

Hispanic Support for Donald Trump: In-Group Favoritism or Out-Group Animus?

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Donald Trump increased his support from Hispanic Americans in the 2020 election. Using data pooled across the 2018, 2020, and 2022 Cooperative Electoral Study, we test whether Hispanic support for Trump was driven by in-group favoritism or out-group animus. We find prioritizing a White identity among Hispanic Americans was not consistently associated with the likelihood of voting for Trump. Instead, out-group animus, measured through racial resentment, denial of racism, xenophobia, and sexism, emerged as a significant predictor, with xenophobia having the strongest link to Trump voting. These results contribute to a more nuanced understanding of Hispanic voter behavior by highlighting the role of out-group attitudes. Given that Hispanics constitute the fastest-growing demographic in the U.S. electorate, these insights have important implications for future electoral dynamics.

Keywords: Hispanic voting; race; White identity; racial resentment; Donald Trump

In the 2020 presidential election, Donald Trump received a higher proportion of Hispanic¹ votes than any Republican candidate since George W. Bush in 2004 (Drucker 2020), increasing his vote share with Hispanic from 28 percent in 2016 to 38 percent (Pew Research Center 2018, 2021). Initial results indicate that Trump’s share of Hispanic voters increased again in 2024 (Sanders 2024). Following these elections, several narratives emerged to explain this improved performance, including that Hispanics had been “taken for granted” by the Biden campaign in 2020 (Medina and Lerer 2021) due to the group’s historic support of the Democratic Party (Saavedra Cisneros 2017). Yet, many Hispanic voters hold conservative views aligned closer to the Republican Party (Contreras 2022; Foggatt 2023).² Hispanic Americans reported being disappointed in the Democratic Party’s perceived connections to socialism (Gamboa 2021), and supported Republican policy choices regarding lockdowns during COVID-19 (Gutierrez et al. 2019; Lauter 2021; Ocampo, Garcia-Rios, and Gutierrez 2021). Given these clear trends, we seek to understand what is driving some Hispanic voters towards Trump.

After the 2016 election, research extensively tested drivers of support for Trump, identifying several important factors including in-group measures such as White identity and measures of out-group prejudice such as racism, sexism, and xenophobia (Buyuker et al. 2021; Jardina 2021; Knuckey and Hassan 2022; Long 2023; Major, Blodorn, and Major Blascovich 2018; Sides, Tesler, and Vavreck 2017; Stewart and Willer 2022). This body of research largely focused on Anglo-White voters, finding that both in-group favoritism and out-group animus were associated with voting for Trump, with out-group measures such as xenophobia being among the strongest predictors of support (Buyuker et al. 2021; Jardina 2021). We test whether these phenomena are specific to Anglo-Whites, asking whether these intergroup attitudes can help explain Trump’s increased levels of Hispanic support.

¹ The term “Hispanic” has its roots in colonialism as the Spanish language is not native to Latin America, meaning the term may be taken as erasing indigenous and Afro-Latin Americans (Cruz-Janzen 2007). We use “Hispanic Americans” to include both Spaniards and Latin Americans (including those with Spanish ancestry) living in the U.S. who are racialized in similar ways (Soto-Márquez 2019), while still recognizing European Spaniards likely experience racism in distinct ways from Latin Americans. Though this category was not designed to include Brazilians, many Brazilians in the U.S. identify as Hispanic and are therefore included (Passel and Krogstad 2023).

² Potentially connected to changes in the Republican Party in the twenty-first century (see e.g., Blum and Cowburn 2024; Cowburn 2024).

Heterogeneity in Hispanic Americans’ voting behavior has been identified both before and during the Trump era based on demographic and economic characteristics—such as age, gender, country of origin, and income (Alvarez and Bedolla 2003; Garcia 2021; Gouin 2021; Hill and Moreno 1996; Medina 2020; Segura 2012). An association between prejudicial beliefs such as denial of racism (Alamillo 2019; Haywood 2017a), sexism (Hickel and Deckman 2022), and xenophobia (Sommer and Franco 2024) and support for Trump has also been identified among Hispanics. Yet, current studies do not systematically test all of these features simultaneously (i.e., controlling for one another). Other research finds an association between Whiteness and conservatism among Hispanics (Cuevas-Molina 2023; Filindra and Kolbe 2022; Ostfeld and Yadon 2022) but does not specifically test between “White”³ self-categorization and support for Trump. Given the existing findings related to in-group and out-group beliefs, and support for Trump among Anglo-Whites, it is necessary to consider these facets concurrently. We therefore offer a comprehensive analysis, addressing the empirical gap in the existing literature, to test whether in-group favoritism or out-group animus drove Hispanic support for Donald Trump.

To do so, we use data from the 2018, 2020, and 2022 Cooperative Electoral Study (CES) (Ansolabehere, Schaffner, and Luks 2021).⁴ We operationalize Hispanics’ in-group favoritism based on whether they choose to self-categorize as “White” rather than “Hispanic” when given both options. We operationalize out-group animus along four potentially salient dimensions: racial resentment, denial of racism, xenophobia, and sexism. Our findings for self-categorizing as “White” rather than “Hispanic” are mixed; on aggregate we report null findings in our pooled results, but identify that the marginal effect of this categorization shifted temporally, with a positive association in 2018 becoming a negative association by 2022. However, all four measures of out-group animus were strongly and consistently associated with a greater likelihood of voting for Trump. Unlike previous literature focusing on merely one or two aspects of out-group animus, we find that racial resentment, denial of

³ We use quotations when referring to the category of a racial group, rather than members of a certain racial group.

⁴ We extend our analysis to 2016 in the supplementary material, but this CES is missing two of our key variables—racial resentment and symbolic sexism—meaning we omit it from the main analysis.

racism, symbolic sexism, and xenophobia all *simultaneously and significantly* contribute to support for Trump among Hispanic voters. Of our out-group measures, we find that xenophobia was the strongest predictor for support for Trump, in line with previous findings identifying xenophobia as the strongest intergroup predictor among Anglo-Whites (Buyuker et al. 2021).

These results are important for our understanding of Hispanic voter behavior as a heterogeneous phenomenon and the role of in-group favoritism and out-group animus in structuring the political preferences of demographic groups other than Anglo-Whites. Hispanics are the fastest-growing group in the U.S. electorate, meaning our findings are important for future electoral outcomes.

Theoretical Framework

To understand the intergroup dynamics of Hispanics' support for Trump, we use social identity theory (SIT) (Tajfel 1974; Tajfel and Turner 1979, 1986). SIT explains how individuals understand themselves and interact with others through membership within a group (Tajfel 1981, 255). Individuals can create a social identity by making positive comparisons between other in-group members and distance from characteristics of the out-group (Bogardus 1992; Brown and Pehrson 2019; Magee and Smith 2013). Consequently, group attachments and preferential treatment are given to one's in-group often at the expense of an unfavored out-group. This behavior can be exacerbated by both realistic *and perceived* threats to one's group status (Brown and Pehrson 2019; Sherif and Sherif 1953) or by feelings that one's group is worse off relative to other groups (Relative Deprivation Theory) (Davis 1959; Runciman 1966; Stouffer et al. 1949; Walker and Pettigrew 1984).

Drawing from SIT, racial group consciousness offers a mechanism explaining why Hispanics *would not* support Trump. Racial or ethnic group consciousness describes the willingness of members of marginalized groups in society to work together, engaging the political and electoral process, to improve their group's position (Miller et al. 1981). The tendency of Hispanic voters to support the Democratic Party has often been explained through racial or ethnic group consciousness (G. R. Sanchez and Masuoka 2010; Vargas, Sanchez, and Valdez 2017). Since the policies championed by

the Democratic Party have been comparatively supportive of their group, Hispanic voters with a heightened sense of racial or ethnic group consciousness are more likely to support the Democratic Party (Morín, Macías Mejía, and Sanchez 2021; Saavedra Cisneros 2017) and less likely to support Trump (Gutierrez et al. 2019). Because individuals’ sense of positive self-conception is derived from their social groups, they may try to improve the standing of the group in face of discrimination. In turn, the social standing of the group determines whether its members can access economic, political, and social resources, making group interest a proxy for self-interest and where the destiny of the individuals is connected to the membership of their group (Dawson 1994).⁵

Though racial or ethnic group consciousness offers a mechanism for why Hispanics would vote against Trump, individuals react to discrimination in different ways. According to SIT, when faced with group-based discrimination, individuals may re-evaluate or even change their membership into a more positively distinct group (Ellemers, Spears, and Doosje 2002; Tajfel and Turner 1979; Walker and Pettigrew 1984). In this case, Hispanics may seek proximity to Whiteness and distance themselves from other groups to achieve higher status. Both of these facets involve changing positionality on the American racial hierarchy, or the “ordering of political power among groups classified by race” (Masuoka and Junn 2013, 2).

The racial hierarchy is two dimensional with a racial ordering on one dimension and insider and outsider status on the other. On the racial dimension, Anglo-Whites sit at the top and Black Americans are at the bottom, with Asians and Hispanics falling in between. However, whereas Anglo-Whites and Black Americans are perceived as insiders, Asian and Hispanic Americans are positioned as outsiders (Kim 1999; Masuoka and Junn 2013). Both the racial dimension and outsider status constrain those in the middle from moving up the hierarchy, as is the case for Hispanic Americans (Cheryan and Monin 2005; Devos and Banaji 2005; Huynh, Devos, and Smalarz 2011; Kim 1999). The desire and the ability to move toward Whiteness, therefore, is connected with the desire for an

⁵ Racial/ethnic group consciousness is often discussed with the concept of “linked fate” (Dawson 1994). However, linked fate is specifically theorized to explain the unique history and context of the Black experience in America and has been found to be complicated when applied to Hispanics (G. Sanchez, Masuoka, and Abrams 2019).

increase in status and power. At the same time, maintaining an identity that is distinct from other out-groups is also an attempt to move into the space of being an insider (Brewer 1999). Mobility strategies therefore include both identification with a new group and the creation of distance from other groups to move both up the racial dimension and into the insider dimension of the racial hierarchy. Because in-group favoritism and out-group animus are not systematically correlated (Brewer 1999), it is unclear how much these factors influence Hispanics' support for Trump. We therefore test both in-group favoritism and out-group animus in tandem.

Whiteness and Hispanic Identity

Discussing Hispanics' ethnoracial identity in the U.S. reveals a fraught distinction between concepts of "race" and "ethnicity." Since the 1970 Census, Hispanic Americans were asked to self-categorize both their ethnic identity—that is, their connection to Hispanic heritage—and their race, which does not include an option for Hispanic or Latino identity. Yet, with the continued racialization of Hispanic Americans into an Hispanic identity (Cobas, Duany, and Feagin 2015; Massey 2014; Rumbaut 2015; contra Barrera 2008)—connected to yet distinct from Whiteness or Blackness—many Hispanic Americans are unsure of how to fill out forms that separate race and ethnicity.⁶ As a result, many self-categorize their racial identity as "Some other race" and will write in something akin to "Hispanic" or "Latino" (Filindra and Kolbe 2022; Hitlin, Brown, and Elder Jr 2007; Mathews et al. 2017). While it may seem that self-categorization does not contribute to the social psychological process of identity, self-categorization on a form is a meaningful process. Drawing from SIT, Self-Categorization Theory argues that individuals first categorize their social environment and use these categories to develop a social identity (Turner and Reynolds 2011). Though self-categorization is not the same as self-identification, being able to categorize one's identity is still an important social psychological process that is connected to one's identity. For example, when individuals are not able to self-categorize their identity on a form, they perceive a form of identity threat that leads to anger

⁶ This approach has been how the census has categorized those of Hispanic descent from 1970. In early 2024, the Office of Management and Budget changed their racial minimum categories to include Hispanic identity as solely a racial category. These changes will be reflected in the census from 2030.

(Fath and Proudfoot 2024; d’Urso 2022b). That is, absent a social category, individuals cannot place themselves within a group to have a social identity. By choosing to self-categorize one’s race as “White” as opposed to something else—including “Hispanic”—Hispanic Americans engage in an active project of developing a social identity toward Whiteness by distancing themselves from being Hispanic, opening the possibility for group conflict with individuals who do not identify this way.

One motivation for self-categorizing as White is to increase status due to colorism. Color and race are closely tied together in Latin America which are exemplified in concepts like *mestizaje*, or racial mixing. Phrases like “*mejorar la raza*” (“improve the race”)—through Whiteness—reveal how ingrained colorism is among many Latin Americans both within and outside of the U.S. (Haywood 2017b; Ostfeld and Yadon 2022; Telles 2014). The aspiration of Whiteness reveals the “recognition that skin color—in addition to race—is intertwined with power” (Ostfeld and Yadon 2022, 1806). Colorism influences many of the aspirational aspects of Whiteness for Hispanics and has tangible consequences for peoples’ lived experiences. Among Black and African Americans, and Hispanic populations, those with lighter skin pigmentation make more money and have better educational experiences relative to those of the same ethnoracial group with darker skin pigmentation (Gans 2012; for an overview see Hunter 2007). The Whitening of the Hispanic population is not uniform. Light-skinned and wealthy Hispanics are more likely to be socially “Whitened” than dark-skinned, poor Hispanics (Gans 2012). These differences, combined with the colonial history of Latin America, help explain why skin color influences how Hispanics feel towards Anglos, with light-skinned Mexican Americans (Murguía and Forman 2003) and other Hispanic groups (Wilkinson and Earle 2013) having higher affective views of Anglo-Americans than darker-skinned counterparts. Thus, the pervasiveness of colorism within Latin America and within Hispanic communities provides context for the desire to be proximate toward Whiteness in appearance, but this can extend to self-categorizing as “White,” as well. Both offer avenues to move through the racial hierarchy.

Self-categorization is a meaningful expression of one’s identity. Hispanic Americans’ willingness to self-categorize as “White” is closely related to their political opinions (Ceron-Anaya, de Santana Pinho, and Ramos-Zayas 2023; Cuevas-Molina 2023; Filindra and Kolbe 2022; Mathews et

al. 2017; Ostfeld and Yadon 2022; Yadon and Ostfeld 2020). Hispanic Americans who self-categorize as “White” are more likely to identify as Republican (Cuevas-Molina 2023). The relationship between Whiteness and conservatism also extends to skin color, with Hispanics who overestimate how light their skin pigmentations is relative to a light-reflectance meter reading were more likely to hold conservative attitudes and identify as Republicans (Ostfeld and Yadon 2022).⁷ Combining these findings with existing research on Anglo-White identity and support for Trump (Jardina 2021; Long 2023; Sides, Tesler, and Vavreck 2017), we hypothesize that Hispanics who self-categorize their race as “White,” despite being given the option to self-categorize their race—and not just their ethnicity—as “Hispanic,” will be more likely to support Donald Trump.

H₁: Hispanic Americans who self-categorize as “White” will be more likely to vote for Donald Trump.

We are mindful of the theoretical and practical gap between self-categorization as “White”, such as on a form, and group identification as White. Notably, self-categorization is not the same as self-identification because self-categorization is based on institutionally constructed categories that may not reflect how individuals identify (d’Urso 2022a). Moreover, though Hispanic respondents may self-categorize as “White” when they are asked about their racial identity, they may not necessarily identify as White (Filindra and Kolbe 2022). Racial and ethnic identities and self-categorization develop within childhood and early adolescence (Phinney 2006; Ruble et al. 2004), are stable over time (Simpson, Jivraj, and Warren 2016; Syed, Azmitia, and Phinney 2007), and are unlikely to change due to partisanship (Egan 2020). Therefore, it is possible that self-categorization is not capturing a desire for status and proximity to Whiteness but simply learned behavior for how to fill out forms asking about race and ethnicity in the U.S., knowing that Hispanics must choose a race before they can identify their ethnicity as Hispanic. However, this scenario appears less likely for Hispanics who select their race as “White” even when the opportunity to identify their race as

⁷ To “heighten their proximity to the privileges associated with Whiteness—or to try to reduce proximity to the adversity associated with Blackness” (Ostfeld and Yadon 2022, 1811).

“Hispanic” is available (i.e., as structured in the CES). Absent questions about identity strength or salience and from work on Self Categorization Theory, we rely on self-categorization as one mechanism to understand identification with Whiteness.

One remaining question is whether Whiteness should be considered an in-group characteristic for Hispanics. We are not testing how Hispanics see their identities relative to each other, wherein prioritizing White identity over Hispanic identity may be considered an out-group belief. Instead, because we are interested in support for Trump, we construct our theory around the social identity of Trump supporters. Among Anglo-Americans, the strength of White identity is associated with support for Trump as a candidate who represents White Americans (Jardina 2021; Sides, Tesler, and Vavreck 2017). According to social identity theory, one way Hispanics may distance themselves from individuals they perceive to be unfavorable out-groups is through self-categorization as “White.” As such, we believe Hispanics who prioritize self-categorizing their race as “White” over “Hispanic” would consider Donald Trump to be a candidate who *specifically* supports White Americans, including themselves. Thus, we conceptualize this identity—in the context of support for Trump—as an in-group characteristic.

Out-Group Animus Among Hispanics

Concomitant with Social Identity Theory, individuals may perceive other groups (out-groups) as a threat to their group’s status. Individuals may believe that moving up the racial hierarchy not only involves identification with a higher status group, but distancing themselves from out-groups they perceive as being undesirable. Group conflict theory further explains the desire to distance as individuals of one group believe they are losing out on political resources and benefits to another group (Blummer 1958; Bobo and Hutchins 1996). That is, “the more that members of a particular racial group feel collectively oppressed and unfairly treated by society, the more likely they are to perceive members of other groups as potential threats” (Bobo and Hutchins 1996, 951). While there are a finite number of in-groups with whom one may identify, there are more out-groups from which individuals can distance themselves (Brewer 1999). Given the existing research on out-group animus

and support for Trump among Anglo-Whites (Hodwitz and Massingale 2023; Jardina and Piston 2019; Lajevardi and Oskooii 2018; Rothe and Collins 2019), we focus on four theoretically-motivated out-group prejudices: racial resentment, denial of racism, xenophobia, and symbolic sexism. These four are distinct measures aimed at capturing animus toward *different* out-groups. However, each captures the underlying, *shared* psychological process of out-group prejudice.⁸

Racial Resentment

Racial prejudice in the form of racial resentment towards Black and African Americans played a significant role in motivating Anglo-Whites to vote for Trump (Buyuker et al. 2021; Hooghe and Dassonneville 2018; Jardina 2021; Knuckey and Hassan 2022; Lajevardi and Abrajano 2019; Long 2023; Shook et al. 2020; Wong 2018). Though racial animus toward Black Americans typically focuses on Anglo-Whites, these prejudicial attitudes are not unique to Anglo-Whites. SIT and resources-based theories of group conflict posit that individuals will express a desire to differentiate from minorities perceived to be lower status (Gans 2012) and potentially in conflict with over resources. In the case of racial resentment, Black Americans serve as this defining “other” (Warren and Twine 1997) from which Hispanics wish to differentiate with colorism (discussed above), playing a historic and significant contributor to these beliefs.

Hispanics’ stereotypes of Black and African Americans are more negative than Anglo-Whites (McClain et al. 2006), and Hispanics are no different from Anglo-Whites in their negative perceptions of this group’s work ethic and intelligence (Krupnikov and Piston 2016).⁹ Immigration history contributes to anti-Black prejudice among Hispanics, where Mexican immigrants show stronger

⁸ We conduct a factor analysis in the supplementary material demonstrating that these four variables load onto a single factor, which we contend makes sense to call “out-group animus.”

⁹ When discussing anti-Black prejudice among Hispanics, it is important to note the historical and theoretical distinction between prejudice toward African Americans and Afro-Latinos, both of whom are racially Black. Though testing the distinctions between Hispanic prejudice toward African Americans and prejudice toward Afro-Latinos is beyond the scope of this article, these are two different types of prejudices—one of which involves racial prejudice toward co-ethnic members and one of which involves racial prejudice among non-co-ethnics.

animus toward Black and African Americans than U.S.-born Mexicans (Murguia and Forman 2003).¹⁰ Anti-Black racism, denial of racism, and racial resentment among Hispanics are associated with support for Trump as they are for Anglo-Whites (Alamillo 2019; Haywood 2017a; Hickel et al. 2020). Racial resentment provides one of the closest foils to prioritizing a White in-group identity because racial resentment specifically positions the Anglo-White experience against the experience of Black Americans. As discussed above, the American racial hierarchy positions Whites at the top and as insiders. While Hispanics are positioned above Black Americans but, unlike Black Americans, Hispanics are considered outsiders (Kim 1999; Masuoka and Junn 2013). Hispanic voters may hold racially resentful beliefs to distance themselves from groups of which they do not want to be a part. We therefore expect that Hispanics' racial resentment will be associated with and support for Trump.

H₂: Hispanic Americans with higher racial resentment will be more likely to vote for Donald Trump.

Denial of Racism

One potential strategy used by Hispanics to reduce the social distance between them and Anglo-Whites (or increase the distance to African Americans) is denying the existence of racism (Pérez, Robertson, and Vicuña 2023). Denial of racism is theoretically distinct from racial resentment; whereas racial resentment captures prejudice toward Black and African Americans, denial of racism captures the sentiment that the U.S. has become a color-blind and post-racial society (Bonilla-Silva 2017); this allows Hispanics to distance themselves from Black Americans by distancing from the Black American experience of racism. In a series of interviews, Rojas-Sosa (2016) finds that, in the face of discrimination, Hispanics tend to: (1) avoid identifying their antagonists; (2) dissociate themselves from negative statements of immigrants by distinguishing 'good' from 'bad' immigrants; (3) show tolerance towards anti-immigrant positions and justify their antagonists' arguments, and; (4) echo common ideologies about race, in which racism is no longer a social problem. Denial of

¹⁰ Both groups felt significantly warmer toward Anglo-Americans than to Black Americans, regardless of immigration generation.

racism might therefore serve as a strategy of minority groups to prevent being perceived as ‘un-American’ (Rojas-Sosa 2016). Hispanics who deny the existence of racism are also more likely to hold conservative views and support Trump (Alamillo 2019; Hickel et al. 2020). We therefore expect denying the existence of racism will predict support for Trump.

H₃: Hispanic Americans who deny racism exists will be more likely to vote for Donald Trump.

Xenophobia

Among Anglo-Whites, xenophobia was the strongest and most consistent predictor of support for Trump—more than White identity, racial resentment, or symbolic sexism (Buyuker et al. 2021; Hooghe and Dassonneville 2018; Jardina 2021). Given issues of immigration policy and Hispanic identity are often intertwined (Bonilla and Mo 2018; Mohamed 2017; Serrano-Careaga and Huo 2019), Hispanic voters may not be driven by xenophobic attitudes in their support for Trump.¹¹ For some, prioritizing an American over a Hispanic identity is associated with supporting conservative immigration policies, including a border wall, and less favorability toward undocumented immigrants (Hickel et al. 2020). Hispanicity alone does not preclude Hispanic Americans from holding conservative or anti-immigration policy positions. Hispanics’ anti-immigrant attitudes predict their denial of racism and are strongly associated with voting for Trump (Alamillo 2019; Cadena 2023). Though Hispanic voters hold more conservative views about immigration than non-voters, they tend to prioritize issues such as the economy rather than immigration (Galbraith and Callister 2020).

Drawing from SIT, anti-immigrant or xenophobic beliefs can stem from the perception that resources are limited and if any immigrant receives benefits, others are inherently losing out. While this belief can extend to any immigrant, Trump focused most of his rhetoric specifically on preventing Hispanic immigration into the U.S. Thus, the primary focus when discussing immigration in the context of Trump, tends to be on Hispanic immigration. As Masuoka and Junn (2013) discuss, many Hispanics are perceived as being outsiders and immigrants, even if they and their families have been

¹¹ See, for example, the perpetual foreigner stereotype (Huynh, Devos, and Smalarz 2011).

in the U.S. for generations (i.e., “perpetual foreigner stereotype”). Thus, for Hispanics to secure a higher status on the American racial hierarchy, they may want to create distance from other “outsiders” in order to position themselves as “insiders.” As such, many Hispanics voted for Trump *because* of—not despite—his anti-immigration attitudes and Hispanics with more positive perceptions of the economy were more likely to hold anti-immigrant attitudes (Sommer and Franco 2024). Though Hispanics rated the economy as more important than immigration (Galbraith and Callister 2020), the two issues are interrelated relative to support for Trump. We therefore expect that Hispanic Americans holding more xenophobic attitudes will be more likely to vote for Trump.

H₄: Hispanic Americans with more xenophobic attitudes will be more likely to vote for Donald Trump.

Symbolic Sexism

When candidates differ on an identity characteristic, that characteristic becomes more salient, particularly related to prejudicial attitudes (Petrow, Transue, and Vercellotti 2018). Candidates’ gender differences made sexism more salient in 2016 (Cassese and Barnes 2019) and was consistently associated with support for Donald Trump due to his willingness to make sexist remarks and appeals (Bracic, Israel-Trummel, and Shortle 2019; Buyuker et al. 2021; Cassese and Barnes 2019; Cassese and Holman 2019; Deckman and Cassese 2021; Hickel and Deckman 2022; Schaffner, MacWilliams, and Nteta 2018; Shook et al. 2020). Sexism helped Donald Trump, with sexist voters attracted to Trump’s sexist rhetoric as opposed to merely penalizing Hillary Clinton for being a woman (Glick 2019), suggesting that the importance of sexism in support for Trump is not confined to instances when the opposing candidate is a woman.

Hickel and Deckman (2022) test the extent to which Latino support for Trump was influenced by sexism by drawing from the theory of “machismo”, often discussed as a form of sexism toward women within the Hispanic community.¹² They test the relationship between “traditional sexism,”

¹² Hickel and Deckman (2022) draw on work by Arciniega et al. (2008) to highlight that machismo includes both negative traits—including hypermasculinity and aggressive characteristics—and positive traits—including

and “modern sexism,” on support for Trump among Hispanic voters in the 2016 and 2020 elections. Traditional sexism scales relate to attitudes toward women working outside of the home and their roles as mothers. Yet, as the social norm has moved beyond these outwardly sexist beliefs, scales such as symbolic sexism capture more nuance related to attitudes toward gender equality and resentment toward women (Hickel and Deckman 2022). Symbolic sexism, similar to measures such as racial resentment, provides us the leverage to evaluate the role of sexist attitudes on support for Trump in light of the fact that overt expressions of sexism are met with social stigma (Connor, Glick, and Fiske 2017; Glick and Fiske 2018; Swim et al. 1995). When testing both measures, Hickel and Deckman (2022) find that both types of sexism were positively associated with supporting Trump. We expand their study by assessing the effect of sexism on support for Trump, controlling for in-group favoritism (via White self-classification) and out-group animus (via racial resentment, denial of racism, and xenophobia) to fully capture the effect of sexism on support for Trump among Hispanics.

H₅: Hispanic Americans with more sexist attitudes will be more likely to vote for Donald Trump.

As mentioned when discussing our justification for why White identity is a measure of in-group favoritism, we hold a similar logic for why we consider symbolic sexism as a measure of out-group animus. Although we hypothesize this relationship for both women and men, we still consider this to be an out-group characteristic because Donald Trump’s rhetoric has shown to promote a view centered around men and masculinity (Glick 2019; Scotto di Carlo 2020). As such, Trump supporters find appeal in his version of masculinity which stands in opposition to women, particularly women in positions of power. Given the 2024 presidential election will also be against a woman candidate, Vice President Kamala Harris, the role of sexism may also give insights into how it may be influential in 2024.

closeness with family and nurturing characteristics. They also draw on this work to note the term itself can be broadly applied across Hispanic communities although it is Mexican in origin.

Data & Research Design

We test these hypotheses using data from the Cooperative Election Study (CES), a nationally representative survey of American adults (Ansolabehere, Schaffner, and Luks 2021). All hypotheses were pre-registered before conducting our analyses (see supplemental material). We initially use data from four years: 2016, 2018, 2020, and 2022, but report 2016 results in the supplementary material because two key variables are missing. We only include respondents who voted in the most recent presidential election and restrict inclusion into our sample to Hispanics and Latinos. Between 2018 and 2022, a total of 10,142 respondents met the criteria of having voted in the most recent presidential election and being classed as Hispanic.

Our dependent variable for all hypotheses is a dichotomous variable of **voting for Trump** in the most recent presidential election, taking the value “1” when the respondent voted for Trump and “0” when they voted for any other candidate.. In presidential election years, this is determined by the answer to the post-election survey question “For whom did you vote for President of the United States?” where respondents who answered “Hillary Clinton/ Joe Biden”, “Donald J. Trump”, or “Other” were included and respondents who answered “I did not vote in this race”, “I did not vote”, or “Not Sure” were excluded. In midterm elections (2018 and 2022), we restrict inclusion based on the answer to the question “In the election for U.S. President, who did you vote for?”, where respondents who answered “Donald Trump”, “Hillary Clinton/Joe Biden”, or “Someone Else” were included.¹³ Respondents who answered “I did not cast a vote for president” or “I don’t recall” were excluded as we are theoretically interested in Hispanic *voters* as our denominator.¹⁴

CES respondents are first asked to select what race they primarily self-categorize as, of which “Hispanic”, “White”, “Black”, “Asian”, “Native American”, “Middle Eastern” and “Other” are possible answers [race]. *Afterwards*, any respondent *who did not select Hispanic* is asked if they have Hispanic ancestry [hispanic]. We include all respondents who indicate their racial identity as “Hispanic” [race]

¹³ Given the possibility that midterm respondents (strategically) misremembered who they voted for, we repeat these analyses using Trump approval in the supplementary material.

¹⁴ The results of an additional model including those who did not cast a vote for president is reported in the supplemental material.

or who have Hispanic ancestry [hispanic] in our sample. This provides us with two groups; those who self-categorize primarily as “Hispanics” in the first question [race], and those who self-categorize as another race in the first question but indicate they are of Hispanic heritage [hispanic]. Drawing from the operationalization by Cuevas-Molina (2023), our **white identity** independent variable for \mathbf{H}_1 is therefore Hispanic respondents who primarily self-categorized their race as “White” in response to the first question about race [race], with other individuals who selected “Hispanic” as their race serving as the reference category.¹⁵ It is for these respondents who select “White” as their race whom we consider to be prioritizing a White identity. That is, instead of self-categorizing their race as “Hispanic,” they see their race as “White;” these individuals selected “White” *despite the opportunity to self-categorize their race as “Hispanic”* (see also Dowling 2015).

Racial resentment measures the belief that Blacks lack the moral values of individualism, hard work, discipline, and self-sacrifice, central to American society (Kinder and Sanders 1996). The CES uses two statements¹⁶ to measure racial resentment, and respondents answered these statements using a five-point scale (strongly agree; somewhat agree; neither agree nor disagree; somewhat disagree; strongly disagree). Answers were standardized to have a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one and scaled such that high values represent greater levels of racial resentment and anti-Black animus, serving as our independent variable for \mathbf{H}_2 .¹⁷

Denial of racism is operationalized in the CES by measuring the belief that race does not affect one’s life chances, as drawn from the colorblind racial attitudes scale (Neville et al. 2000). Participants are asked to respond to two further statements¹⁸ using the same five-point scale. The

¹⁵ Cuevas-Molina (2023), uses this same operationalization from the CES to study the relationship between White identity among Hispanics and conservatism (Cuevas-Molina 2023).

¹⁶ 1) Irish, Italians, Jewish, and many other minorities overcame prejudice and worked their way up. Blacks should do the same without any special favors. 2) Generations of slavery and discrimination have created conditions that make it difficult for Blacks to work their way out of the lower class.

¹⁷ Cronbach’s alpha = 0.807.

¹⁸ 1) White people in the U.S. have certain advantages because of the color of their skin. 2) Racial problems in the U.S. are rare, isolated situations.

measure was coded such that high values represent a higher denial of racism¹⁹ and scaled and standardized to serve as our independent variable for **H₃**.

We operationalize **xenophobia** using respondents' answers to the four immigration questions on the CES.²⁰ In the supplementary material, we perform a factor analysis, demonstrating that these four questions load onto a single factor. We recoded responses to these questions such that higher values signify opposition to immigration, then aggregated them to produce a single indicator of immigration views which we then scaled and standardized for use as our independent variable for **H₄**.²¹

From 2018 onwards, the CES contains two items²² to measure **symbolic sexism**, which participants are asked to respond to on the same five-point scale. Traditional sexism scales relate to attitudes toward women working outside of the home and their roles as mothers. Yet, as the social norm has moved beyond outwardly sexist beliefs, scales such as symbolic sexism capture more nuance related to attitudes toward gender equality and resentment toward women (Hickel and Deckman 2022, 1384–85). Symbolic sexism, similar to measures such as racial resentment, provides us the leverage to evaluate the role of sexist attitudes on support for Trump in light of the fact that overt expressions of sexism are met with social stigma (Connor, Glick, and Fiske 2017; Glick and Fiske 2018; Swim et al. 1995). As with our measures for other hypotheses, we aggregate, scale, and standardize responses for use as our independent variable in **H₅**.²³

We include several control variables that might predict the likelihood of voting for Trump for reasons other than in-group attachment or out-group animus, namely: partisanship, ideology,

¹⁹ Cronbach's alpha = 0.774.

²⁰ What do you think the U.S. government should do about immigration? Do you support or oppose each of the following? 1) Grant legal status to all illegal immigrants who have held jobs and paid taxes for at least 3 years, and not been convicted of any felony crimes. 2) Increase the number of border patrols on the US-Mexican border. 3) Reduce legal immigration by 50 percent over the next 10 years by eliminating the visa lottery and ending family-based migration. 4) Increase spending on border security by \$25 billion, including building a wall between the U.S. and Mexico.

²¹ Cronbach's alpha = 0.747.

²² For CES18, these two items are: 1) When women lose to men in a fair competition, they typically complain about being discriminated against. 2) Feminists are making entirely reasonable demands of men. CES20 and CES22 include two different yet related items: 1) Women seek to gain power by getting control over men 2) Women are too easily offended

²³ Cronbach's alpha = 0.727.

country of origin, gender, income, being of multiple races, education, age, generations since family migrated to the U.S., and religiosity. These controls largely follow the established literature on Hispanic voting behavior and are discussed in detail in the supplementary material.

Our dependent variable is dichotomous and we expect the relationship to be linearly related to the log odds of our independent variables, meaning we use binary logistic regression. Because our data are not structured as panel data, with different individuals asked each year, our observations are independent of one another. We test for multicollinearity, presenting the correlation coefficients in the supplementary materials alongside the descriptive statistics and a series of robustness checks.

Results

We first show the descriptive statistics of our outcome variable in Table 1. As discussed above, we are interested in whether candidates voted for Trump or voted for any other candidate (e.g., not Trump). Across our entire sample for all years, roughly one-third of our sample voted for Trump with little change over time. In Table 2, we show the distribution of our sample in terms of racial self-identification, with more than two-thirds of our sample identifying as Hispanic and less than twenty percent self-categorizing as “White.” We provide further descriptive data about our sample in the supplementary material, including for 2016.

Table 1: Observations by Presidential Vote

	2018	%	2020	%	2022	%	Total	%
Trump	972	29.68	1,112	46.21	1,122	33.50	3,206	31.61
Not	2,303	70.32	2,406	68.39	2,227	66.50	6,936	68.39
Trump								
Total	3,275		3,518		3,349		10,142	

Table 2: Observations by Racial Self-Identification

	2018	%	2020	%	2022	%	Total	%
Hispanic	2,297	70.14	2,662	75.67	2,351	70.20	7,310	72.08
White	601	18.35	518	14.72	581	17.35	1,700	16.76
Black	72	2.20	89	2.53	95	2.84	256	2.52
Asian	24	0.73	24	0.68	17	0.51	65	0.64
Other	281	8.58	224	6.40	305	9.11	811	8.00
Total	3,275		3,518		3,349		10,142	

Table 3 shows the result of our full pooled model for all hypotheses across 2018 to 2022.²⁴ For **H₁**, we observe no direct relationship between Hispanic respondents’ prioritization of White identity and their likelihood of voting for Trump across this period. Conversely, all four measures of out-group animus present a positive and highly significant relationship for all four indicators (**H₂** through **H₅**). Of the four out-group measures, xenophobia has the strongest substantive relationship to voting for Trump, followed by denial of racism, racial resentment, then symbolic sexism. In the supplementary material, we show that symbolic sexism is better able to explain Trump voting among male CES respondents (see Table A.31).

Table 3: Pooled Model (2018–2022)


	Trump Vote
White Identity (H₁)	-0.040 (0.115)
Racial Resentment (H₂)	0.388*** (0.063)
Denial of Racism (H₃)	0.581*** (0.058)
Xenophobia (H₄)	0.735*** (0.054)
Symbolic Sexism (H₅)	0.270*** (0.054)
Observations	10,142
AIC	3,652
BIC	3,912
Log. Likelihood	-1,790
RMSE	0.25

Coefficients are odds ratios with robust standard errors in parentheses

* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

²⁴ We present the full results for each election cycle in the supplementary material. We also present results with year fixed effects and with the addition of a time trend, our main findings are unchanged.

Figure 1: Marginal Effects Plot of Out-Group Indicators (2018–2022 Pooled)




Because logistic regression results can be difficult to interpret substantively, we also present the pooled marginal effects plots for our out-group indicators in Figure 1.²⁵ Moving from the lowest to the highest end of the racial resentment (\mathbf{H}_2) scale was associated with a 22 percentage point change, from 15 percent to 37 percent, in the likelihood of voting for Trump when all other values are held at their means. Similarly, moving from the lowest to highest value in the denial of racism (\mathbf{H}_3) scale was associated with a 39 percentage point change, from 15 percent to 54 percent, in the likelihood of voting for Trump when all other values are held at their means. For xenophobia (\mathbf{H}_4), the change is stronger still (42 percentage points), from 13 percent to 55 percent at the highest value

²⁵ We break this figure down by election cycle in the supplementary materials.

of the scale. For symbolic sexism (\mathbf{H}_5) the change is 17 percentage points, from 18 percent to 35 percent.

The results presented in Table 3 and Figure 1 align with our theoretical expectations derived from social identity theory (SIT) and the literature on out-group animus, reinforcing the notion that xenophobia, racial resentment, denial of racism, and symbolic sexism significantly predict Trump voting among Hispanics. Indeed, all four measures load on the same factor (see Appendix Table A.36) and White identity does not load alongside these four out-group measure (see Appendix Table A.40). Xenophobia, in particular, stands out as the strongest predictor, in line with previous research that highlights the salience of anti-immigrant sentiment as a key driver of support for Trump (Buyuker et al. 2021). Denial of racism was also strongly associated with Trump, a finding that aligns with studies demonstrating that some Hispanic voters may adopt a color-blind framework that downplays racial inequalities (Pérez, Robertson, and Vicuña 2023) which, in turn, fosters alignment with the Republican Party (Alamillo 2019; Hickel et al. 2020). Racial resentment was also significantly associated with support for Trump, aligning with prior research on racial attitudes that suggests that resentment toward Black Americans—often framed through the lens of individual responsibility and opposition to race-conscious policies—is predictive of conservative political preferences (Alamillo 2019; Haywood 2017a; Hickel et al. 2020). Our finding supports the argument that anti-Black prejudice is not confined to White Americans but also exists within other racial and ethnic groups. Although racial resentment is a significant predictor, the effect size is weaker than that of xenophobia and denial of racism, suggesting that attitudes toward immigrants and perceptions of systemic racism are even more salient drivers of Trump support. Symbolic sexism is also significantly associated with Trump support but the substantive impact is weaker than the other out-group measures. Gender attitudes intersect with racial and ethnic identities (Dehingia et al. 2023; Scarborough et al. 2021), and this pattern may reflect how Hispanic men and women perceive Trump’s rhetoric and policy stances, ultimately structuring their likelihood of voting for him (also see Cowburn and Conroy 2023; Hickel and Deckman 2022).

Given that our null results for our White identity hypothesis (H_1), we break our results down by electoral cycle to enable us to identify any temporal trends in our data. We show the average marginal effects of each of our independent variables on the likelihood of voting for Trump for each election cycle in Figure 2. In line with the results presented in Table 3 and Figure 1, xenophobia has a consistent positive association with the likelihood of voting for Trump across this period. Sexism and racial resentment have a similar positive association across the three years. The denial of racism variable appears to increase in substantive effect over time, with a null association in 2018. The increasing substantive effect of denial of racism across election cycles may suggest that attitudes about race have become more deeply intertwined with political preferences among Hispanic voters over time.



Unlike the out-group variables which are largely consistent over time, White identity was positively associated with voting for Trump in 2018, not significantly associated in 2020, and negatively associated in 2022.²⁶ This temporal shift in the relationship between White identity and voting for Trump was not in line with the expectations set out in our hypotheses. The temporal variation in the effect of White identity suggests that political context and shifting party coalitions may play a role in shaping the meaning of Whiteness among Hispanics. This shift could be due to changes in Republican messaging, racial depolarization, or demographic changes within the Hispanic electorate. Ultimately, this finding highlights the limitations of treating White identity as a static

²⁶ Aggregating to no effect in Table 3.

construct for Hispanic political behavior and reinforces the argument that out-group attitudes—rather than in-group identification—are the more consistent predictors of Trump support.

Discussion & Conclusion

Out-group animus directly related to Hispanics’ propensity to support Donald Trump across multiple elections where he featured on the ballot. Conversely, the association between the prioritization of a White rather than a Hispanic identity and vote choice varied over time, from being positively associated with voting for Trump in 2018 to negatively associated by 2022. These findings speak to the power of out-group animus as a motivating force in modern U.S. politics, even beyond Anglo-Whites. Moreover, whereas existing research has considered the role of each of these out-group attitudes among Hispanics separately, we find that racial resentment, denial of racism, symbolic sexism, and xenophobia *all* contribute to support for Trump among Hispanics. This allows us a more comprehensive understanding of the constitutive elements that drive support for Trump among Hispanics. Consistent with other findings (Buyuker et al. 2021; Sommer and Franco 2024), xenophobia had the strongest connection to the decision by Hispanics to vote for Trump. However, unlike previous findings related to Hispanic support for Trump, we can show that this finding is robust to other out-group attitudes, as well. Our findings suggest that though Trump’s, often targeted, xenophobic rhetoric was not appealing to most Hispanic voters, he held particular appeal for an important minority with distinct beliefs about immigration.

We also show Hispanic voters’ attitudes about race—especially their views about Black Americans—further influenced their decision to support the former president. In particular, beliefs about the role of race in U.S. society strongly aligned with Hispanic voters’ willingness to vote for Donald Trump. Racial resentment, including the belief that Black Americans should work their way out of prejudice, was a further indicator of Trump support. These findings appear particularly troubling at a time when racial, especially anti-Black, attitudes have become increasingly salient in U.S. politics (Tesler 2016). Beliefs about women and the prevalence of gender discrimination were

further linked to likelihood of voting for Trump. Here, our findings suggest Trump’s macho appeals may have helped him garner further support from Hispanic voters (see also Medina 2020).

We found mixed results over time for Hispanic voters’ prioritization of a White identity and their propensity to vote for Donald Trump. Previous studies have also found mixed results, with studies of other groups such as those by Sides et al. (2018) and Jardina (2019) finding positive associations, but Buyuker et al. (2021) reporting null results for Hispanics when controlling for out-group measures. The more nuanced relationship here may also be connected to questions of ancestry and “ethnic attrition,” where, for example, a respondent may have a Latina grandmother but otherwise White lineage and therefore identify as White (Alba and Islam 2009; Duncan and Trejo 2011). Absent the out-group measures, White identity had a positive and statistically significant association with Trump support (see supplementary material), suggesting that self-categorization as “White” may be confounded by other measures. Though we do not specifically test this, previous studies suggest that self-categorization may be linked to distinguishing oneself from an out-group more than strictly identification with an in-group (Brewer 1999; Filindra and Kolbe 2022).

As mentioned above, self-categorization is a proxy for group identification, but it may also capture individuals who know that in the United States, Hispanic identity consists of a racial and ethnic component. Thus, our operationalization may be capturing both types of individuals. Self-categorization may not be the most precise way to measure White in-group favoritism among Hispanics. Although White in-group identity scales exist (Jardina 2019), it is unclear whether this scale would theoretically apply to ethnic Whites such as Hispanics or Middle Eastern and North African Americans; however, future research may find an adaptation of this scale could more accurately measure White in-group affinity among ethnic Whites such as Hispanics. Additionally, given the prevalence of colorism, and the desire to be proximate to Whiteness, future measures of White in-group identity may also seek to consider questions related to the role of colorism and self-perceptions (Ostfeld and Yadon 2022). Even with potential avenues for increasing precision in the measurement of White in-group identity among Hispanics, Filindra and Kolbe (2022) find, there is limited empirical connection between self-categorization as “White” and political attitudes among

Hispanics, and Cuevas-Molina (2023), we believe this is still an important identity-based consideration we need to test to understand Hispanics’ support for Trump.²⁷ Overall, however, our strongest and most consistent findings relate to out-group animus, and indeed, this is supported by the broader literature identifying the relationship between intergroup identities and support for Trump.

In many ways, our findings mirror the findings by Buyuker et al. (2021), with an important addition: like Anglo-Whites, Hispanic American support for Trump was largely driven by out-group animus. Like Anglo-Whites, xenophobia had the most consistent and largest substantive effect on support for Trump among all out-group covariates.²⁸ Despite the myriad ways that Hispanics differ politically from Anglo-Whites, this study takes seriously the possibility that drivers of support for Trump operate similarly among voters, regardless of their racial and ethnic group. When it comes to support for Trump, many of the drivers salient for Anglo-Whites were also salient for Hispanic Americans.

A crucial question for the near future of U.S. electoral politics is how the fastest-growing demographic group will align in terms of partisanship. The role and importance of Hispanic voters is growing both at a national level (Cruz and Romero 2023) and in current (e.g., Arizona, Nevada) and potential future (e.g., Texas) swing states. These findings prompt questions about Hispanic vote choices in other contexts (see Gomez 2024), where we might expect less importance on specific questions about immigration given the disproportionate focus on the topic by Trump. One limitation of these findings is our inability to determine causal effects as we lack the sufficient panel data to test individual-level responses to Trump’s rhetoric and actions. This approach would make for an interesting further study, though an alternative candidate may be needed given the high level of pre-existing knowledge about Trump’s views.

²⁷ The shifting relationship between White identity and Trump voting may also relate to how different groups responded to the COVID pandemic, changing economic conditions, or concerns about democracy following Trump’s refusal to concede and the events of January 6th.

²⁸ The only coefficient with a substantively larger relationship with voting for Trump than xenophobia was Republican partisan identification (see supplementary material).

The share of Hispanic Americans who voted for Trump increased from 2016 to 2020 (Igielnik et al. 2021) and initial data also suggest an further increase from 2020 to 2024 (Sanders 2024). We offer insights into the attitudes most associated with this support for Trump among this key demographic group, namely animus toward out-groups. While Trump and those close to him espouse vitriolic language toward a number of groups—including immigrants, Black Americans, and women—our findings suggest some Hispanic Americans may likely be *more* willing to support such candidates, meaning these findings are important for future elections regardless of whether Trump is on the ballot (Gomez 2024).

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Supplementary Material

Below we include additional descriptive information about our key variables, correlation coefficients, and further models with additional controls and separated by hypothesis.

Control Variables

We include several control variables that might predict the likelihood of voting for Trump for reasons other than in-group attachment or out-group animus. Most obviously, we include traditional controls for partisanship and ideology, with ‘Independent’ and ‘Moderate’²⁹ used as the respective reference categories (Abrajano and Alvarez 2011; Alvarez and Bedolla 2003; Collingwood, Barreto, and Garcia-Rios 2014; Segura 2012). Heterogeneity based on country of origin is also well documented, with, in particular, Hispanics of Cuban origin both more conservative and more politically aligned with the Republican Party (Alvarez and Bedolla 2003; Gouin 2021; Hill and Moreno 1996; Segura 2012). We therefore include country of origin as a further control.³⁰

We also control for respondents’ gender. Differences in the voting behavior and political views of Hispanic men and women are well documented, both generally (Bejarano 2013; Galbraith and Callister 2020; Monforti 2017; Montoya 1996) and in specific application to the ‘macho’ appeals of Trump (Garcia 2021; Medina 2020). Higher-income Hispanics are said to favor Republican candidates (Alvarez and Bedolla 2003) and hold less prejudiced attitudes (Carvacho et al. 2013), meaning we include income as a further control. Based on CES responses, this variable is coded as a factor variable of ‘low’, ‘middle’, and ‘high’ income (see also Alamillo 2019). We use middle-income as the reference category in our models. As with the population at large, education may be a further important determinant of vote choice and participation (Alvarez and Bedolla 2003; Arvizu and Garcia

²⁹ We recognize the burgeoning literature around this term (see e.g., Fowler et al. 2022) with moderates described as cross-pressured (Treier and Hillygus 2009), ideologically innocent (Kinder and Kalmoe 2017), or with preferences that are poorly captured by a single dimension (Broockman 2016). We do not seek to contribute to this literature but use ideology as a control to better isolate the effects of our key variables in question.

³⁰ In the CES, respondents can indicate many countries as their country of origin, meaning we do not factorize this variable or have any single reference category.

1996), meaning we control whether the respondent holds a college degree. We also include employment status and views on abortion as further controls.

Both age and the number of generations since a family migrated to the U.S. are important factors shaping the identities and attitudes of Hispanics (Bejarano 2014; Pew Research Center 2004). We therefore include age as a continuous variable, with a further factor variable based on the number of generations a respondent’s family has been in the country, with ‘third generation or more’ as our base category. Given that religion is an important determinant of Hispanic behavior (Morales, Rodriguez, and Schaller 2020), we also include controls for denomination and religiosity, scaled using respondents’ answers to the question “how religious are you?” in the CES.

Descriptives

Figure A.1 shows the distribution of racial resentment, the median is 0.11. As with the denial of racism scale, the modal response was to reject both statements. Twenty percent of the sample is at the negative end of the scale, indicating an acknowledgment of systemic racism. Roughly sixteen percent of the sample is scaled at the middle of the sample, likely because they “neither agree nor disagree” with both statements. More notably for our purposes here, fifteen percent of the sample are positioned at the highest end of the scale, these respondents can be said to reject arguments that systemic conditions make it more difficult for Black Americans to succeed in American society.

Figure A.1: Racial Resentment Distribution




Figure A.2: Denial of Racism Distribution




Figure A.3 shows the distribution of the xenophobia variable that serves as our key independent variable for hypothesis four.





Figure A.4 shows the distribution of the symbolic sexism variable that serves as the key independent variable for hypothesis five.



Correlation Coefficients

In Table A.1 we present the correlation coefficients of the key variables in our analysis. Given that our denial of racism and racial resentment variable correlate above 0.6 and several other variables correlate above 0.5, we present a series of robustness checks below where we test each of our out-group indicators independently. In all cases, our results remain substantively significant.

Table A.1: Correlation Coefficients

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Denial of Racism (1)	1				
Racial Resentment (2)	0.636	1			
Xenophobia (3)	0.581	0.569	1		
Symbolic Sexism (4)	0.437	0.490	0.427	1	
White ID (5)	0.102	0.081	0.089	0.039	1

Full Model with Controls

In Table A.2 we present our full model shown in Table 1 with the inclusion of all control variables.

Table A.2: Full Model with Controls

	Full Model
(Intercept)	-2.525*** (0.242)
DenialSc	0.581*** (0.058)
ImmSc	0.735*** (0.054)
SexismSc	0.270*** (0.054)
ResentmentSc	0.388*** (0.063)
PartyIDDemocrat	-2.218*** (0.109)
PartyIDRepublican	1.531*** (0.109)
IdeoLiberal	-0.623*** (0.123)
IdeoConservative	0.580*** (0.103)
GenderFemale	0.034 (0.094)
RaceWhite	-0.040 (0.115)
RaceBlack	-1.009*** (0.284)
RaceAsian	-0.485 (0.609)
RaceOther	0.629*** (0.175)
IncomeLow Income	0.019 (0.108)
IncomeHigh Income	0.180+ (0.107)
EducCollege degree	-0.076 (0.097)
ReligProtestant	0.222 (0.142)
ReligCatholic	-0.317* (0.126)
ReligSomething else	0.372* (0.169)
AborSc	0.432*** (0.053)
EmplStatusUnemployed	0.448** (0.160)
EmplStatusRetired or unable to work	-0.076

	(0.119)
EmplStatusHomemaker	0.063
	(0.178)
EmplStatusStudent	0.453*
	(0.200)
Religiosity	-0.041
	(0.050)
NationInc	0.278***
	(0.037)
HouseholdInc	0.208***
	(0.048)
Immstatus1st Gen	0.050
	(0.148)
Immstatus2nd Gen	-0.231+
	(0.119)
Immstatus3rd Gen	0.085
	(0.123)
Cuban	0.181
	(0.178)
South American	0.194
	(0.186)
Mexican	-0.057
	(0.101)
Puerto Rican	-0.097
	(0.134)
US American	-0.058
	(0.098)
Num.Obs.	10142
AIC	3652.0
BIC	3912.1
Log.Lik.	-1790.013
RMSE	0.25
+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001	

Robustness Checks

In the following, we demonstrate the robustness of our main model to several further checks. These extensions serve to demonstrate that our main results are not artifacts of our choices made to operationalize any variables.

In Table A.3 we present our results with the inclusion of Year Fixed Effects, using 2018 as the baseline.

Table A.3: Inclusion of Year Fixed Effects

	Year FE
(Intercept)	-3.379***
	(0.268)
DenialSc	0.546***
	(0.059)
ImmSc	0.700***
	(0.056)
SexismSc	0.291***
	(0.054)
ResentmentSc	0.348***
	(0.064)
PartyIDDemocrat	-2.189***
	(0.110)
PartyIDRepublican	1.570***

	(0.112)
IdeoLiberal	-0.715***
	(0.126)
IdeoConservative	0.547***
	(0.105)
GenderFemale	0.024
	(0.095)
RaceWhite	0.045
	(0.117)
RaceBlack	-0.963***
	(0.292)
RaceAsian	-0.517
	(0.608)
RaceOther	0.767***
	(0.178)
IncomeLow Income	0.074
	(0.111)
IncomeHigh Income	0.137
	(0.109)
EducCollege degree	-0.098
	(0.099)
ReligProtestant	0.217
	(0.144)
ReligCatholic	-0.353**
	(0.128)
ReligSomething else	0.344*
	(0.173)
AborSc	0.413***
	(0.054)
EmplStatusUnemployed	0.266
	(0.164)
EmplStatusRetired or unable to work	-0.058
	(0.120)
EmplStatusHomemaker	0.120
	(0.179)
EmplStatusStudent	0.338
	(0.206)
Religiosity	-0.031
	(0.051)
NationInc	0.512***
	(0.044)
HouseholdInc	0.147**
	(0.050)
Immstatus1st Gen	0.094
	(0.151)
Immstatus2nd Gen	-0.244*
	(0.121)
Immstatus3rd Gen	0.002
	(0.125)
Cuban	0.157
	(0.182)
South American	0.176
	(0.188)
Mexican	-0.107
	(0.102)
Puerto Rican	-0.119
	(0.137)
USUS American	0.028
	(0.099)
factor(Year)2020	1.059***
	(0.120)
factor(Year)2022	-0.184
	(0.117)
Num.Obs.	10142

AIC	3542.6
BIC	3817.1
Log.Lik.	-1733.280
RMSE	0.25
+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001	

In Table A.4 we present our results with the inclusion of State Fixed Effects

Table A.4: State Fixed Effects

	State FEs
(Intercept)	-2.493*** (0.246)
DenialSc	0.584*** (0.058)
ImmSc	0.739*** (0.054)
SexismSc	0.272*** (0.054)
ResentmentSc	0.387*** (0.063)
PartyIDDemocrat	-2.212*** (0.109)
PartyIDRepublican	1.541*** (0.110)
IdeoLiberal	-0.610*** (0.123)
IdeoConservative	0.592*** (0.104)
GenderFemale	0.031 (0.094)
RaceWhite	-0.039 (0.116)
RaceBlack	-1.026*** (0.287)
RaceAsian	-0.532 (0.611)
RaceOther	0.616*** (0.176)
IncomeLow Income	0.011 (0.108)
IncomeHigh Income	0.176 (0.108)
EducCollege degree	-0.072 (0.097)
ReligProtestant	0.212 (0.143)
ReligCatholic	-0.310* (0.126)
ReligSomething else	0.363* (0.170)
AborSc	0.432*** (0.053)
EmplStatusUnemployed	0.458** (0.160)
EmplStatusRetired or unable to work	-0.085 (0.119)
EmplStatusHomemaker	0.060 (0.178)
EmplStatusStudent	0.451* (0.201)
Religiosity	-0.037 (0.050)
NationInc	0.278***

	State FEs
	(0.037)
HouseholdInc	0.208***
	(0.048)
Immstatus1st Gen	0.084
	(0.149)
Immstatus2nd Gen	-0.225+
	(0.119)
Immstatus3rd Gen	0.090
	(0.124)
Cuban	0.209
	(0.184)
South American	0.188
	(0.186)
Mexican	-0.099
	(0.104)
Puerto Rican	-0.038
	(0.139)
US American	-0.069
	(0.098)
State FEs	✓
Num.Obs.	10142
AIC	3652.3
BIC	3941.3
Log.Lik.	-1786.147
RMSE	0.25

+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

In Table A.5 we include an additional control for time to account for temporal trends in our dependent variable and to provide a harder test of our hypotheses.

Table A.5: Additional Time Control

	Time Trend
(Intercept)	-2.470***
	(0.269)
DenialSc	0.582***
	(0.058)
ImmSc	0.741***
	(0.055)
SexismSc	0.269***
	(0.054)
ResentmentSc	0.387***
	(0.063)
PartyIDDemocrat	-2.218***
	(0.109)
PartyIDRepublican	1.533***
	(0.110)
IdeoLiberal	-0.625***
	(0.123)
IdeoConservative	0.576***
	(0.104)
GenderFemale	0.035
	(0.094)
RaceWhite	-0.040
	(0.115)
RaceBlack	-1.004***
	(0.284)
RaceAsian	-0.489
	(0.609)
RaceOther	0.636***
	(0.176)

IncomeLow Income	0.024 (0.108)
IncomeHigh Income	0.182+ (0.107)
EducCollege degree	-0.076 (0.097)
ReligProtestant	0.220 (0.142)
ReligCatholic	-0.317* (0.126)
ReligSomething else	0.376* (0.170)
AborSc	0.430*** (0.053)
EmplStatusUnemployed	0.449** (0.160)
EmplStatusRetired or unable to work	-0.075 (0.119)
EmplStatusHomemaker	0.065 (0.178)
EmplStatusStudent	0.452* (0.201)
Religiosity	-0.041 (0.050)
NationInc	0.281*** (0.037)
HouseholdInc	0.204*** (0.049)
Immstatus1st Gen	0.049 (0.148)
Immstatus2nd Gen	-0.234* (0.119)
Immstatus3rd Gen	0.084 (0.123)
Cuban	0.179 (0.178)
South American	0.197 (0.186)
Mexican	-0.055 (0.101)
Puerto Rican	-0.094 (0.135)
US American	-0.057 (0.098)
TimeTrend	-0.027 (0.057)
Num.Obs.	10142
AIC	3653.7
BIC	3921.0
Log.Lik.	-1789.836
RMSE	0.25

+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

In Table A.6 through Table A.10, we separately test each of our five hypotheses without the presence of the other key independent variables in the model. This demonstrates that our findings are not an artifact of the correlations shown above. These models all include all of the same control variables (not shown) as our main model.

Table A.6: White Identity Only

White Identity Model	
(Intercept)	-0.884*** (0.023)
RaceWhite	0.537*** (0.052)
RaceBlack	-0.507*** (0.146)
RaceAsian	0.188 (0.286)
RaceOther	0.254*** (0.072)
Num.Obs.	12209
AIC	14559.6
BIC	14596.7
Log.Lik.	-7274.824
RMSE	0.46
+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001	

Table A.7: Racial Resentment

Resentment Only	
(Intercept)	-2.623*** (0.224)
Resentment	0.924*** (0.051)
Num.Obs.	10504
AIC	4254.9
BIC	4494.4
Log.Lik.	-2094.431
RMSE	0.26
+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001	

Table A.8: Denial of Racism

Denial of Racism Only	
(Intercept)	-2.697*** (0.228)
Denial of Racism	0.952*** (0.049)
Num.Obs.	10290
AIC	4084.0
BIC	4322.9
Log.Lik.	-2009.004
RMSE	0.26
+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001	

Table A.9: Xenophobia

Xenophobia Only	
(Intercept)	-2.450*** (0.229)
Xenophobia	1.050*** (0.048)
Num.Obs.	10464
AIC	4039.5
BIC	4278.9
Log.Lik.	-1986.751
RMSE	0.26
+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001	

Table A.10: Sexism

Sexism Only	
(Intercept)	-2.759*** (0.221)
Sexism	0.572***

	(0.047)
Num.Obs.	10437
AIC	4403.8
BIC	4643.1
Log.Lik.	-2168.880
RMSE	0.27
+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001	

Table A.11 shows the model using the raw rather than scaled values of our variables to ensure that our findings are not an artifact of the scales we constructed.

Table A.11: Raw Values

	Raw Values
(Intercept)	-7.902*** (0.338)
Imm	0.522*** (0.038)
Denial	0.238*** (0.024)
Resentment	0.144*** (0.023)
Sexism	0.113*** (0.022)
PartyIDDemocrat	-2.218*** (0.109)
PartyIDRepublican	1.531*** (0.109)
IdeoLiberal	-0.623*** (0.123)
IdeoConservative	0.580*** (0.103)
GenderFemale	0.034 (0.094)
RaceWhite	-0.040 (0.115)
RaceBlack	-1.009*** (0.284)
RaceAsian	-0.485 (0.609)
RaceOther	0.629*** (0.175)
IncomeLow Income	0.019 (0.108)
IncomeHigh Income	0.180+ (0.107)
EducCollege degree	-0.076 (0.097)
ReligProtestant	0.222 (0.142)
ReligCatholic	-0.317* (0.126)
ReligSomething else	0.372* (0.169)
AborSc	0.432*** (0.053)
EmplStatusUnemployed	0.448** (0.160)
EmplStatusRetired or unable to work	-0.076 (0.119)
EmplStatusHomemaker	0.063

	(0.178)
EmplStatusStudent	0.453*
	(0.200)
Religiosity	-0.041
	(0.050)
NationInc	0.278***
	(0.037)
HouseholdInc	0.208***
	(0.048)
Immstatus1st Gen	0.050
	(0.148)
Immstatus2nd Gen	-0.231+
	(0.119)
Immstatus3rd Gen	0.085
	(0.123)
Cuban	0.181
	(0.178)
South American	0.194
	(0.186)
Mexican	-0.057
	(0.101)
Puerto Rican	-0.097
	(0.134)
US American	-0.058
	(0.098)
Num.Obs.	10142
AIC	3652.0
BIC	3912.1
Log.Lik.	-1790.013
RMSE	0.25
+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001	

Table A.12 shows our results with only the out-group measures and no controls.

Table A.12: Out-Group Measures (No Controls)

	Out-Group Measures (No Controls)
DenialSc	0.845***
	(0.038)
ImmSc	1.112***
	(0.035)
SexismSc	0.336***
	(0.035)
ResentmentSc	0.699***
	(0.042)
Num.Obs.	11764
AIC	7345.7
BIC	7382.6
Log.Lik.	-3667.860
RMSE	0.31
+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001	

Table A.13 shows our results for 2016. In 2016, the CES did not ask the sexism question or the racial resentment question, meaning we present our results absent these hypotheses. Our results are substantively unchanged.

Table A.13: 2016 Results

	Trump Vote
--	------------

White Identity (H₁)	0.031 (0.213)
Racial Resentment (H₂)	-
Denial of Racism (H₃)	1.009*** (0.102)
Xenophobia (H₄)	0.842*** (0.094)
Symbolic Sexism (H₅)	-
Observations	3483
AIC	1086.9
BIC	1296.2
Log. Likelihood	-509.451
RMSE	0.27

Coefficients are odds ratios with robust standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

In Table A.14 we present our results with the inclusion of Hispanics who did not vote or who could not recall if they voted in the previous presidential election. In this model these individuals are added to the “0” non-Trump voters, the “1” Trump voter category is unchanged.

Table A.14: Inclusion of Non-Voters

	Trump Vote 2016	Trump Vote 2020
White Identity (H₁)	-0.414*** (0.124)	0.341+ (0.191)
Racial Resentment (H₂)	-	0.110 (0.106)
Denial of Racism (H₃)	0.028 (0.055)	0.677*** (0.088)
Xenophobia (H₄)	-0.053 (0.055)	0.999*** (0.087)
Symbolic Sexism (H₅)	-	0.229** (0.076)
Observations	4000	3824
AIC	3143.4	1721.0
BIC	3357.4	1952.2
Log. Likelihood	-1537.682	-823.482
RMSE	0.45	0.25

+ $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

In Figure A.5 (2018), A.6 (2020), and A.7 (2022) we present the marginal effects of moving from one category of racial identification to another.

Figure A.5: Marginal Effects all Races (2018)




Figure A.6: Marginal Effects all Races (2020)





Figure A.7: Marginal Effects all Races (2022)***Controls-Only Model***

To demonstrate the need for the inclusion of our control variables, we produce a controls-only model without our key independent variables of our-group animus or in-group identity, the results are shown in Table A.15 below.

Table A.15: Controls Only Model

	Controls Only
(Intercept)	-2.592*** (0.213)
PartyIDDemocrat	-2.442*** (0.100)
PartyIDRepublican	1.691*** (0.097)
IdeoLiberal	-0.843*** (0.108)
IdeoConservative	0.860*** (0.092)
GenderFemale	-0.079 (0.082)
IncomeLow Income	-0.115 (0.097)
IncomeHigh Income	0.306** (0.095)
EducCollege degree	-0.170* (0.086)
ReligProtestant	0.125 (0.130)
ReligCatholic	-0.236* (0.113)
ReligSomething else	0.511*** (0.150)
AborSc	0.843***

	Controls Only
	(0.045)
EmplStatusUnemployed	0.548***
	(0.141)
EmplStatusRetired or unable to work	0.089
	(0.104)
EmplStatusHomemaker	-0.068
	(0.160)
EmplStatusStudent	-0.119
	(0.186)
Religiosity	-0.083+
	(0.045)
NationInc	0.426***
	(0.032)
HouseholdInc	0.261***
	(0.043)
Immstatus1st Gen	0.203
	(0.132)
Immstatus2nd Gen	-0.247*
	(0.106)
Immstatus3rd Gen	0.128
	(0.109)
CubanCuban	0.210
	(0.160)
SouthamericanSouth American	0.136
	(0.162)
MexicanMexican	-0.234**
	(0.088)
PuertoRicanPuerto Rican	-0.205+
	(0.121)
USUS American	0.095
	(0.086)
Num.Obs.	10151
AIC	4439.1
BIC	4641.5
Log.Lik.	-2191.574
RMSE	0.28
+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001	

Election Cycle Models

Below we present our full results for each election cycle with all controls. Table A.16 shows the full results for 2018, Table A.17 shows the results for 2020, and Table A.18 shows the results for 2022.

Table A.16: Election Cycle Model (2018)

	Trump Vote Share
DenialSc18	0.071
	(0.107)
ResentmentSc18	0.416***
	(0.118)
ImmSc18	0.905***
	(0.107)
SexismSc_18	0.550***
	(0.117)
Race18White	0.600**
	(0.207)
Num.Obs.	3275
AIC	1089.9
BIC	1315.3
Log.Lik.	-507.930
RMSE	0.26

	Trump Vote Share
+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001	

Table A.17: Election Cycle Model (2020)

	Trump Vote Share
DenialSc20	1.052*** (0.113)
ResentmentSc20	0.127 (0.127)
ImmSc20	0.917*** (0.108)
SexismSc_20	0.408*** (0.091)
Race20White	0.438+ (0.241)
Num.Obs.	3518
AIC	1178.1
BIC	1406.3
Log.Lik.	-552.071
RMSE	0.22
+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001	

Table A.18: Election Cycle Model (2022)

	Trump Vote Share
DenialSc22	0.677*** (0.125)
ResentmentSc22	0.334** (0.129)
ImmSc22	0.485*** (0.119)
SexismSc_22	0.121 (0.099)
Race22White	-0.542* (0.214)
Num.Obs.	3369
AIC	1103.1
BIC	1323.5
Log.Lik.	-515.566
RMSE	0.25
+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001	

Figure A.8: Marginal Effects Plot of Out-Group Indicators (2018)




Figure A.9: Marginal Effects Plot of Out-Group Indicators (2020)





Figure A.10: Marginal Effects Plot of Out-Group Indicators (2018)



Trump Approval

It may be problematic to rely on the survey question about who voters chose in a midterm election due to the potential for voters to provide an unreliable account of how they voted in previous elections, for examples due to buyers remorse or because they wanted to identify with the winning team. We therefore validate our 2018 findings using the Trump approval question (CC18_308a) in the 2018 CES (unfortunately no such question exists in 2022 as he was no longer the incumbent president). The answer to this question ranges from 1 - Strongly Approve, “2 - Somewhat Approve”, “3 - Somewhat Disapprove”, “4 - Strongly Disapprove” and “5 - Not Sure”. We drop the “Not Sure” category and run an ordered probit model

The results are presented in Table A.19. Interestingly, these results look more similar to our pooled results shown in Table 3 than our standalone 2018 results in Table A.16. One potential explanation of this is that CES respondents in 2018 did indeed misremember or misidentify who they voted for in 2016.

Table A.19: Trump Approval Model (2018)

Trump Approval

White Identity (H₁)	0.021 (0.075)
Racial Resentment (H₂)	0.180*** (0.040)
Denial of Racism (H₃)	0.332*** (0.038)
Xenophobia (H₄)	0.609*** (0.038)
Symbolic Sexism (H₅)	0.160*** (0.037)
Observations	3438
AIC	3733.0
BIC	3966.4
RMSE	2.12

Robust standard errors in parentheses

* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

Interaction Effects

We also recognize that our independent variables might be conditioned by other factors, in particular those relating to economic conditions given the literature on “economic anxiety” as a motivating factor for people voting for Trump. We therefore run a series of models interacting our out-group variables with a variable to capture economic status in society. We run these as a series of separate models rather than running all of the interaction effects in a single model that would lose more degrees of freedom. In short, we are attempting to understand whether our measures of out-group animus are conditioned by “economic anxiety”.

We first operationalize “economic anxiety” by measuring the interaction with a respondent’s perception of the national economy, captured in CES question CES_302: Would you say that OVER THE PAST YEAR the nation’s economy has ... gotten much better (1) or much worse (5). To consistently interpret this response, we invert the measure if a Republican held the presidency so that higher numbers represent a situation that might benefit the Republican Party. Therefore, in 2016 and 2022 we leave the measure as is, and in 2018 and 2020 we invert the scale. We present our interacted results for Racial Resentment in Table A.20, for Denial of Racism in Table A.21, for Xenophobia in A.22, and for Sexism in A.23. In some of these models (denial of racism, xenophobia) we observe that the effects of our IVs decreases as the perception of economic performance became more positive, potentially shedding further light on debates about the relative importance of economic or cultural factors in motivating Trump support among Hispanics.

Table A.20: National Economy x Racial Resentment

	Trump Vote
White Identity (H₁)	-0.039 (0.115)
Racial Resentment (H₂)	0.484*** (0.147)
Denial of Racism (H₃)	0.581*** (0.058)
Xenophobia (H₄)	0.736*** (0.054)
Symbolic Sexism (H₅)	0.270*** (0.054)
National Economy	0.288*** (0.039)
Racial Resentment x National Economy	-0.030 (0.041)
Observations	10142
AIC	3654.0
BIC	3921.3
Log Likelihood	-1790.008
RMSE	0.25

Coefficients are odds ratios with robust standard errors in parentheses

* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

Table A.21: National Economy x Denial of Racism

	Trump Vote
White Identity (H₁)	-0.038 (0.115)
Racial Resentment (H₂)	0.388*** (0.063)
Denial of Racism (H₃)	0.851*** (0.136)
Xenophobia (H₄)	0.739*** (0.054)
Symbolic Sexism (H₅)	0.266*** (0.054)
National Economy	0.304*** (0.039)
Denial of Racism x National Economy	-0.084* (0.038)
Observations	10142
AIC	3650.2
BIC	3917.5
Log Likelihood	-1788.111
RMSE	0.25

Coefficients are odds ratios with robust standard errors in parentheses

* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

Table A.22: National Economy x Xenophobia

	Trump Vote
White Identity (H₁)	-0.044 (0.115)
Racial Resentment (H₂)	0.388*** (0.063)
Denial of Racism (H₃)	0.590*** (0.058)
Xenophobia (H₄)	1.080***

	(0.135)
Symbolic Sexism (H₅)	0.272***
	(0.054)
National Economy	0.321***
	(0.040)
Xenophobia x National Economy	-0.107**
	(0.038)
Observations	10142
AIC	3646.4
BIC	3913.7
Log Likelihood	-1786.221
RMSE	0.25
Coefficients are odds ratios with robust standard errors in parentheses	
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001	

Table A.23: National Economy x Sexism

	Trump Vote
White Identity (H₁)	-0.044
	(0.115)
Racial Resentment (H₂)	0.390***
	(0.063)
Denial of Racism (H₃)	0.579***
	(0.058)
Xenophobia (H₄)	0.737***
	(0.054)
Symbolic Sexism (H₅)	0.460***
	(0.127)
National Economy	0.303***
	(0.040)
Sexism x National Economy	-0.060+
	(0.036)
Observations	10142
AIC	3651.1
BIC	3918.4
Log Likelihood	-1788.571
RMSE	0.25
Coefficients are odds ratios with robust standard errors in parentheses	
+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001	

We next operationalize economic anxiety using perception of household income using question CES_303: “OVER THE PAST YEAR, has your household's annual income...?” Increased a lot (1), increased somewhat (2), stayed about the same (3), decreased somewhat (4), decreased a lot (5). We present our interacted results for Racial Resentment in Table A.24, for Denial of Racism in Table A.25, for Xenophobia in A.26, and for Sexism in A.27. In these models, we find no relationship between our IVs and absolute values of household income.

Table A.24: National Economy x Racial Resentment

	Trump Vote
White Identity (H₁)	-0.040
	(0.115)
Racial Resentment (H₂)	0.370*

	(0.182)
Denial of Racism (H₃)	0.581***
	(0.058)
Xenophobia (H₄)	0.735***
	(0.054)
Symbolic Sexism (H₅)	0.270***
	(0.054)
Household Income	0.207***
	(0.051)
Racial Resentment x Household Income	0.006
	(0.055)
Observations	10142
AIC	3654.0
BIC	3921.3
Log Likelihood	-1789.983
RMSE	0.25

Coefficients are odds ratios with robust standard errors in parentheses

* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

Table A.25: Household Income x Denial of Racism

	Trump Vote
White Identity (H₁)	-0.039
	(0.115)
Racial Resentment (H₂)	0.388***
	(0.063)
Denial of Racism (H₃)	0.510**
	(0.171)
Xenophobia (H₄)	0.735***
	(0.054)
Symbolic Sexism (H₅)	0.271***
	(0.054)
Household Income	0.202***
	(0.050)
Denial of Racism x Household Income	0.023
	(0.052)
Observations	10142
AIC	3653.4
BIC	3920.7
Log Likelihood	-1789.700
RMSE	0.25

Coefficients are odds ratios with robust standard errors in parentheses

* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

Table A.26: Household Income x Xenophobia

	Trump Vote
White Identity (H₁)	-0.047
	(0.115)
Racial Resentment (H₂)	0.386***
	(0.063)
Denial of Racism (H₃)	0.581***
	(0.058)
Xenophobia (H₄)	0.549***
	(0.154)
Symbolic Sexism (H₅)	0.272***
	(0.054)
Household Income	0.184***
	(0.051)
Xenophobia x Household Income	0.061
	(0.047)

Observations	10142
AIC	3653.4
BIC	3920.7
Log Likelihood	-1789.715
RMSE	0.25

Coefficients are odds ratios with robust standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table A.27: Household Income x Sexism

	Trump Vote
White Identity (H_1)	-0.036 (0.115)
Racial Resentment (H_2)	0.391*** (0.063)
Denial of Racism (H_3)	0.581*** (0.058)
Xenophobia (H_4)	0.736*** (0.054)
Symbolic Sexism (H_5)	0.535*** (0.159)
Household Income	0.251*** (0.054)
Sexism x Household Income	-0.084+ (0.048)
Observations	10142
AIC	3649.2
BIC	3916.5
Log Likelihood	-1787.619
RMSE	0.25

Coefficients are odds ratios with robust standard errors in parentheses

+ $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Given research showing important differences between male and female voters in how our independent variables might function, we also interact our out-group variables with respondent gender, where the gender variable takes the value 1 if the respondent is female. We present our interacted results for Racial Resentment in Table A.28, for Denial of Racism in Table A.29, for Xenophobia in A.30, and for Sexism in A.31. We report null results in all models except the sexism model where we show that women are slightly ($p < 0.1$) more likely to vote for Trump across all levels of sexism, but that women are comparatively (versus men) less likely to vote for Trump at higher levels of sexism. Put simply, the sexism variable appears a better explanation of male respondents' likelihood of voting for Trump.

Table A.28: Gender x Racial Resentment

	Trump Vote
White Identity (H_1)	-0.034 (0.115)

Racial Resentment (H₂)	0.458*** (0.082)
Denial of Racism (H₃)	0.579*** (0.058)
Xenophobia (H₄)	0.734*** (0.054)
Symbolic Sexism (H₅)	0.270*** (0.054)
Gender (Female)	0.081 (0.100)
Racial Resentment x Gender (Female)	-0.147 (0.111)
Observations	10142
AIC	3651.3
BIC	3918.6
Log Likelihood	-1788.673
RMSE	0.25

Coefficients are odds ratios with robust standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

Table A.29: Gender x Denial of Racism

	Trump Vote
White Identity (H₁)	-0.037 (0.115)
Racial Resentment (H₂)	0.386*** (0.063)
Denial of Racism (H₃)	0.636*** (0.074)
Xenophobia (H₄)	0.734*** (0.054)
Symbolic Sexism (H₅)	0.273*** (0.054)
Gender (Female)	0.065 (0.097)
Denial of Racism x Gender (Female)	-0.123 (0.104)
Observations	10142
AIC	3651.8
BIC	3919.1
Log Likelihood	-1788.901
RMSE	0.25

Coefficients are odds ratios with robust standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

Table A.30: Gender x Xenophobia

	Trump Vote
White Identity (H₁)	-0.039 (0.115)
Racial Resentment (H₂)	0.387*** (0.063)
Denial of Racism (H₃)	0.580*** (0.058)
Xenophobia (H₄)	0.765*** (0.070)
Symbolic Sexism (H₅)	0.271*** (0.054)
Gender (Female)	0.054 (0.099)
Xenophobia x Gender (Female)	-0.065

	(0.098)
Observations	10142
AIC	3653.8
BIC	3921.1
Log Likelihood	-1789.901
RMSE	0.25
Coefficients are odds ratios with robust standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001	

Table A.31: Gender x Sexism

	Trump Vote
White Identity (H₁)	-0.039 (0.115)
Racial Resentment (H₂)	0.378*** (0.063)
Denial of Racism (H₃)	0.590*** (0.058)
Xenophobia (H₄)	0.737*** (0.054)
Symbolic Sexism (H₅)	0.462*** (0.073)
Gender (Female)	0.184+ (0.101)
Sexism x Gender (Female)	-0.401*** (0.102)
Observations	10142
AIC	3636.7
BIC	3904.0
Log Likelihood	-1781.331
RMSE	0.25
Coefficients are odds ratios with robust standard errors in parentheses + p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001	

Combined Out-Group Measure

In the factor analyses below, we demonstrate that our four measures of out-group animus load onto a single factor. In Table A.32, we present the results using a combined measure of out-group animus. As expected, this variable significantly predicts Trump voting. In this model White identity remains non-significant.

Table A.32: Combined Out-Group Animus Measure

	Trump Vote
White Identity	-0.051 (0.114)
Out-Group Animus	1.767*** (0.073)
Observations	10,142
AIC	3688.4
BIC	3926.8
Log Likelihood	-1811.177
RMSE	0.25

We also show the significant marginal effects of this combined measure out-group animus on the likelihood of voting for Trump in Figure A.11. Broken down by electoral cycle, as shown in Figure A.12, we see that this effect is highly stable over time.

Figure A.11: Marginal Effects of Combined Out-Group Measure





Figure A.12: Marginal Effects of Combined Out-Group Measure by Year



Ridge Regression

Given the correlation between several of our independent variables (see Table A.1), we run a ridge regression which serves as an additional robustness check for our main analysis. Ridge regression is a regularization technique used when a dataset has multicollinearity between independent variables.

Ridge regression introduces a penalty term to the loss function, reducing the magnitude of coefficients and stabilizing the estimates. The penalty term, controlled by the hyperparameter λ , is added to the sum of squared residuals and takes the form of the L2 norm (sum of squared coefficients). This prevents overfitting by shrinking coefficients toward zero, testing whether all variables contribute to the model.

We use cross-validation to determine the optimal λ value rather than manually selecting it. By identifying λ in this way, we ensure that the penalty applied was neither too large (which would excessively shrink coefficients and underfit the data) nor too small (which would leave multicollinearity issues unresolved). Ridge regression therefore provides an alternative estimate that serves as an effective check for the potential multicollinearity issues in our main results, preserving information from correlated variables while preventing over-reliance on any single predictor.

In our implementation, we extract ridge regression coefficients at the optimal λ (0.03) and then, as in the main paper, use logistic regression to approximate standard errors and p-values. These results are shown in Table A.33. As discussed above, the coefficients in this model are substantially reduced by introducing a penalty term to the loss function. As shown in Table A.33 and in line with the results presented in the main paper, each of our out-group measures is statistically significant in the ridge regression whereas the white identity variable is not.

Table A.33: Ridge Regression Results

Variable	Coefficient	Standard Error	P-Value
White Identity (\mathbf{H}_1)	0.148160581148363168502	0.104	0.137
Racial Resentment (\mathbf{H}_2)	0.000000000000003890802	0.000	0.000
Denial of Racism (\mathbf{H}_3)	0.000000000000005113706	0.000	0.000
Xenophobia (\mathbf{H}_4)	0.000000000000006264864	0.000	0.000
Symbolic Sexism (\mathbf{H}_5)	0.000000000000002675920	0.000	0.000

Advanced Descriptives

To give a better sense of who the people in the CES are, we present a more detailed descriptive breakdown of our data in Table A.34. Here, we show the values of each of our key variables by year and over whether they voted for Trump or someone else.

Table A.34: Advanced Descriptives

Variable	Value	2018		2020		2022	
		Trump	Non-Trump	Trump	Non-Trump	Trump	Non-Trump
Denial of Racism	2	40	914	29	1071	37	833
	3	50	481	32	4991	50	444
	4	112	351	94	383	92	401
	5	124	169	110	151	127	203
	6	195	226	168	190	198	211
	7	147	74	155	63	146	79
	8	122	41	156	31	161	25
	9	96	34	144	11	132	17
	10	86	13	224	15	179	14
Racial Resentment	2	13	464	12	708	11	571
	3	15	260	8	337	9	244
	4	19	308	20	324	29	318
	5	35	290	42	258	59	254
	6	152	432	146	368	180	401
	7	120	185	104	142	122	178
	8	147	144	170	127	153	119
	9	156	98	172	45	150	61
	10	315	122	438	97	409	81
Xenophobia	4	62	1518	39	1248	31	859
	5	95	411	101	676	103	704
	6	159	189	200	265	240	375
	7	358	126	381	171	379	236
	8	298	59	391	46	369	53
Sexism	2	8	365	49	786	58	711
	3	13	223	37	297	30	232
	4	31	384	93	367	89	332
	5	83	344	111	271	113	242
	6	204	505	215	304	221	303
	7	145	213	203	166	178	168
	8	187	152	174	112	180	124
	9	135	63	121	62	120	70
	10	166	54	109	41	133	45
PartyID	Other	272	580	369	620	374	551
	Democrat	73	1587	57	1704	71	1585
	Rep	627	136	686	82	677	91
Ideo	Moderate	263	855	370	906	359	886
	Liberal	63	1199	65	1309	58	1185
	Conservative	646	249	677	191	705	156
Gender	Male	512	879	540	944	562	866
	Female	460	1424	572	1462	560	1361
Race	Hispanic/Latino	619	1678	815	1847	741	1610
	White	253	348	205	313	251	330
	Black	15	57	16	73	16	79
	Asian	9	15	10	14	8	9
	Other	76	205	66	159	106	199
Income	Middle Income	447	1076	455	1109	479	937
	Low Income	114	468	174	491	218	565
	High Income	411	759	483	806	425	725
Education	No college degree	388	899	468	1008	577	1105
	College degree	584	1404	644	1398	545	1122
Religion	Not religious	173	806	190	927	246	882
	Protestant	332	379	334	331	322	285
	Catholic	401	952	457	923	417	861
	Something else	66	166	131	225	137	199
Abortion	5	47	826	61	1050	72	1107
	6	96	660	97	621	116	540
	7	114	336	146	336	157	258
	8	189	223	214	178	200	146
	9	353	184	401	175	402	143
	10	173	74	193	46	175	33
Employment Status	Employed	649	1585	645	1362	653	1288
	Unemployed	33	124	102	267	75	183
	Retired or unable to work	185	329	260	501	294	506
	Homemaker	85	167	83	176	79	168
	Student	20	98	22	100	21	82
Religiosity	1	102	616	101	738	135	693
	2	109	401	119	403	126	365
	3	285	652	341	613	311	593
	4	476	634	551	652	550	576
Perception of national income	1	11	261	149	1424	17	116
	2	27	599	297	683	34	406
	3	113	905	128	172	55	391
	4	347	449	260	91	187	845
	5	474	89	278	36	829	469
Perception of household income	1	13	137	69	325	23	115
	2	47	359	123	596	142	539
	3	320	1147	494	1169	475	1066
	4	445	553	313	266	286	348
	5	147	107	113	50	196	159
Immigration background	4th Gen or higher	290	660	322	723	357	622

	1st Gen	172	314	210	332	162	320
	2nd Gen+	257	797	289	760	310	744
	3rd Gen	253	532	291	591	293	541
US American	Not US	575	1405	739	1626	656	1348
	US	397	898	373	780	466	879
South American	No	908	2113	1019	2210	1043	2039
	Yes	64	190	93	196	79	188

Factor Analyses

Below we present the results of a factor analysis on our different out-group animus measures. The exploratory factor analysis identifies that our racial resentment, denial of racism, xenophobia, and sexism all load onto a single factor which we label “out-group animus”. In Table A.35, we present the Eigenvalues of our exploratory factor analysis. In Table A.36 we present the factor loadings, unique variances of our variables on that factor, and squared multiple correlations (SMC) of variables with all other variables. Of these measures, we see that sexism is the most distinct but still loads on to the single out-group animus factor.

Table A.35: Out-Group Factor Analysis

Factor	Eigenvalue	Difference	Proportion	Cumulative
Factor1	2.01410	2.07054	1.1953	1.1953
Factor2	-0.05644	0.05599	-0.0335	1.1618
Factor3	-0.11243	0.04784	-0.0667	1.0951
Factor4	-0.16027	-	-0.0951	1.0000

Obs = 10,142; Retained Factors = 1; Number of Parameters = 4

Table A.36: Out-Group Factor Loadings & SMC

Variable	Factor1	Uniqueness	SMC
Denial of Racism	0.7577	0.4259	0.4845
Xenophobia	0.7079	0.4989	0.4185
Racial Resentment	0.7725	0.4032	0.4980
Sexism	0.5849	0.6579	0.2839

We also perform a factor analysis of the components of the xenophobia variable to ensure they meaningfully align on a single factor. As a reminder, the components of the xenophobia/immigration composite measure are: **Imm1** Grant legal status to all illegal immigrants who have held jobs and paid taxes for at least 3 years, and not been convicted of any felony crimes, **Imm2** Increase the number of border patrols on the US-Mexican border, **Imm3** Reduce legal immigration by 50 percent over the next 10 years by eliminating the visa lottery and ending family-based migration, and **Imm4** Increase spending on border security by \$25 billion, including building a wall between the U.S. and Mexico. As above we present the results of our factor analysis in Table

A.37 and the factor loadings and SMC in Table A.38. As in the previous results, the components clearly load onto a single factor which we label xenophobia, with Imm1 being the most unique.

Table A.37: Immigration Factor Analysis

Factor	Eigenvalue	Difference	Proportion	Cumulative
Factor1	1.70730	1.77655	1.2613	1.2613
Factor2	-0.06929	0.03636	-0.0512	1.2101
Factor3	-0.10561	0.07316	-0.0780	1.1321
Factor4	-0.17878	-	-0.1321	1.0000

Table A.38: Immigration Factor Loadings & SMC

Variable	Factor1	Uniqueness	SMC
Imm1	0.5178	0.7318	0.2077
Imm2	0.6748	0.5447	0.3653
Imm3	0.6472	0.5811	0.3328
Imm4	0.7516	0.4351	0.4478

We also test whether the individual items load highly on that factor, presenting the results in Table A.39. As shown, all of these items load above 0.5, with most items loading above 0.6.

Table A.39: Individual Items Factor Loadings

Variable	Factor1
Resentment1	0.774
Resentment2	0.732
Denial1	0.692
Denial2	0.736
Sexism1	0.550
Sexism2	0.645
Imm1	0.597
Imm2	0.517
Imm3	0.581
Imm4	0.729
Loadings	4.366
Proportion	0.437

To test how our measure of White identity relates to the other four items, we also present the results of a factor analysis with the four out-group measures and a dummy variable for if the respondent identifies as White. As shown in Table A.40 and Table A.41, White identity is clearly distinct from the out-group measures that we use and loads poorly onto one factor.

Table A.40: Out-Group and White Identity Factor Analysis

Factor	Eigenvalue	Difference	Proportion	Cumulative
Factor1	2.02717	2.01211	1.1928	1.1928
Factor2	0.01507	0.08631	0.0089	1.2017
Factor3	-0.07125	0.04062	-0.0419	1.1598
Factor4	-0.11187	0.04780	-0.0658	1.0940
Factor5	-0.15967	-	-0.0940	1.0000

Table A.41: Out-Group Measures and White Identity Factor Loadings & SMC

Variable	Factor1	Uniqueness	SMC
----------	---------	------------	-----

Denial of Racism	0.7590	0.4235	0.4859
Xenophobia	0.7085	0.4979	0.4192
Racial Resentment	0.7721	0.4037	0.4981
Sexism	0.5835	0.6574	0.2842
White Identity	0.1115	0.9753	0.0121



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Hispanic/Latino Support for Trump: White Identity or Out-Group Animus? (#152895)

Created: 11/28/2023 12:58 PM (PT)

This is an anonymized copy (without author names) of the pre-registration. It was created by the author(s) to use during peer-review.
A non-anonymized version (containing author names) should be made available by the authors when the work it supports is made public.

1) Have any data been collected for this study already?

It's complicated. We have already collected some data but explain in Question 8 why readers may consider this a valid pre-registration nevertheless.

2) What's the main question being asked or hypothesis being tested in this study?

Research question: What factors are associated with Latino Americans voting for Trump?

H_1: Latino Americans who hold more negative views about outgroups are more likely to have voted for Trump relative to Latino Americans who hold less-negative views about outgroups, holding all else constant.

H_1a: Latino Americans who are more racially resentful are more likely to have voted for Trump relative to Latino Americans who are less racially resentful, holding all else constant.

H_1b: Latino Americans who deny racism exists are more likely to have voted for Trump relative to Latino Americans who score lower in their denial of racism, holding all else constant.

H_1c: Latino Americans who support more restrictive immigration policies (proxy for xenophobia) are more likely to have voted for Trump relative to Latino Americans who support less restrictive immigration policies, holding all else constant.

H_1d: Latino Americans who hold more symbolic sexist views are more likely to have voted for Trump relative to Latino Americans who hold less symbolic sexist views, holding all else constant.

H_2: Latino Americans who self-classify as White are more likely to have voted for Trump relative to Latino Americans who do not self-classify as White, holding all else constant.

3) Describe the key dependent variable(s) specifying how they will be measured.

We will use vote choice for Trump in the 2016 and 2020 elections. These questions are asked in 2016, 2018, 2020, and 2022. In 2016 and 2020, we construct this variable from the answer to the question "For whom did you vote for President of the United States?" in the post-election waves. In 2018 and 2022, we use the answer to question "Who did you vote for in the election for President in 2016/2020?" in the pre-election surveys to construct this variable. In each case our dependent variable is dichotomous, taking the value "1" when the respondent indicated that they voted for Trump and "0" when they voted for any other candidate. We do not include respondents who did not vote in the previous presidential election.

4) How many and which conditions will participants be assigned to?

The data are from the Cooperative Election Study (CES; formerly the Cooperative Congressional Election Study). All participants are assigned to answer certain questions which are publicly available. These questions are referred to as "Common Content." Participants were also randomly assigned to receive questions from different modules. The general public only has access to the common content questions, which are the questions we are using for these analyses. There is no random assignment involved as these data are observational.

5) Specify exactly which analyses you will conduct to examine the main question/hypothesis.

Given that our dependent variable in all cases is dichotomous and we expect the relationship to be linearly related to the log odds of our independent variables, we use binary logistic regression. Given that our data are not structured as panel data, with different individuals asked each year, our observations are independent from one another. We will test our independent variables for multicollinearity and present the correlation coefficients of our different independent variables in our study. We will also present the descriptive statistics including means, standard deviations, and max/min values. Our sample (see 7 below) is large enough to support this approach.

☒ To do this, we will scale and standardize each of our independent variables so they have a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one. All measures will be coded such that higher values represent a higher expression of the trait (denial of racism, racial resentment, xenophobia, sexism, White identity). This approach makes a relative comparison of our findings easier to interpret.

6) Describe exactly how outliers will be defined and handled, and your precise rule(s) for excluding observations.

Because the 2016 CES does not include racial resentment or symbolic sexism, we will include our analyses of 2016 in the appendix.

☒ We will not need to exclude any respondents as outliers given that all responses will be scaled and standardized, and that all respondents' raw answers are already provided in the form of a Likert scale.

7) How many observations will be collected or what will determine sample size? No need to justify decision, but be precise about exactly how the number will be determined.

We only include respondents to the CES who voted in the most recent presidential election. In presidential election years (2016 and 2020), this is indicated by the answer to the post-election survey question "For whom did you vote for President of the United States?" where respondents who answered "Hillary

Clinton/ Joe Biden", "Donald J. Trump", or "Other" were included and respondents who answered "I did not vote in this race", "I did not vote", or "Not Sure" were excluded. In midterm elections (2018 and 2022), we restrict inclusion based on the answer to the question "In the election for U.S. President, who did you vote for?", where respondents who answered "Donald Trump", "Hillary Clinton/Joe Biden", or "Someone Else" were included. Respondents who answer "I did not cast a vote for president" or "I don't recall" were excluded.

We also restrict inclusion into our sample to Hispanics and Latinos. Between 2016 and 2022, the CES asks the question "what racial or ethnic group best describes you?" [race]. We include all respondents who identify as Hispanic or Latino in respond to this question. In addition, the CES asks "are you of Spanish, Latino, or Hispanic origin or descent?" [hispanic]. We include all respondents who answered in the affirmative to the [hispanic] question. Any respondents who failed to answer any of these questions were excluded from our data. In total 18,800 respondents met the above criteria of having voted in the most recent presidential election and can be classed as Hispanic or Latino. The yearly breakdown of these 18,800 voters is as follows: 2016-4,231; 2018-4,459; 2020-4,260; 2022-5,850. The total number of observations used in our main analyses will be slightly less than this figure once we account for missing data in our independent or control variables.

8) Anything else you would like to pre-register? (e.g., secondary analyses, variables collected for exploratory purposes, unusual analyses planned?)

As we are using observational data from the CES, the data are already collected. However, we have not done analyses using our variables and hypotheses. We are preregistering our hypotheses and the analyses we intend on using to assuage concerns of p-hacking with observational data. For this reason, this is still a valid pre-registration.

☐ We will also include a series of robustness tests in the supplementary material. These will include: adding a year fixed effects control to account for variation in Trump support in individual years, adding a time constant control to account for temporal trends in our dependent variable and providing a harder test of our hypotheses, independently testing each of our sub-hypotheses in separate models, running our models on the raw values of our independent variables to demonstrate that findings are not an artifact of our data generation process, running our models without any controls to demonstrate that our findings are not the result of the introduction of other factors, inclusion of state fixed effects and census region fixed effects (Northeast, Midwest, South, West) to account for geographic (spatial) variation in Trump support. We expect our main results to hold under all of these conditions, though they may decrease in substantive size and significance without the necessary controls.