin American Citizens (LULAC) and the American G.I. Forum fought for the removal of the racial label, arguing Mexican Americans, and Hispanic Americans, more generally, were to be considered “other [W]hites” (San Miguel Jr 1987, 177). These organizations advocated for this change because Mexican parents wanted to send their children to better schools in Texas, only accessible if their children were legally categorized as White (San Miguel Jr 1987, 72). Although the Census removed the racial label of “Mexican”—without adding

any question to capture whether individuals were Hispanic—the end goal for Mexican American parents in Texas was not met. After federal demands to desegregate schools to comply with *Brown v. Board of Education*, Texan school districts argued they had complied with desegregation requirements. Instead of integrating all students, the school districts grouped Black schools with Hispanic schools—legally designated as White—keeping Anglo-White schools separate (San Miguel Jr 1987). Consequently, Hispanic organizations shifted strategies and petitioned for their own category that explicitly includes race *and* ethnicity in order to simultaneously claim Whiteness, while also claiming difference from Anglo-White Americans (San Miguel Jr 1987). From 1940 through 1960 Hispanic Americans were strictly classified as White, with Hispanic added as an ethnic category in the 1970s. The 1973 Supreme Court decision of *Keys v. School District Number One, Denver, Colorado* declared Mexican Americans “were constitutionally entitled to recognition as an identifiable minority” (San Miguel Jr 1987, 180–81), which remains their category today. This brief history highlights the inexorable link between Whiteness as a race and Hispanicity as an ethnicity in the U.S. and shows that Hispanic identification as White is not a twenty-first-century phenomenon.

With the continued racialization of Hispanic Americans into a Hispanic identity distinct from Whiteness or Blackness, many Hispanic Americans are unsure of how to fill out forms that separate race and ethnicity. The dual question allows for individuals who are Black or Afro-Hispanic, for example, to be able to identify as both Black *and* Hispanic, with evidence that Afro-Latino identity transcends merely Black or Hispanic identity alone (Clealand and Gutierrez 2022; Hordge-Freeman and Veras 2020; Howard 2018; Nicholson, Pantoja, and Segura 2005; Nolasco 2020; Smith 2020). Other research demonstrates the importance of Whiteness among White Hispanics (Ceron-Anaya, de Santana Pinho, and Ramos-Zayas 2023; Cuevas-Molina 2023; Filindra and Kolbe 2022;

Ostfeld and Yadon 2022; Yadon and Ostfeld 2020).⁶ Hispanic Americans who self-categorize as White are more likely to identify as Republican than other Hispanic Americans (Cuevas-Molina 2023), as are Hispanics who overestimate how light their skin pigmentation is relative to an objective reading (Ostfeld and Yadon 2022). Qualitative work helps contextualize self-identification as White (Dowling 2015), and identifies distinct trends in self-classification and the classification as White by others (Vargas 2015).

Given extant research linking White identity and support for Trump (Jardina 2021; Long 2023; Sides, Tesler, and Vavreck 2017), we consider support for Trump among Hispanic Americans. One remaining question is whether conceptualizing White self-categorization is considered in-group among Hispanics. Because our framework relies on social distancing as a mechanism for understanding group distinctiveness, we believe Hispanics who prioritize “White” over “Hispanic” consider Donald Trump to be a candidate that specifically supports White Americans. As such, we conceptualize this identity—in the context of support for Trump—as an in-group characteristic.

H₁: White Hispanic Americans will be more likely to support Donald Trump relative to Hispanics who do not indicate they are White.

Out-Group Animus Among Hispanics

Trump’s rhetoric increased the salience of racial animus toward Black and African Americans (Jardina and Piston 2023), xenophobia toward immigrants (Hodwitz and Massingale 2023), Islamophobia toward Muslims (Lajevardi and Oskooii 2018), and sexism

⁶ It is impossible to discuss Whiteness among Hispanics without discussing colorism. Indeed colorism—or prejudicial beliefs about individuals with darker skin pigmentation, particularly members of one’s ethnoracial group—is one of the starkest differences between the practice of Whiteness among Hispanics and Anglo-Whites. Colorism influences many of the aspirational aspects of Whiteness for Hispanics and has tangible consequences on people’s lived experiences. Among Black and African Americans and Hispanic populations, those with lighter skin pigmentation make more money and have better educational experiences relative to those of the same ethnoracial group with darker skin pigmentation (Gans 2012; for overview see Hunter 2007).

(Rothe and Collins 2019). In this section, we focus our attention on four theoretically-motivated out-group prejudices among Hispanics’ support for Trump: racial resentment, xenophobia, and symbolic sexism.

Racial Resentment

Racial prejudice in the form of racial resentment played a significant role in motivating Anglo-Whites to vote for Trump (Buyuker et al. 2021; Hooghe and Dassonneville 2018; Jardina 2021; Knuckey and Hassan 2022; Lajevardi and Abrajano 2019; Long 2023; Shook et al. 2020; Wong 2018). Though racial animus toward Black and African Americans typically focuses on Anglo-White prejudice, prejudicial attitudes toward Black and African Americans are not unique to Anglo-Whites.

Hispanics’ stereotypes of Black and African Americans are more negative than Anglo-Whites (McClain et al. 2006), and Hispanics are no different from Anglo-Whites in their negative perceptions of Black and African Americans regarding work ethic and intelligence (Krupnikov and Piston 2016).^{7,8} Immigration history contributes to anti-Black prejudice among Hispanics, where Mexican immigrants show stronger animus toward Black and African Americans relative to U.S.-born Mexicans (Murguia and Forman 2003).⁹ Anti-Black racism, denial of racism, and racial resentment among Hispanics are associated with support for Trump as there are for Anglo-Whites (Alamillo 2019; Haywood 2017; Hickel et al. 2020). Racial resentment provides one of the closest foils to prioritizing

⁷ When discussing anti-Black prejudice among Hispanics, it is important to note the historical and theoretical distinction between prejudice toward African Americans and Afro-Latinos, both of whom are racially Black. Though testing the distinctions between Hispanic prejudice toward African Americans and prejudice toward Afro-Latinos is beyond the scope of this article, these are two different types of prejudices—one of which involves racial prejudice toward co-ethnic members and one of which involves racial prejudice among non-co-ethnics.

⁸A self-reinforcing dynamic might exist, where already-believed stereotypes are reinforced by the desire to differentiate from minorities perceived to have lower status (Gans 2012), and Blacks serving as a defining ‘other’ (Warren and Twine 1997).

⁹ Both groups felt significantly warmer toward Anglo-Americans than to Black Americans, regardless of immigration generation.

a White in-group identity because racial resentment specifically positions the Anglo-White experience against the experience of Black Americans. Some Hispanics may see Whiteness as a vehicle to escape racial prejudice and higher status in the U.S.: “Just as Italian and Irish Americans did, the fastest path to Whiteness for Latinos may be to minimize the social space between themselves and Whites and adopt White views of race and racism” (Alamillo 2019, 461). That is, Hispanic voters may hold racially resentful beliefs as a means to distance themselves from groups of which they do not want to be a part. We therefore consider Hispanics’ relationship between racial resentment and support for Trump.

H₂: Among Hispanic Americans, higher racial resentment will be associated with an increased likelihood of voting for Donald Trump.

Denial of Racism

One potential strategy used by Hispanics to reduce the social distance between them and Anglo-Whites (or increase the distance to African Americans) is denying the existence of racism (Pérez, Robertson, and Vicuña 2023). Denial of racism is theoretically distinct from racial resentment; whereas racial resentment captures prejudice toward Black and African Americans, denial of racism captures the sentiment that the U.S. has become a color-blind and post-racial society (Bonilla-Silva 2017). In a series of interviews, Rojas-Sosa (2016) finds that, in the face of discrimination, Hispanic students tend to: (1) avoid identifying their antagonists; (2) dissociate themselves from negative statements of immigrants by distinguishing ‘good’ from ‘bad’ immigrants; (3) show tolerance towards anti-immigrant positions and justify their antagonists’ arguments, and; (4) echo common ideologies about race, in which racism is no longer a social problem. Denial of racism might therefore serve as a strategy of minority groups to prevent being perceived as ‘un-American’ (Rojas-Sosa 2016). Hispanics who deny the existence of racism are also more likely to hold conservative

views and support Trump (Alamillo 2019; Hickel et al. 2020). We therefore expect denying the existence of racism will predict support for Trump.

H₃: Hispanic Americans who deny racism exists are more likely to have voted for Trump relative to Latino Americans who score lower in their denial of racism.

Xenophobia

Xenophobia has been shown to be one of the strongest predictors of support for Donald Trump (Buyuker et al. 2021; Hooghe and Dassonneville 2018; Jardina 2021). Among Anglo-Whites, xenophobia was the strongest and most consistent predictor of support for Trump—more than White identity, racial resentment, or symbolic sexism (Buyuker et al. 2021). Given issues of immigration policy and Hispanic identity are often intertwined (Bonilla and Mo 2018; Mohamed 2017; Serrano-Careaga and Huo 2019), Hispanic voters may not be driven by xenophobic attitudes in their support for Trump.¹⁰ For some, prioritizing an American over a Hispanic identity is associated with supporting conservative immigration policies, including a border wall, and less favorability toward undocumented immigrants (Hickel et al. 2020). Hispanicity alone does not preclude Hispanic Americans from holding conservative or anti-immigration policy positions.

Anti-immigrant attitudes among Hispanics predicted their denial of racism and are strongly associated with voting for Trump (Alamillo 2019; Cadena 2023). Although Hispanic voters hold more conservative views about immigration than non-voters, these Hispanics prioritize issues such as the economy rather than immigration (Galbraith and Callister 2020). Yet, many Hispanics voted for Trump *because* of—not despite—his anti-immigration attitudes and Hispanics with more positive perceptions of the economy were more likely to hold anti-immigrant attitudes (Sommer and Franco 2024). Though Hispanics rated the economy as more important than immigration (Galbraith and Callister 2020), the two issues are interrelated relative to support for Trump. We therefore

¹⁰ See, for example, the perpetual foreigner stereotype (Huynh, Devos, and Smalarz 2011).

hypothesize Hispanic Americans holding xenophobic attitudes will be associated with support for Trump.

H₄: Among Hispanic Americans, more xenophobic attitudes will be associated with an increased likelihood of voting for Donald Trump.

Symbolic Sexism

Though the 2008 election featured vice-presidential nominee Sarah Palin, the 2016 presidential election was the first in which gender and sexism were highly salient and where the two major parties' candidates were of different genders. When candidates differ on an identity characteristic, that characteristic becomes more salient, particularly related to prejudicial attitudes (Petrow, Transue, and Vercellotti 2018). Candidates' gender differences made sexism more salient in 2016 (Cassese and Barnes 2019) and was consistently associated with support for Donald Trump (Bracic, Israel-Trummel, and Shortle 2019; Buyuker et al. 2021; Cassese and Barnes 2019; Cassese and Holman 2019; Deckman and Cassese 2021; Hickel and Deckman 2022; Schaffner, MacWilliams, and Nteta 2018; Shook et al. 2020).

Hickel and Deckman (2022) test the extent to which Latino support for Trump was influenced by sexism by drawing from the theory of “machismo”, often discussed as a form of sexism toward women within the Hispanic community.¹¹ They test the relationship between “machismo,” “traditional sexism,” and “modern sexism” (similar to “symbolic sexism”), on support for Trump among Hispanic voters in the 2016 and 2020 elections, finding that sexism was positively associated with supporting Trump. We expand their study by assessing the effect of sexism on support for Trump, controlling for in-group favoritism (via White self-classification) and out-group animus (via racial resentment,

¹¹ Hickel and Deckman (2022) draw on work by Arciniega et al. (2008) to highlight that machismo includes both negative traits—including hypermasculinity and aggressive characteristics—and positive traits—including closeness with family and nurturing characteristics. They also draw on this work to note the term itself can be broadly applied across Hispanic communities although it is Mexican in origin.

denial of racism, and xenophobia) to fully capture the effect of sexism on support for Trump among Hispanics.

H₅: Among Hispanic Americans, more sexist attitudes will be associated with an increased likelihood of voting for Donald Trump.

Data & Research Design

We test these hypotheses using data from the Cooperative Election Study (CES), a nationally representative survey of American adults (Ansolabehere, Schaffner, and Luks 2021). All hypotheses were pre-registered before conducting our analyses (see supplemental material). We use data from four years: 2016, 2018, 2020, and 2022, but report 2016 results in the supplementary material given two key variables are missing. We only include respondents to the CES who voted in the most recent presidential election. In presidential election years (2016 and 2020), this is indicated by the answer to the post-election survey question “For whom did you vote for President of the United States?” where respondents who answered “Hillary Clinton/ Joe Biden”, “Donald J. Trump”, or “Other” were included and respondents who answered “I did not vote in this race”, “I did not vote”, or “Not Sure” were excluded. In midterm elections (2018 and 2022), we restrict inclusion based on the answer to the question “In the election for U.S. President, who did you vote for?”, where respondents who answered “Donald Trump”, “Hillary Clinton/Joe Biden”, or “Someone Else” were included. Respondents who answered “I did not cast a vote for president” or “I don’t recall” were excluded. The results of an additional model including those who did not cast a vote for president is reported in the supplemental material and aligns with our main model, but we are theoretically interested in Hispanic *voters* as our denominator.

We also restrict inclusion into our sample to Hispanics and Latinos. Between 2016 and 2022, the CES asked “what racial or ethnic group best describes you?” [race]. We include all respondents who identify as Hispanic or Latino in response to this question.

The CES also asks “are you of Spanish, Latino, or Hispanic origin or descent?” [hispanic]. We include all respondents who answered in the affirmative to the [hispanic] question. Respondents who failed to answer either of these questions were excluded. Across four years, 18,800 respondents met the criteria of having voted in the most recent presidential election and can be classed as Hispanic according to one of these two questions. The total number of observations in our main analysis is 10,142 as racial resentment and symbolic sexism measures are not included in 2016. Our separate analyses for each hypothesis, including 2016, are presented in the supplementary materials.

Our dependent variable for all hypotheses is a dichotomous variable of voting for Trump in the most recent presidential election. In years that feature a presidential election (2016 and 2020), we construct this variable using the answer to the question “for whom did you vote for President of the United States?” in the post-election waves of the survey. In 2018 and 2022, we use the answer to the question “who did you vote for in the election for President in 2016/2020?” in the pre-election surveys. In each case our dependent variable is dichotomous, taking the value “1” when the respondent indicated they voted for Trump and “0” when they voted for any other candidate.

Hypothesis 1 expects Hispanics will be more likely to support Donald Trump if they prioritize a White racial identity. To construct this independent variable, we identify White Hispanic individuals from CCES. Respondents are first asked to select what race they primarily self-categorize as, of which “Hispanic”, “White”, “Black”, “Asian”, “Native American”, “Middle Eastern” and “Other” are possible answers [race]. Afterwards, respondents are then asked if they have Hispanic ancestry [hispanic]. We include all respondents who indicate their racial identity is Hispanic [race] or who have Hispanic ancestry [hispanic] in our sample. This provides us with two groups; those who self-categorize primarily as Hispanics in the first question [race], and those who self-categorize as another race in the first question but indicate they are of Hispanic heritage [hispanic]. Our independent variable for H_1 is therefore Hispanic respondents who primarily self-

categorized their race as “White” in response to the first question about race [race], with individuals who selected “Hispanic” as their race serving as the reference category.

Yet, as d’Urso (2022) and Filindra and Kolbe (2022) demonstrate, self-categorization is not the same as self-identification because self-categorization is based on institutionally constructed categories that may not reflect how individuals identify (d’Urso 2022). Though Hispanic respondents may self-categorize as White when they are asked about their racial identity, they do not necessarily identify as White (Filindra and Kolbe 2022). Hispanics and Latinos who identify as White—not merely self-categorize as such—hold more conservative political views (Filindra and Kolbe 2022). Unfortunately, few, if any, batteries measure White identity salience among Hispanic Americans, as batteries capturing the strength of White identity (Jardina 2019) are not designed to capture identity strength for Hispanics. Though some Hispanics *are* co-racial with Anglo-Whites, their ethnic identity may mean questions designed to understand White identity among Hispanics are qualitatively different than the Anglo-White identity measures. In this study, we believe our operationalization addresses the concerns raised by Filindra and Kobe despite having a specific battery item for White Hispanic identity salience because we operationalize White Hispanics as individuals who selected White as their racial category *despite the option to self-categorize their race as Hispanic* (see also Dowling 2015). These respondents, therefore, prioritize their White *racial* identity in ways other Hispanic respondents do not. It is for these individuals that we expected there will be a connection between White identity and support for Trump.¹² Racial and ethnic identities and self-categorization develop within childhood and early adolescence (Phinney 2006; Ruble et al. 2004), are stable over time (Simpson, Jivraj, and Warren 2016; Syed, Azmitia, and Phinney 2007), and are unlikely to change due to partisanship (Egan 2020). These studies suggest some explanations as to our theorized direction of the relationship between

¹² Cuevas-Molina (2023) uses this operationalized to understand the relationship between White identity and partisanship among Hispanics.

self-categorization and Trump support, but we recognize that absent panel data or an experimental design, we cannot make causal claims about their direction.

Hypothesis 2 expects Hispanics with higher levels of racial resentment will be more likely to vote for Trump. Racial resentment measures the belief that Blacks lack the moral values of individualism, hard work, discipline, and self-sacrifice, central to American society (Kinder and Sanders 1996). The CES uses two statements¹³ to measure racial resentment, and respondents answered these statements using a five-point scale (strongly agree; somewhat agree; neither agree nor disagree; somewhat disagree; strongly disagree). Answers were standardized to have a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one and scaled such that high values represent greater levels of racial resentment and anti-Black animus.¹⁴

Hypothesis 3 expects Hispanics who deny the existence of racism will be more likely to vote for Trump. Denial of racism is operationalized in the CES by measuring the belief that race does not affect one's life chances, as drawn from the colorblind racial attitudes scale (Neville et al. 2000). Participants are asked to respond to two further statements¹⁵ using the same five-point scale. The measure was coded such that high values represent a higher denial of racism¹⁶ and scaled and standardized.

Hypothesis 4 expects Hispanics with higher levels of xenophobic attitudes will be more inclined to vote for Trump. Immigration is a particularly salient issue for Hispanic voters (Morales, Rodriguez, and Schaller 2020), which may be motivated by beliefs not connected to race. We test beliefs about immigration using respondents' answers to the five immigration questions on the CES.¹⁷ We recoded responses to these questions such

¹³ 1) Irish, Italians, Jewish, and many other minorities overcame prejudice and worked their way up. Blacks should do the same without any special favors. 2) Generations of slavery and discrimination have created conditions that make it difficult for Blacks to work their way out of the lower class.

¹⁴ The Cronbach's alpha value for this measure is 0.807, indicating high internal consistency.

¹⁵ 1) White people in the U.S. have certain advantages because of the color of their skin. 2) Racial problems in the U.S. are rare, isolated situations.

¹⁶ The Cronbach's alpha value for this scale is 0.774, indicating high internal consistency.

¹⁷ CC20_331grid

that higher values signify opposition to immigration, then aggregated them to produce a single indicator of immigration views which we then scaled and standardized.

Hypothesis 5 expects Hispanics with higher levels of symbolic sexism will be more likely to vote for Trump. This expectation aligns with previous work focused on vote choice in the 2016 presidential election (Cassese and Holman 2019; Schaffner, MacWilliams, and Nteta 2018). From 2018 onwards, the CES contains two items¹⁸ to measure symbolic sexism which participants are asked to respond to on the same five-point scale. As with our measures for other hypotheses, we aggregate, scale, and standardize responses.

We include several control variables that might predict the likelihood of voting for Trump for reasons other than in-group attachment or out-group animus. These controls largely follow the established literature on Hispanic voting behavior. We discuss these variables in the supplementary material.

Our dependent variable is dichotomous and we expect the relationship to be linearly related to the log odds of our independent variables, meaning we employ binary logistic regression. Because our data are not structured as panel data, with different individuals asked each year, our observations are independent of one another. We test for multicollinearity, presenting the correlation coefficients in the supplementary materials alongside the descriptive statistics and a series of robustness checks.

Results

Table 1 shows the result of our full combined model for all hypotheses. For **H₁**, we observe no direct relationship between Hispanic respondents' prioritization of White identity and their likelihood of voting for Trump. Conversely, our four measures of out-group animus

¹⁸ For CES18, these two items are: 1) When women lose to men in a fair competition, they typically complain about being discriminated against. 2) Feminists are making entirely reasonable demands of men. CES20 and CES22 include two different yet related items: 1) Women seek to gain power by getting control over men 2) Women are too easily offended

present a positive and statistically significant relationship for all four indicators (**H₂** through **H₅**). Of the four outgroup measures, xenophobia has the strongest substantive relationship to voting for Trump, followed by denial of racism, racial resentment, and then symbolic sexism. In all cases, these relationships are highly significant.

Table 1: Full Model

	Trump Vote
White Identity (H₁)	-0.040 (0.115)
Racial Resentment (H₂)	0.388*** (0.063)
Denial of Racism (H₃)	0.581*** (0.058)
Xenophobia (H₄)	0.735*** (0.054)
Symbolic Sexism (H₅)	0.270*** (0.054)
Observations	10,142
AIC	3,652.0
BIC	3,912.1
Log. Likelihood	-1,790.013
RMSE	0.25


Coefficients are odds ratios with robust standard errors in parentheses

* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

Because logistic regression results can be difficult to interpret substantively, we present the marginal effects plots for our out-group indicators in Figure 1. Moving from the lowest to the highest end of the racial resentment (**H₂**) scale was associated with a 22 percentage point change, from 15 percent to 37 percent, in the likelihood of voting for Trump when all other values are held at their means. Similarly, moving from the lowest to highest value in the denial of racism (**H₃**) scale was associated with a 39 percentage point change, from 15 percent to 54 percent, in the likelihood of voting for Trump when all other values are held at their means. For xenophobia (**H₄**), the change is stronger still (42 percentage points), from 13 percent to 55 percent at the highest value of the scale.


For symbolic sexism (H_5) the change is 17 percentage points, from 18 percent to 35 percent.

Figure 1: Marginal Effects Plot of Out-Group Indicators



Next, we show the average marginal effects of each of our independent variables on the likelihood of voting for Trump. Figure 2 shows these plots across each election cycle. In line with the results presented in Table 1 and Figure 1, xenophobia has the most consistent effect on the likelihood of voting for Trump across this period. Sexism and racial resentment have a similar positive effect across the three years, whereas the denial

of racism variable appears to increase in substantive effect over time. Interestingly, White identity reduced in effect over time, going from a positive effect in 2018 to a negative effect in 2022.



Overall, we observe a clear effect of our four out-group animus variables, with no clear direct relationship between in-group favoritism and likelihood of voting for Trump. We discuss the implications of these findings below.

Discussion & Conclusion

Out-group animus directly related to Hispanics’ propensity to support Donald Trump across multiple elections where he featured on the ballot. Conversely, we find no direct association between the prioritization of a White rather than a Hispanic identity and vote choice. These findings speak to the power of out-group animus as a motivating force in modern U.S. politics, even beyond Anglo-Whites. Consistent with other findings (Buyuker et al. 2021), xenophobia had the strongest connection to the decision by Hispanics to vote for Trump. Our findings suggest that though Trump’s, often targeted, xenophobic rhetoric was not appealing to most Hispanic voters, he held particular appeal for an important minority with distinct beliefs about immigration.

We also show Hispanic voters’ attitudes about race—especially their views about Black Americans—further influenced their decision to support the former president. In particular, beliefs about the role of race in U.S. society strongly aligned with Hispanic

voters' willingness to vote for Donald Trump. Racial resentment, including the belief that Black Americans should work their way out of prejudice, was a further indicator of Trump support. These findings appear particularly troubling at a time when racial, especially anti-Black, attitudes have become increasingly salient in U.S. politics (Tesler 2016). Beliefs about women and the prevalence of gender discrimination were further linked to likelihood of voting for Trump. Here, our findings suggest Trump's macho appeals may have helped him garner further support from Hispanic voters (see also Medina 2020).

Hispanic voters' prioritization of a White identity did not directly relate to their propensity to vote for Donald Trump. Previous studies found mixed results, with studies of other groups such as those by Sides et al. (2018) and Jardina (2019) finding positive associations, but Buyuker et al. (2021) reporting null results for Hispanics when controlling for out-group measures. The absence of a relationship here may also be connected to questions of ancestry and "ethnic attrition", where, for example, a respondent may have a Latina grandmother but otherwise White lineage and therefore identify as White (Alba and Islam 2009; Duncan and Trejo 2011). Absent the out-group measures, White identity had a positive and statistically significant association with Trump support (see supplementary material), suggesting that self-categorization as White may be confounded by other outgroup measures. Although we do not specifically test this, previous studies suggest that self-categorization may be linked to distinguishing oneself from an outgroup more than strictly identification with an in-group (Brewer 1999; Filindra and Kolbe 2022). In many ways, our findings mirror the findings by Buyuker et al. (2021), with an important addition: like Anglo-Whites, Hispanic American support for Trump was largely driven by out-group animus. Like Anglo-Whites, xenophobia had the most consistent and largest substantive effect on support for Trump among all out-group covariates. Xenophobia had the second largest substantive effect for support for Trump after Republican partisanship (see supplementary material). Despite the myriad ways that Hispanics differ politically from Anglo-Whites, this study takes seriously the possibility

that drivers of support for Trump operate similarly among voters, regardless of their racial and ethnic group. When it comes to support for Trump, many of the drivers salient for Anglo-Whites were also salient for Hispanic Americans.

These findings prompt questions about Hispanic vote choices in other contexts, partly due to the unconventional nature of Trump's candidacy. Thinking about Hispanic voting for candidates other than Trump, we might expect less importance on specific questions about immigration given the disproportionate focus on the topic in Trump's 2016 campaign. We might also expect lesser importance for elections that are not for the presidency given the comparatively muted powers that Congress and governors have in this policy field.

A crucial question for the near future of U.S. electoral politics is how the fastest-growing demographic group will align in terms of partisanship. The role and importance of Hispanic voters is growing both at a national level (Cruz and Romero 2023) and in both current (e.g., Arizona, Nevada) and potential future (e.g., Texas) swing states. One limitation of these findings is our inability to determine causal effects as we lack the sufficient panel data to test individual-level responses to Trump's rhetoric and actions. This approach would make for an interesting further study, though an alternative candidate may be needed given the obvious high level of pre-existing knowledge about Trump's views.

Trump's vitriolic language was not the origin of Hispanic discrimination in U.S. politics but rather their continuation and evolution (Branton et al. 2011; Canizales and Vallejo 2021), meaning these findings will remain important for future elections regardless of whether Trump is on the ballot. Given the unfortunate likelihood that some politicians will continue to vilify out-groups including immigrants, Black Americans, and women, we identify one avenue through which some Hispanics will be more inclined to support them. Indeed, our results suggest that some Hispanic voters support these candidates because of rather than despite these traits in a similar manner to the White population.

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Supplementary Material

Below we include additional descriptive information about our key variables, correlation coefficients, and further models with additional controls and separated by hypothesis.

Control Variables

We include several control variables that might predict the likelihood of voting for Trump for reasons other than in-group attachment or out-group animus. Most obviously, we include traditional controls for partisanship and ideology, with ‘Independent’ and ‘Moderate’¹⁹ used as the respective reference categories (Abrajano and Alvarez 2011; Alvarez and Bedolla 2003; Collingwood, Barreto, and Garcia-Rios 2014; Segura 2012). Heterogeneity based on country of origin is also well documented, with, in particular, Hispanics of Cuban origin both more conservative and more politically aligned with the Republican Party (Alvarez and Bedolla 2003; Gouin 2021; Hill and Moreno 1996; Segura 2012). We therefore include country of origin as a further control.²⁰

We also control for respondents’ gender. Differences in the voting behavior and political views of Hispanic men and women are well documented, both generally (Bejarano 2013; Galbraith and Callister 2020; Monforti 2017; Montoya 1996) and in specific application to the ‘macho’ appeals of Trump (Garcia 2021; Medina 2020). Higher-income Hispanics are said to favor Republican candidates (Alvarez and Bedolla 2003) and hold less prejudiced attitudes (Carvacho et al. 2013), meaning we include income as a further control. Based on CCES responses, this variable is coded as a factor variable of ‘low’, ‘middle’, and ‘high’ income (see also Alamillo 2019). We use middle-income as the reference category in our models. Being of multiple races may also affect the voting

¹⁹ We recognize the burgeoning literature around this term (see e.g., Fowler et al. 2022) with moderates described as cross-pressured (Treier and Hillygus 2009), ideologically innocent (Kinder and Kalmoe 2017), or with preferences that are poorly captured by a single dimension (Broockman 2016). We do not seek to contribute to this literature but use ideology as a control to better isolate the effects of our key variables in question.

²⁰ In the CCES, respondents can indicate many countries as their country of origin, meaning we do not factorize this variable or have any single reference category.

behavior of Hispanics, meaning we include an additional control for ‘two or more races’, though we note that some Hispanics struggle to identify using the CCES race question (see also Hickel et al. 2020). As with the population at large, education may be a further important determinant of vote choice and participation (Alvarez and Bedolla 2003; Arvizu and Garcia 1996), meaning we control whether the respondent holds a college degree.

Both age and the number of generations since a family migrated to the U.S. are important factors shaping the identities and attitudes of Hispanics (Bejarano 2014; Pew Research Center 2004). We therefore include age as a continuous variable, with a further factor variable based on the number of generations a respondent’s family has been in the country, with ‘third generation or more’ as our base category. Given that religion is an important determinant of Hispanic behavior (Morales, Rodriguez, and Schaller 2020), we also include controls for denomination and religiosity, scaled using respondents’ answers to the question “how religious are you?” in the CCES.

Descriptives

Table A.1 shows the number of Hispanics in our study by who they voted for in the previous presidential election. For our dependent variable, we consider voting for Trump “1” vs. voting for any other candidate “0”.

Table A.1: Hispanics by Presidential Vote

	2016	2018	2020	2022	Total
Trump	1,237	1,310	1,354	1,971	5,872
Not Trump	2,801	3,205	2,859	3,806	12,671

Table A.2 shows the number of Hispanics in our study by racial self-identification.

Table A.2: Hispanics by Racial Self-Identification

	2016	%	2018	%	2020	%	2022	%	Total
Hispanic	2,916	68.95	3,150	69.31	3,215	75.52	3,962	67.85	13,243
White	838	19.82	840	18.48	618	14.52	1,037	17.76	3,333
Black	86	2.03	109	2.40	101	2.37	260	4.45	556
Asian	29	0.69	37	0.81	27	0.63	32	0.55	125
Other	360	8.51	409	9.00	296	6.95	548	9.39	1,613
Total	4,229		4,545		4,257		5,839		18,870

Figure A.1 shows the distribution of racial resentment, the median is 0.11. As with the denial of racism scale, the modal response was to reject both statements. Twenty percent of the sample is at the negative end of the scale, indicating an acknowledgment of systemic racism. Roughly sixteen percent of the sample is scaled at the middle of the sample, likely because they “neither agree nor disagree” with both statements. More notably for our purposes here, fifteen percent of the sample are positioned at the highest end of the scale, these respondents can be said to reject arguments that systemic conditions make it more difficult for Black Americans to succeed in American society.

Figure A.1: Racial Resentment Distribution




Figure A.2: Denial of Racism Distribution




Figure A.3 shows the distribution of the xenophobia variable that serves as our key independent variable for hypothesis four.

Figure A.3: Xenophobia Distribution





Figure A.4 shows the distribution of the symbolic sexism variable that serves as the key independent variable for hypothesis five.

Figure A.4: Symbolic Sexism Distribution



Correlation Coefficients

In Table A.3 we present the correlation coefficients of the key variables in our analysis. Given that we have correlations above 0.6 in some cases, we present a series of robustness checks below where we test each of the out-group indicators independently. In all cases our results remain substantively significant.

Table A.3: Correlation Coefficients

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Denial of Racism (1)	1			
Racial Resentment (2)	0.686	1		
Xenophobia (3)	0.641	0.628	1	
Symbolic Sexism (4)	0.514	0.562	0.491	1

Full Model with Controls

In Table A.4 we present our full model shown in Table 1 with the inclusion of all control variables.

Table A.4: Full Model with Controls

	Full Model
(Intercept)	-2.525*** (0.242)

DenialSc	0.581*** (0.058)
ImmSc	0.735*** (0.054)
SexismSc	0.270*** (0.054)
ResentmentSc	0.388*** (0.063)
PartyIDDemocrat	-2.218*** (0.109)
PartyIDRepublican	1.531*** (0.109)
IdeoLiberal	-0.623*** (0.123)
IdeoConservative	0.580*** (0.103)
GenderFemale	0.034 (0.094)
RaceWhite	-0.040 (0.115)
RaceBlack	-1.009*** (0.284)
RaceAsian	-0.485 (0.609)
RaceOther	0.629*** (0.175)
IncomeLow Income	0.019 (0.108)
IncomeHigh Income	0.180+ (0.107)
EducCollege degree	-0.076 (0.097)
ReligProtestant	0.222 (0.142)
ReligCatholic	-0.317* (0.126)
ReligSomething else	0.372* (0.169)
AborSc	0.432*** (0.053)
EmplStatusUnemployed	0.448** (0.160)
EmplStatusRetired or unable to work	-0.076 (0.119)
EmplStatusHomemaker	0.063 (0.178)
EmplStatusStudent	0.453* (0.200)
Religiosity	-0.041

	(0.050)
NationInc	0.278***
	(0.037)
HouseholdInc	0.208***
	(0.048)
Immstatus1st Gen	0.050
	(0.148)
Immstatus2nd Gen	-0.231+
	(0.119)
Immstatus3rd Gen	0.085
	(0.123)
Cuban	0.181
	(0.178)
South American	0.194
	(0.186)
Mexican	-0.057
	(0.101)
Puerto Rican	-0.097
	(0.134)
US American	-0.058
	(0.098)
Num.Obs.	10142
AIC	3652.0
BIC	3912.1
Log.Lik.	-1790.013
RMSE	0.25

+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

Robustness Checks

In the following, we demonstrate the robustness of our main model to several further checks. These extensions serve to demonstrate that our main results are not artifacts of our choices made to operationalize any variables.

In Table A.5 we present our results with the inclusion of Year Fixed Effects, using 2018 as the baseline.

Table A.5: Inclusion of Year Fixed Effects

	Year FE
(Intercept)	-3.379***
	(0.268)
DenialSc	0.546***
	(0.059)
ImmSc	0.700***
	(0.056)
SexismSc	0.291***

	(0.054)
ResentmentSc	0.348***
	(0.064)
PartyIDDemocrat	-2.189***
	(0.110)
PartyIDRepublican	1.570***
	(0.112)
IdeoLiberal	-0.715***
	(0.126)
IdeoConservative	0.547***
	(0.105)
GenderFemale	0.024
	(0.095)
RaceWhite	0.045
	(0.117)
RaceBlack	-0.963***
	(0.292)
RaceAsian	-0.517
	(0.608)
RaceOther	0.767***
	(0.178)
IncomeLow Income	0.074
	(0.111)
IncomeHigh Income	0.137
	(0.109)
EducCollege degree	-0.098
	(0.099)
ReligProtestant	0.217
	(0.144)
ReligCatholic	-0.353**
	(0.128)
ReligSomething else	0.344*
	(0.173)
AborSc	0.413***
	(0.054)
EmplStatusUnemployed	0.266
	(0.164)
EmplStatusRetired or unable to work	-0.058
	(0.120)
EmplStatusHomemaker	0.120
	(0.179)
EmplStatusStudent	0.338
	(0.206)
Religiosity	-0.031
	(0.051)
NationInc	0.512***
	(0.044)
HouseholdInc	0.147**
	(0.050)

Immstatus1st Gen	0.094 (0.151)
Immstatus2nd Gen	-0.244* (0.121)
Immstatus3rd Gen	0.002 (0.125)
Cuban	0.157 (0.182)
South American	0.176 (0.188)
Mexican	-0.107 (0.102)
Puerto Rican	-0.119 (0.137)
USUS American	0.028 (0.099)
factor(Year)2020	1.059*** (0.120)
factor(Year)2022	-0.184 (0.117)
Num.Obs.	10142
AIC	3542.6
BIC	3817.1
Log.Lik.	-1733.280
RMSE	0.25

+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

In Table A.6 we present our results with the inclusion of State Fixed Effects.

Table A.6: State Fixed Effects

	State FE
(Intercept)	-2.493*** (0.246)
DenialSc	0.584*** (0.058)
ImmSc	0.739*** (0.054)
SexismSc	0.272*** (0.054)
ResentmentSc	0.387*** (0.063)
PartyIDDemocrat	-2.212*** (0.109)
PartyIDRepublican	1.541*** (0.110)
IdeoLiberal	-0.610*** (0.123)
IdeoConservative	0.592***

	(0.104)
GenderFemale	0.031
	(0.094)
RaceWhite	-0.039
	(0.116)
RaceBlack	-1.026***
	(0.287)
RaceAsian	-0.532
	(0.611)
RaceOther	0.616***
	(0.176)
IncomeLow Income	0.011
	(0.108)
IncomeHigh Income	0.176
	(0.108)
EducCollege degree	-0.072
	(0.097)
ReligProtestant	0.212
	(0.143)
ReligCatholic	-0.310*
	(0.126)
ReligSomething else	0.363*
	(0.170)
AborSc	0.432***
	(0.053)
EmplStatusUnemployed	0.458**
	(0.160)
EmplStatusRetired or unable to work	-0.085
	(0.119)
EmplStatusHomemaker	0.060
	(0.178)
EmplStatusStudent	0.451*
	(0.201)
Religiosity	-0.037
	(0.050)
NationInc	0.278***
	(0.037)
HouseholdInc	0.208***
	(0.048)
Immstatus1st Gen	0.084
	(0.149)
Immstatus2nd Gen	-0.225+
	(0.119)
Immstatus3rd Gen	0.090
	(0.124)
Cuban	0.209
	(0.184)
South American	0.188
	(0.186)

Mexican	-0.099 (0.104)
Puerto Rican	-0.038 (0.139)
US American	-0.069 (0.098)
State FEs	✓
Num.Obs.	10142
AIC	3652.3
BIC	3941.3
Log.Lik.	-1786.147
RMSE	0.25
<hr/>	
+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001	

In Table A.7 we include an additional control for time to account for temporal trends in our dependent variable and to provide a harder test of our hypotheses.

Table A.7: Additional Time Control

	Time Trend
(Intercept)	-2.470*** (0.269)
DenialSc	0.582*** (0.058)
ImmSc	0.741*** (0.055)
SexismSc	0.269*** (0.054)
ResentmentSc	0.387*** (0.063)
PartyIDDemocrat	-2.218*** (0.109)
PartyIDRepublican	1.533*** (0.110)
IdeoLiberal	-0.625*** (0.123)
IdeoConservative	0.576*** (0.104)
GenderFemale	0.035 (0.094)
RaceWhite	-0.040 (0.115)
RaceBlack	-1.004*** (0.284)
RaceAsian	-0.489 (0.609)
RaceOther	0.636*** (0.176)

IncomeLow Income	0.024 (0.108)
IncomeHigh Income	0.182+ (0.107)
EducCollege degree	-0.076 (0.097)
ReligProtestant	0.220 (0.142)
ReligCatholic	-0.317* (0.126)
ReligSomething else	0.376* (0.170)
AborSc	0.430*** (0.053)
EmplStatusUnemployed	0.449** (0.160)
EmplStatusRetired or unable to work	-0.075 (0.119)
EmplStatusHomemaker	0.065 (0.178)
EmplStatusStudent	0.452* (0.201)
Religiosity	-0.041 (0.050)
NationInc	0.281*** (0.037)
HouseholdInc	0.204*** (0.049)
Immstatus1st Gen	0.049 (0.148)
Immstatus2nd Gen	-0.234* (0.119)
Immstatus3rd Gen	0.084 (0.123)
Cuban	0.179 (0.178)
South American	0.197 (0.186)
Mexican	-0.055 (0.101)
Puerto Rican	-0.094 (0.135)
US American	-0.057 (0.098)
TimeTrend	-0.027 (0.057)
Num.Obs.	10142
AIC	3653.7
BIC	3921.0

Log.Lik.	-1789.836
RMSE	0.25
<hr/>	
+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001	

In Table A.8 through Table A.12, we separately test each of our five hypotheses without the presence of the other key independent variables in the model. This demonstrates that our findings are not an artifact of the correlations shown above. These models all include all of the same control variables (not shown) as our main model.

Table A.8: White Identity Only

	White Identity Model
(Intercept)	-0.884*** (0.023)
RaceWhite	0.537*** (0.052)
RaceBlack	-0.507*** (0.146)
RaceAsian	0.188 (0.286)
RaceOther	0.254*** (0.072)
Num.Obs.	12209
AIC	14559.6
BIC	14596.7
Log.Lik.	-7274.824
RMSE	0.46
<hr/>	
+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001	

Table A.9: Racial Resentment

	Resentment Only
(Intercept)	-2.623*** (0.224)
Resentment	0.924*** (0.051)
Num.Obs.	10504
AIC	4254.9
BIC	4494.4
Log.Lik.	-2094.431
RMSE	0.26
<hr/>	
+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001	

Table A.10: Denial of Racism

Denial of Racism Only	
(Intercept)	-2.697*** (0.228)
Denial of Racism	0.952*** (0.049)
Num.Obs.	10290
AIC	4084.0
BIC	4322.9
Log.Lik.	-2009.004
RMSE	0.26

+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

Table A.11: Xenophobia

Xenophobia Only	
(Intercept)	-2.450*** (0.229)
Xenophobia	1.050*** (0.048)
Num.Obs.	10464
AIC	4039.5
BIC	4278.9
Log.Lik.	-1986.751
RMSE	0.26

+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

Table A.12: Sexism

Sexism Only	
(Intercept)	-2.759*** (0.221)
Sexism	0.572*** (0.047)
Num.Obs.	10437
AIC	4403.8
BIC	4643.1
Log.Lik.	-2168.880
RMSE	0.27

+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

Table A.13 shows the model using the raw rather than scaled values of our variables to ensure that our findings are not an artifact of the scales we constructed.

Table A.13: Raw Values

Raw Values	
(Intercept)	-7.902***

	(0.338)
Imm	0.522***
	(0.038)
Denial	0.238***
	(0.024)
Resentment	0.144***
	(0.023)
Sexism	0.113***
	(0.022)
PartyIDDemocrat	-2.218***
	(0.109)
PartyIDRepublican	1.531***
	(0.109)
IdeoLiberal	-0.623***
	(0.123)
IdeoConservative	0.580***
	(0.103)
GenderFemale	0.034
	(0.094)
RaceWhite	-0.040
	(0.115)
RaceBlack	-1.009***
	(0.284)
RaceAsian	-0.485
	(0.609)
RaceOther	0.629***
	(0.175)
IncomeLow Income	0.019
	(0.108)
IncomeHigh Income	0.180+
	(0.107)
EducCollege degree	-0.076
	(0.097)
ReligProtestant	0.222
	(0.142)
ReligCatholic	-0.317*
	(0.126)
ReligSomething else	0.372*
	(0.169)
AborSc	0.432***
	(0.053)
EmplStatusUnemployed	0.448**
	(0.160)
EmplStatusRetired or unable to work	-0.076
	(0.119)
EmplStatusHomemaker	0.063
	(0.178)
EmplStatusStudent	0.453*
	(0.200)

Religiosity	-0.041 (0.050)
NationInc	0.278*** (0.037)
HouseholdInc	0.208*** (0.048)
Immstatus1st Gen	0.050 (0.148)
Immstatus2nd Gen	-0.231+ (0.119)
Immstatus3rd Gen	0.085 (0.123)
Cuban	0.181 (0.178)
South American	0.194 (0.186)
Mexican	-0.057 (0.101)
Puerto Rican	-0.097 (0.134)
US American	-0.058 (0.098)
Num.Obs.	10142
AIC	3652.0
BIC	3912.1
Log.Lik.	-1790.013
RMSE	0.25

+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

Table A.14 shows our results with only the outgroup measures and no controls.

Table A.14: Out-Group Measures (No Controls)

	Out-Group Measures (No Controls)
DenialSc	0.845*** (0.038)
ImmSc	1.112*** (0.035)
SexismSc	0.336*** (0.035)
ResentmentSc	0.699*** (0.042)
Num.Obs.	11764
AIC	7345.7
BIC	7382.6
Log.Lik.	-3667.860
RMSE	0.31

+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

Table A.15 shows our results for 2016. In 2016, the CCES did not ask the sexism question or the racial resentment question, meaning we present our results absent these hypotheses. Our results are substantively unchanged.

Table A.15: 2016 Results

	Trump Vote
White Identity (H ₁)	0.031 (0.213)
Racial Resentment (H ₂)	-
Denial of Racism (H ₃)	1.009*** (0.102)
Xenophobia (H ₄)	0.842*** (0.094)
Symbolic Sexism (H ₅)	-
Observations	3483
AIC	1086.9
BIC	1296.2
Log. Likelihood	-509.451
RMSE	0.27

Coefficients are odds ratios with robust standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

In Table A.16 we present our results with the inclusion of Hispanics who did not vote or who could not recall if they voted in the previous presidential election. In this model these individuals are added to the “0” non-Trump voters, the “1” Trump voter category is unchanged.

Table A.16: Inclusion of Non-Voters

	Trump Vote 2016	Trump Vote 2020
White Identity (H ₁)	-0.414*** (0.124)	0.341+ (0.191)
Racial Resentment (H ₂)	-	0.110 (0.106)
Denial of Racism (H ₃)	0.028 (0.055)	0.677*** (0.088)
Xenophobia (H ₄)	-0.053 (0.055)	0.999*** (0.087)
Symbolic Sexism (H ₅)	-	0.229** (0.076)
Observations	4000	3824
AIC	3143.4	1721.0
BIC	3357.4	1952.2
Log. Likelihood	-1537.682	-823.482
RMSE	0.45	0.25

+ $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

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Hispanic/Latino Support for Trump: White Identity or Out-Group Animus? (#152895)

Created: 11/28/2023 12:58 PM (PT)

This is an anonymized copy (without author names) of the pre-registration. It was created by the author(s) to use during peer-review. A non-anonymized version (containing author names) should be made available by the authors when the work it supports is made public.

1) Have any data been collected for this study already?

It's complicated. We have already collected some data but explain in Question 8 why readers may consider this a valid pre-registration nevertheless.

2) What's the main question being asked or hypothesis being tested in this study?

Research question: What factors are associated with Latino Americans voting for Trump?

H_1: Latino Americans who hold more negative views about outgroups are more likely to have voted for Trump relative to Latino Americans who hold less-negative views about outgroups, holding all else constant.

H_1a: Latino Americans who are more racially resentful are more likely to have voted for Trump relative to Latino Americans who are less racially resentful, holding all else constant.

H_1b: Latino Americans who deny racism exists are more likely to have voted for Trump relative to Latino Americans who score lower in their denial of racism, holding all else constant.

H_1c: Latino Americans who support more restrictive immigration policies (proxy for xenophobia) are more likely to have voted for Trump relative to Latino Americans who support less restrictive immigration policies, holding all else constant.

H_1d: Latino Americans who hold more symbolic sexist views are more likely to have voted for Trump relative to Latino Americans who hold less symbolic sexist views, holding all else constant.

H_2: Latino Americans who self-classify as White are more likely to have voted for Trump relative to Latino Americans who do not self-classify as White, holding all else constant.

3) Describe the key dependent variable(s) specifying how they will be measured.

We will use vote choice for Trump in the 2016 and 2020 elections. These questions are asked in 2016, 2018, 2020, and 2022. In 2016 and 2020, we construct this variable from the answer to the question "For whom did you vote for President of the United States?" in the post-election waves. In 2018 and 2022, we use the answer to question "Who did you vote for in the election for President in 2016/2020?" in the pre-election surveys to construct this variable. In each case our dependent variable is dichotomous, taking the value "1" when the respondent indicated that they voted for Trump and "0" when they voted for any other candidate. We do not include respondents who did not vote in the previous presidential election.

4) How many and which conditions will participants be assigned to?

The data are from the Cooperative Election Study (CES; formerly the Cooperative Congressional Election Study). All participants are assigned to answer certain questions which are publicly available. These questions are referred to as "Common Content." Participants were also randomly assigned to receive questions from different modules. The general public only has access to the common content questions, which are the questions we are using for these analyses. There is no random assignment involved as these data are observational.

5) Specify exactly which analyses you will conduct to examine the main question/hypothesis.

Given that our dependent variable in all cases is dichotomous and we expect the relationship to be linearly related to the log odds of our independent variables, we use binary logistic regression. Given that our data are not structured as panel data, with different individuals asked each year, our observations are independent from one another. We will test our independent variables for multicollinearity and present the correlation coefficients of our different independent variables in our study. We will also present the descriptive statistics including means, standard deviations, and max/min values. Our sample (see 7 below) is large enough to support this approach.

To do this, we will scale and standardize each of our independent variables so they have a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one. All measures will be coded such that higher values represent a higher expression of the trait (denial of racism, racial resentment, xenophobia, sexism, White identity). This approach makes a relative comparison of our findings easier to interpret.

6) Describe exactly how outliers will be defined and handled, and your precise rule(s) for excluding observations.

Because the 2016 CES does not include racial resentment or symbolic sexism, we will include our analyses of 2016 in the appendix.

We will not need to exclude any respondents as outliers given that all responses will be scaled and standardized, and that all respondents' raw answers are already provided in the form of a Likert scale.

7) How many observations will be collected or what will determine sample size? No need to justify decision, but be precise about exactly how the number will be determined.

We only include respondents to the CES who voted in the most recent presidential election. In presidential election years (2016 and 2020), this is indicated by the answer to the post-election survey question "For whom did you vote for President of the United States?" where respondents who answered "Hillary

Clinton/ Joe Biden", "Donald J. Trump", or "Other" were included and respondents who answered "I did not vote in this race", "I did not vote", or "Not Sure" were excluded. In midterm elections (2018 and 2022), we restrict inclusion based on the answer to the question "In the election for U.S. President, who did you vote for?", where respondents who answered "Donald Trump", "Hillary Clinton/Joe Biden", or "Someone Else" were included. Respondents who answer "I did not cast a vote for president" or "I don't recall" were excluded.

We also restrict inclusion into our sample to Hispanics and Latinos. Between 2016 and 2022, the CES asks the question "what racial or ethnic group best describes you?" [race]. We include all respondents who identify as Hispanic or Latino in respond to this question. In addition, the CES asks "are you of Spanish, Latino, or Hispanic origin or descent?" [hispanic]. We include all respondents who answered in the affirmative to the [hispanic] question. Any respondents who failed to answer any of these questions were excluded from our data. In total 18,800 respondents met the above criteria of having voted in the most recent presidential election and can be classed as Hispanic or Latino. The yearly breakdown of these 18,800 voters is as follows: 2016-4,231; 2018-4,459; 2020-4,260; 2022-5,850. The total number of observations used in our main analyses will be slightly less than this figure once we account for missing data in our independent or control variables.

8) Anything else you would like to pre-register? (e.g., secondary analyses, variables collected for exploratory purposes, unusual analyses planned?)

As we are using observational data from the CES, the data are already collected. However, we have not done analyses using our variables and hypotheses. We are preregistering our hypotheses and the analyses we intend on using to assuage concerns of p-hacking with observational data. For this reason, this is still a valid pre-registration.

☐We will also include a series of robustness tests in the supplementary material. These will include: adding a year fixed effects control to account for variation in Trump support in individual years, adding a time constant control to account for temporal trends in our dependent variable and providing a harder test of our hypotheses, independently testing each of our sub-hypotheses in separate models, running our models on the raw values of our independent variables to demonstrate that findings are not an artifact of our data generation process, running our models without any controls to demonstrate that our findings are not the result of the introduction of other factors, inclusion of state fixed effects and census region fixed effects (Northeast, Midwest, South, West) to account for geographic (spatial) variation in Trump support. We expect our main results to hold under all of these conditions, though they may decrease in substantive size and significance without the necessary controls.